प्रधानमन्त्री चयनको संवैधानिक अप्ठ्यारो - डा. विपिन अधिकारी

त्यसैले अब के उपाय बाँकी छ त ? भन्ने प्रश्न स्वाभाविक रूपमा उपस्थित हुन्छ । प्रस्ट रूपमा भन्दा बारम्बार चुनाव गराएरै किनबेच र भाँडभैलोलगायतको प्रक्रियाबाट बहुमतको सरकार उपस्थित गराउनुको वैधानिक विकल्प यो संविधानमा छैन । यसलाई कि त सन् १७९९ को स्वघोषित दामोदर पाण्डेले झैँ कोही अरूले आफूलाई प्रधानमन्त्रीमा स्थापित गरेर टुंग्याउन सम्भव छ या अब फेरि अर्को सर्वसम्मतिको नाममा कानुनी राजको मर्दन गर्दै तथा आमनिर्वाचनको वैधतालाई चुनौती दिँदै अर्को प्रक्रियाको सिर्जना गरिनेछ । यी तीनै प्रक्रियाहरू अवैधानिक नै हुनेछन् । एउटा दोषपूर्ण संविधान क्रान्ति गरेर आवोस् वा जनआन्दोलनबाट त्यो दोषपूर्ण नै हुन्छ । अहिलेको टड्कारो प्रश्न हो- वर्तमान अवस्थाको जिम्मेवारी कसले लिने ?

http://www.ekantipur.com/np/2067/4/21/full-news/315776/

चिनियाँहरूमाझ एउटा उखान छ, 'अगाडिको बाटो कस्तो छ भनेर जान्न त्यही बाटो फर्किँदै गरेकालाई सोध्नुपर्छ- सहयात्रीलाई होइन ।' यसको आशय के हो भने अनुभवलाई जहिले पनि महत्त्व दिनुपर्छ ।

व्यवस्थापिका संसद्भित्र प्रधानमन्त्रीको चयनका लागि साउन १७ गतेको तेस्रो प्रयत्न पनि विफल भयो । अब चौथो प्रयत्न आज हुँदै छ । चैत २०६४ मा भएको आमनिर्वाचन तथा त्यसले विभिन्न राजनीतिक दलहरूलाई दिएको जनादेश व्यवस्थापिका संसद्मा ताजै छ । कसको हैसियत कति हो भन्ने कुरामा कुनै विवाद छैन । सरकार बनाउन पहिले कसको हक लाग्छ । अनि त्यसपछि कसको दोस्रो पालो हो, बुझ्न नसकिने स्थिति छैन । तर त्यो हैसियतलाई स्वीकार गर्दै प्रधानमन्त्री नियुक्त गरिदिने जिम्मेवारी अन्तरिम संविधान, २०६३ अन्तर्गत राष्ट्राध्यक्षलाई प्राप्त छैन । वर्तमान समस्याको चुरो यहाँबाट सुरु हुन्छ ।

नेपालको इतिहासले दामोदर पाण्डेलाई पहिलो प्रधानमन्त्रीको रूपमा देखाउँछ । उनी सन् १७९९ देखि १८०४ सम्म मुलुकका प्रधानमन्त्री भए । त्यो हिसाबले वर्तमान प्रधानमन्त्री माधवकुमार नेपाल यो देशको ५८ औँ प्रधानमन्त्री हुन् । तर दामोदर पाण्डेलाई कसैले नियुक्तिपत्र दिएको थिएन । न त शपथग्रहण नै गराएको थियो । प्रधानमन्त्रीको पद पाण्डे आफैंले आफ्ना लागि छाने । उनलाई लाग्यो- राजा रणबहादुर शाह गद्दी त्याग गरी विदेश गइसकेको तथा उनीसँगै त्यसबेलाका शक्तिशाली व्यक्तिहरू भीमसेन थापा, दलभञ्जन पाण्डे तथा महारानी राजराजेश्वरी पनि उतै लागेकीले देश चलाउने कोही भएन । हुन पनि डेढ वर्षका युवराज गीर्वाणयुद्धले बाबुको बिँडो थाम्न सक्ने कुरै भएन । दामोदर पाण्डे मुठ्ठी कसेर देशको प्रधानमन्त्री भए ।

समयसँगै प्रधानमन्त्रीको पद मुलुकको कार्यकारिणी संरचनामा एउटा महत्त्वपूर्ण पदका रूपमा स्थापित हुँदै गयो । त्यसबेलादेखि नै प्रधानमन्त्रीको चयन स्वेच्छाले होस् वा दबाबले - राजाबाटै हुँदै आएको हो । सन् १९५९ अर्थात् प्रधानमन्त्री दामोदर पाण्डेको हत्याको १ सय ५५ वर्षपछि वयस्क मताधिकार तथा राष्ट्रव्यापी बहुदलीय आमनिर्वाचनका आधारमा नेपाली कांगे्रसका नेता विश्वेश्वरप्रसाद कोइराला तत्कालीन राजा महेन्द्रबाट प्रधानमन्त्रीमा नियुक्त भएका थिए । दुई तिहाइ बहुमत प्राप्त उनको नेतृत्वको संसदीय दल उनको हैसियतको प्रतीक थियो । त्यो हैसियतलाई राजाले संविधानबमोजिम स्वीकार गरेका थिए ।

बेलायती नमुनाको संसदीय प्रणालीलाई प्रयोग गर्ने सबै मुलुकमा प्रधानमन्त्रीको नियुक्ति राष्ट्राध्यक्षबाट हुने गर्छ । चुनाव जितेर संसद्मा आइसकेपछि प्रधानमन्त्रीको दाबेदार कुनै पनि सांसदले संसद्भित्र पुनः निर्वाचन खप्नु पर्दैन । प्रधानमन्त्री नियुक्ति हुन उसको नेतृत्वको हैसियत उसलाई संसद्भित्र आफ्नो संसदीय दलको बहुमतले दिएको हुन्छ । त्यस हैसियतको परीक्षण आमनिर्वाचनमा भइसकेको हुन्छ । त्यसको सत्यताका बारेमा राष्ट्राध्यक्षलाई विश्वास दिलाउनु उसका लागि प्रधानमन्त्री बन्न सबैभन्दा ठूलो वैधानिक आधार हो । जसको दलले आमनिर्वाचनमा आफ्नो दलको सबैभन्दा ठूलो हैसियत देखाउन सक्दैन, उसले राष्ट्राध्यक्षलाई म मुलुकको प्रधानमन्त्रीको सही हकदार हुँ भन्ने कुराका बारेमा विश्वास दिलाउन पनि सक्दैन ।

संसद्का लागि हुने आमनिर्वाचनमा सधैं एउटा दलले बहुमत प्राप्त गर्छ भन्ने छैन । त्यस्तो अवस्थामा राष्ट्राध्यक्षले त्यस्तो व्यक्तिलाई सरकार बनाउन निमन्त्रणा दिन्छन्, जसले दुई वा दुईभन्दा बढी दलहरूको सहयोगमा बहुमतको सरकार दिन सक्छ । यस्तो निर्णय गर्दा राष्ट्राध्यक्षका लागि संसद्भित्र कुन दलको हैसियत कस्तो छ भन्ने प्रश्न सबैभन्दा महत्त्वपूर्ण प्रश्न हो । त्यसरी दुई वा दुईभन्दा बढी दलको सहभागिताबाट सरकार निर्माण हुन नसकेको परिस्थितिमा पनि राष्ट्राध्यक्षले संसद्भित्रका दलहरूमध्ये सबैभन्दा ठूलो दललाई अल्पसंख्यकको सरकार बनाउन आह्वान गर्नसक्छ । यस्तो आह्वान गर्दा राष्ट्राध्यक्षले त्यस्तो सबैभन्दा ठूलो दलले अल्पसंख्यकको सरकार बनाउने मात्र नभई सरकार चलाउन चाहिने कानुन तथा नीति बहुमतबाट पारित गर्नका लागि आवश्यक सामथ्र्य राख्छ भन्ने कुराको आश्वासन

खोज्छन् । सहयोगी दलहरू तयार छन् वा छैनन् भन्ने कुरामा राष्ट्राध्यक्षले चाहिएको परामर्श लिने परम्परा हुन्छ । तर जुनसुकै परिस्थितिमा पनि संसद्भित्र बाकस राखेर प्रधानमन्त्रीको निर्वाचन गरिने संसदीय पद्धति भनेको केवल नेपालका नागरिक समाज तथा राजनीतिज्ञहरूले मात्र सोच्न सक्छन् । संसारमा यस्तो प्रचलन छैन ।

बेलायती नमुनाको प्रजातन्त्रमा जुनसुकै हालतमा पनि प्रधानमन्त्रीको नियुक्ति राष्ट्राध्यक्षबाटै हुन्छ । यदि एउटै दलको बहुमत प्राप्त सरकार छ भने उसले आफ्नो हैसियत पहिलो पटक राष्ट्राध्यक्षले संसद्मा दिएको सम्बोधन वा आफ्नो सरकारको वाषिर्क नीतिलाई पारित गरेर देखाएको हुन्छ । यदि दुई वा दुईभन्दा बढी दलको संयुक्त सरकार गठन भएको छ भने वा त्यो पनि हुन नसकेको परिस्थितिमा माथि उल्लेख भएझैँ अल्पसंख्यकको सरकार बनाइएको रहेछ भने त्यस्तो सरकारका प्रधानमन्त्रीले संविधानले उल्लेख गरेको अवधिमा प्रतिनिधिसभामा बहुसंख्यकको विश्वासको मत लिएर आफ्नो वैधता प्रमाणित गर्छन् । विश्वासको मत पाएको सरकारले आफ्ना नीतिनिर्णयहरू संसद्बाट निकास गराउन सकेन भने राष्ट्राध्यक्षले जनताका हकमा प्रधानमन्त्रीलाई आफूउपर संसद्को विश्वास छ भन्ने कुरा प्रमाणित गर्न अनुरोध गर्न सक्छन् । संसदीय परम्परामा सरकार निर्माण गर्न नसक्ने प्रतिनिधिसभालाई जीवित रहने अधिकार छैन । त्यसलाई भंग गरिन्छ र नयाँ जनादेशका लागि नयाँ आमनिर्वाचन गरिन्छ । यसको निर्णय तत्काल कायम रहेको 'कामचलाउ' सरकारको सिफारिसमा राष्ट्राध्यक्षले गर्ने परम्परा हुन्छ ।

नेपालको अन्तरिम संविधान बनाउँदा कानुनी राज तथा संविधानवादको सिद्धान्तलाई महत्त्व दिइएन । सयौँ वर्षदेखि प्रचलनमा रहेको सिद्धान्तहरूलाई विस्थापित गर्दा सनकको सहारा लिनु हुँदैन । स्थापित मूल्य र मान्यतासहितको विकल्प रोज्नुपर्छ । त्यसो हुन नसक्दा वर्तमान संविधानको धारा ३८ -१) ले सर्वसम्मतिको सरकारको परिकल्पना गर्‍यो । यो आफैंमा नराम्रो कुरो त नहोला । तर अधिकांश अवस्थाहरूमा असहज कुराचाहिँ हो । यदि संसार सर्वसम्मतिबाटै चलेर जान सक्ने भएको भए निश्चय पनि बहुमतमा आधारित प्रजातान्त्रिक प्रणालीको सूत्रपात हुने थिएन ।

त्यस्तै सर्वसम्मतिबाट सम्भव नभएको अवस्थामा बहुमतका आधारमा संसद्बाट प्रधानमन्त्रीको निर्वाचन गरिने भन्ने कुरा पनि स्वाभाविक हुँदैन । यसमा बलजफ्ती नै गरे पनि संविधानमा 'तत्काल कायम रहेको सम्पूर्ण सदस्य संख्याको बहुमत' भन्ने शब्दावलीको साटो 'तत्काल उपस्थित सदस्यहरूको बहुमत' भन्ने मात्र उल्लेख गरिएको भए संसद्ले बहुमतको प्रधानमन्त्रीको चयन गरिसक्थ्यो होला । त्यस्तो प्रधानमन्त्रीले संविधानको धारा ५५ -क) बमोजिम विश्वासको मत लिई आफूसँग पूर्ण बहुमत -एब्सोल्युट मेजोरिटी) भएको प्रमाणित गर्न सक्थ्यो । यसका लागि पनि संविधानले कुनै बाटो राखेन ।

क्रान्ति वा जनआन्दोलनको नाममा प्रणालीगत आधारमा स्वीकार गर्न नसकिने विभिन्न प्रावधानहरू संविधानमा लेखिदिँदा निर्वाचनले दिएको म्यान्डेट -कार्यादेश) गलत प्रवृत्तिहरूको धरापमा परेको छ । प्रजातन्त्रका लागि योभन्दा ठूलो विडम्बना हुन सक्दैन । सांसदको किनबेचदेखि लिएर गैरराजनीतिक निष्ठाहरूको आधारमा आफ्नो बहुमत जुटाउने प्रवृत्तिको विकास हुनु यो संविधानले उल्लेख गरेबमोजिम नै हो । मुलुकको प्रधानमन्त्रीको चयन यस्तो प्रक्रियाबाट हुनुको परिणाम नेपालीहरूले देख्दै आएका छन् । यो आज संस्थागत भएको छ । यस्तो परिस्थितिमा देशलाई कसरी नयाँ प्रधानमन्त्री प्रदान गर्ने भन्ने समस्याको निराकरण यो संविधानभित्रबाट सम्भव छैन ।

कतिपयको भनाइ छ, व्यवस्थापिका संसद्को नियमावलीलाई संशोधन गरी यो पटकपटक असफल चुनाव गर्नुपर्ने बाध्यताबाट वर्तमान राजनीतिलाई मुक्त गर्न सकिन्छ । यो भनाइ सही छैन । किनकि संविधानमा जुन कुरा प्रस्टसँग उल्लेख गरिएको छ, त्यसलाई प्रभावित गर्ने गरी वैकल्पिक व्यवस्था गर्न मिल्दैन । हो, संविधानको एघारौँ संशोधन गरी परम्परागत संसदीय नियमलाई पुनर्लेखन गर्न आपत्ति छैन । तर वर्तमान सरकार संविधान संशोधन गर्ने क्षमताको भएको भए संवैधानिक प्रणालीको यस्तो बिजोग हुने थिएन । यसका लागि दुईतिहाइ बहुमत चाहिन्छ । त्यो भएको भए नयाँ सरकारले अहिलेसम्म शपथ लिइसकेको हुन्थ्यो ।

त्यसैले अब के उपाय बाँकी छ त ? भन्ने प्रश्न स्वाभाविक रूपमा उपस्थित हुन्छ । प्रस्ट रूपमा भन्दा बारम्बार चुनाव गराएरै किनबेच र भाँडभैलोलगायतको प्रक्रियाबाट बहुमतको सरकार उपस्थित गराउनुको वैधानिक विकल्प यो संविधानमा छैन । यसलाई कि त सन् १७९९ को स्वघोषित दामोदर पाण्डेले झैँ कोही अरूले आफूलाई प्रधानमन्त्रीमा स्थापित गरेर टुंग्याउन सम्भव छ या अब फेरि अर्को सर्वसम्मतिको नाममा कानुनी राजको मर्दन गर्दै तथा आमनिर्वाचनको वैधतालाई चुनौती दिँदै अर्को प्रक्रियाको सिर्जना गरिनेछ । यी तीनै प्रक्रियाहरू अवैधानिक नै हुनेछन् । एउटा दोषपूर्ण संविधान क्रान्ति गरेर आवोस् वा जनआन्दोलनबाट त्यो दोषपूर्ण नै हुन्छ । अहिलेको टड्कारो प्रश्न हो- वर्तमान अवस्थाको जिम्मेवारी कसले लिने

A fine kettle of fish

The history of the world shows that a constitution does not become democratic simply because it has been drafted by a popular leadership. One must not be oblivious of the requirements of the law of the constitution in a democratic framework.

http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2010/07/28/oped/a-fine-kettle-of-fish/210961/

BIPIN ADHIKARI

JUL 28, 2010 - The weird electoral contest between UCPN (Maoist) chief Prachanda and Nepali Congress leader Ram Chandra Poudel for the post of prime minister scheduled to be held on August 2 is not surprising. This is a product of the defective constitution that Nepal has adopted as an interim arrangement.

If Damodar Pande (1799-1804) is taken as the first prime minister of Nepal, Madhav Kumar Nepal (2009 onwards) would be the 58th. As the story given by historians goes, Pande took over the coveted position himself in the best assessment of the situation because King Rana Bahadur Shah had just abdicated, and his son and heir apparent, one-and-a-half-year-old Girvan Yuddha, was too young to replace his father. Pande faced almost no protest against his move. His rivals Bhimsen Thapa, Dalbhanjan Pande and Queen Rajrajeswari—all very powerful at the palace—were already out of the country with the king.

From this time onwards, the position of the prime minister became part of the court of the royal palace. Ever since, it was either the free choice of the king (or the queen) to appoint who the prime minister should be, or an induced choice. But it was only in 1959, or 155 years after the assassination of Prime Minister Damodar Pande, that multiparty general elections to parliament were held based on adult franchise; and B.P. Koirala, being the leader of the party commanding a two-thirds majority in the house, was appointed by the reigning king as prime minister.

In a Westminster-style parliamentary system, it is the responsibility of the head of state to ask the leader of the party commanding a majority in the House of Representatives to form a government based on his electoral strength. In a post-election scenario when there is a party in the house which is holding a clear majority of seats, there is little controversy about this matter. As such, the leader of the parliamentary party is without doubt asked to form a government in that case. There is no election in the house, whatsoever.

In alternative scenarios, or when there is no party with a majority, the head of state has to see whether a leader who can mobilise a coalition of parties to form a majority, or a minority party even if it is still far behind in the required number of votes, can provide the necessary leadership. When the head of state does so, here too, he or she is guided by the strict parliamentary convention to ask the person best placed to secure the confidence of the house (that is, the active or passive support of a plurality of its members). Once the prime minister is appointed, he or she is then asked by the head of state to form the cabinet, bring the house in order and demonstrate its confidence to carry on further.

The role of the head of state in this exercise has two immediate effects. First, by appointing the potential prime minister, he or she recognises immediately the competitive electoral strength of the party which has shown its mandate to lead the country (when compared to other competitors). Second, by recognising the leader of the house, he or she gives the opportunity to talk with the colleagues, organise a cabinet, and prepare itself for a vote of confidence.

When the prime minister is a coalition leader, or just a minority party leader as noted above, this is also the time for the prime minister to prepare a common front, sort out differences between the parties joining hands, and create grounds for a stable government. This also gives him or her the opportunity to deal with others from positions of power (by virtue of whatever electoral mandate he or she has). In such a situation, a prime minister need not go to every party to “buy” their vote, resort to malpractice and show “numerical” strength over others.

More or less, this was how it was in Nepal under the 1990 Constitution. Unfortunately, the Interim Constitution, drafted and frequently amended with the least commitment to democracy, parted with this time tested convention for hidden political reasons. It encouraged constituting a government based on “consensus” in order to facilitate a non-partisan approach in writing the constitution. But it never happened, and there is the least likelihood of it happening this time around too. A person who cannot command a majority cannot lead a consensus government either. When there is no majority party, the role of the head of state is crucial to ensure smooth sailing through the divided house. His wisdom in choosing the most suitable person as prime minister would have saved the continued legitimacy of the April 2008 elections.

The resulting malpractices, including the fast degeneration of the electoral mandate, could be easily shingled out. First, a prime minister who was still commanding a clear majority in the house was made to resign. Had the need for a “national” government been the issue, the prime minister should have been given the first opportunity to talk with the parties unrepresented in his council of ministers and expand the cabinet without smashing his team. Second, every party which can help build a new coalition, or a new national government, is now contesting for the post of prime minister, making it impossible for others to form a government (the smaller parties being insignificant in the head count).

Third, when it is very clear that the in-house election for the prime minister has failed, the constitution should have allowed the formation of a minority government without a hitch. In fact, the largest party in the house is being victimised because its strength based on the electoral mandate is not being recognised. Whether a national government or a government of a coalition of parties, the largest party should have been given the opportunity to form the government first, and take the necessary confidence initiative later. There is no provision in the constitution which states that even a minority government should be allowed to perform in good faith and that it takes a vote of confidence in due course.

Finally, the simple rule that where the house is not able to produce a government at all, it should be dissolved and fresh elections called has also not been stated in the constitution in the spirit of the Westminster tradition. Given the responsibility to adopt a new constitution for the country, the Constituent Assembly, or the country’s parliament, was not provided this option. There is logic in this argument. But the net effect of all these constitutional defects is that this country cannot produce a government on the basis of the constitution.

What is there as a direction, then? There are two possible options. The first direction is another lot of compromises on Nepal and its institutions. The Interim Constitution created an elephant without providing a mahout. The mahout is operating from outside the constitutional regime—defeating the purpose of democracy and the rule of law.

Or, as stated in the beginning, a new Damodar Pande will have to emerge who will proclaim himself the new protector for the transition. Suffice here to pinpoint what led to the rise of Jung Bahadur. The history of the world shows that a constitution does not become democratic simply because it has been drafted by a popular leadership. One must not be oblivious of the requirements of the law of the constitution in a democratic framework.



Bipin Adhikari

lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com

Things don’t look good

The failure of the leaders to provide the CA a positive work environment is a real letdown.

http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2010/07/14/oped/things-dont-look-good/210467/

BIPIN ADHIKARI

JUL 14, 2010 - President Ram Baran Yadav has called upon the political parties to form a majority government after they failed to form a national government within the extended deadline given by him.

While his move was unavoidable in the given situation, there is little doubt that the state of affairs will change materially with a change in the present government, if it is not a government with a two-thirds majority in the legislature. The ultimate objective behind instituting a new government is to make it possible for the Constituent Assembly (CA) to finalise the draft constitution and pass it with the required two-thirds majority. Obviously, a simple majority government cannot fulfil that objective.

The UCPN (Maoist) has been very vocal about having a national government. But when they talk about a national government, they mean a government led by themselves. A major bottleneck towards this move. Also, contrary to this perception, they could do pretty little over the last two weeks to solicit the necessary support from the others by recommitting themselves to universal democratic standards, which have always been questionable. In fact, it is enough for the Maoists to have either the CPN-UML or the Nepali Congress to form a strong government with the support of other fringe parties and put together a two-thirds strength in the house. But they did not try out this option. They think the UML and the Congress are unnaturally tied to each other “under pressure”, and only a national government can weaken the case against them.

Whatever the Maoist weaknesses, many aspects of the ongoing negotiations are still not transparent. It is said that efforts to reach a consensus failed as the three major parties—the UCPN (Maoist), the CPN-UML and the Nepali Congress—refused to give up their respective stances. However, it is not yet adequately clear what were the stances of each of these parties. There were certainly movements of leaders from this corner of the parliamentary premises to that corner, but even knowledgeable people were not clear about who wanted what, and what were the issues that prevented a consensus. To this day, the positions and counter-positions have not been put across plainly. What has been observed is that the tenacious “Tom” is forever on the tail of his elusive nemesis “Jerry”, fully disregarding the mayhem and destruction that has been ensuing.

There has been no talk between the major parties, absolutely none in fact, on sorting out the contentious issues before the CA and its Constitutional Committee. Similarly, the parties were not ready to sit down with the Maoists with some homework on their action plan on the integration of the combatants and discuss what further concessions could be necessary. The Maoists kept up their sleeves additional options to address the concerns of the NC and the UML regarding dismantling the Maoist youth wing, the Young Communist League (YCL), and returning properties seized by the party during the insurgency. There was simply no effort to move ahead with a genuine desire to complete the peace process, and it will remain incomplete without Maoist participation.

At present, the prime minister is from the CPN-UML and the chairperson of the CA is also from the same party. The major coalition partners, especially the Nepali Congress, have led important ministries. The president also comes from this party, and the chairperson of the CA Constitutional Committee, the principal constitution drafting body in the CA, is also a Nepali Congress nominee. In the perspective of the Maoists, they do not show up anywhere as the largest party in the CA and, therefore, in the scheme of constitution writing. Politically, they think it will be a disaster for them to sign off their power and clout to agree on a constitution finalised by the UML or the Congress.

Instead, the Congress and the UML smelt a rat in the 60-week time plan of the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) for the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants. Prime Minister Nepal went so far as to criticise the UN agency in public disregarding diplomatic norms. He also completely ignored the fact that UNMIN’s plan had already been discussed with the relevant authorities of the government and the political parties had already been consulted for their feedback. The UNMIN time plan might have been a little uninformed by the politics after the resignation of the prime minister; it definitely deserved an informed response.

The days ahead are not propitious. The situation reminds one of what happened in the Middle East 60 years ago. Elections to the Constituent Assembly were held in newly independent Israel on Jan. 25, 1949 with 85 percent of the people casting their votes. A noble thing had been done. However, the assembly was able to hold only four meetings. The political leadership was faced with the challenge of establishing a democracy within physically vulnerable borders surrounded by active aggressive elements. There were chronic political and ideological differences. There were good leaders as well. But the situation was not so good. They tried, but quickly gave up.

On Feb. 16, 1949, the assembly adopted the Transition Law by which it renamed itself the First Knesset (i.e., first assembly). Because the assembly could not prepare a constitution for Israel, the Knesset became the heir to the assembly for the purpose of fulfilling this function. It was intended as a constitutional stopgap for Israel. But once the constitutional development process stalled, the law took on a pseudo-constitutional character. The situation has not changed even after 60 years. There are important constitutional laws in the country. But the country’s lack of a constitution still translates into a paucity of clearly articulated values what the state represents and defends.

Notwithstanding this fact, Israel is still hoping for the best. Its institutions are still working. Its economy is still prospering. The country is defending itself against all odds. Its people have not lost faith in the political state. Nepal’s scores are generally at an all-time low against its own standards. The failure of the leaders to provide the CA a positive work environment is a real letdown. It must not be minimised.

Knots and bolts

BIPIN ADHIKARI "Political difficulties surrounding the resignation of Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal, despite the fact that he still holds a clear majority in the Constituent Assembly (CA), are more than obvious. What is not obvious is what is supposed to come next."

http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2010/07/01/oped/knots-and-bolts/210017/

JUL 02, 2010 - Political difficulties surrounding the resignation of Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal, despite the fact that he still holds a clear majority in the Constituent Assembly (CA), are more than obvious. What is not obvious is what is supposed to come next.

In a way, the prime minister had been under constant pressure from UCPN (Maoist) to resign as a condition for their support to amend the constitution for extension of the deadline to write a new constitution by a year. With his resignation, the prime minister has fulfilled, although belatedly, the understanding to which he was not a negotiating partner. He has become a ‘caretaker’ prime minister, and the Maoists, as a largest party in the parliament, now have the opportunity to tender their claim for the next government.

It is now the turn of the Maoist party, which has the crucial votes for passing any constitutional provision by the required two-third majority, to reciprocate the goodwill by starting to implement the remaining two points of the three-point understanding signed between three major parties on the midnight of May 28. The three-point understanding comprised of a provision for extending the term of the Constituent Assembly by a year, implementation of all past agreements (which envisage a democratic constitution for the country) and the resignation of the prime minister within ‘days’ to pave the way for a national government.

At the moment, there is very little distance between the Maoists and the vacant post of prime minister, if they are flexible to reach consensus with other parties on the integration/rehabilitation of their combatants, and tone down their aggressive positions on many crucial constitutional issues. It is not that Maoists do not understand the implications of what they have proposed; the problem is they want exactly what are being implied. These positions, if conceded under pressure, can detrimentally affect the quality of democracy under the new constitution due to their authoritarian overtones.

CA Chairman Subash Nembang has already compiled 18 contentious constitutional issues, and asked the parties to find compromise solutions on each of them, in order to help the constitution drafting process resume. These issues overlap with, and the real number of contentious issues is no more than 12. Some of these issues are real, but result from a blatant disregard for the basics of constitutionalism.

In addition to that, however, the most pressing issue is the lack of agreement on integration/rehabilitation of the combatants—on which Maoist preconditions are not aboveboard. There are multiple options on the table, but the breakthrough will come only after the Maoists give up their desire to retain their combatants until their grip on power is fully achieved. If this is not true, it is probably the time for the Maoists to show where they stand on these issues—and how they plan to go ahead if they are to form the next government.

It is probably not out of place here to point out that the initiative of CA chairperson towards formation of the State Restructuring Commission (SRC)—something that surprises many ethnic groups—may not be a good idea. There are issues for sure—on the number, names and boundaries of federal units. But they must be handled within the Constituent Assembly, without discrediting the groundwork done by the Committee on State Restructuring and Division of State Powers and Committee on Natural Resources, Economic Powers and Allocation of Revenues.

Even if a SRC is created, it would not have a magic formula. It would be the forum of the same politicians, same experts and probably the same biases or prejudices. But its creation will definitely create an environment of distrust between political parties who have different levels of commitment and enthusiasm about federalisation issues. The best way out in the given situation is to devise a small but politically powerful sub-committee within the CA, which would have access to all experts and resources that a SRC might purportedly enjoy, but also build on what has already been done.

Additionally, it is good to revive the high level political mechanism to work within the Assembly. The role of such a mechanism has become all the more important because of lack of towering or statesman-like leaders in the assembly who can get things done. There has not been enough give and take in the matter of principles to create a win-win situation so far. In an environment which lacks coalition culture, such a mechanism, if properly worked out, can help political parties arrive at crucial decisions.

The Constitutional Committee in the CA, the final drafting body, must also be able to lay down certain norms on the length of the new constitution. The details that have come through the thematic committees are simply too long. What is to be included and excluded is the most difficult part of the job. A related issue is tension between shortness and detail. A short and simple constitution is much better. But the shorter the document, the greater the scope for interpretation by the courts. There is no agreed boundary of what is constitutional, and what is not. But the issue must be sorted out in order to save the document from unnecessary challenges—especially due to unnecessary details.

There is no other way out of working with the Maoist if the ongoing transition is to be completed within the next 11 months. Even with Maoists, it is not going to be smooth. There are contradictions within Maoists as well. The only positive thing is that it is still united, and the present leadership, despite all its shortcomings, is still the best available bet for any meaningful change in the country.

Buying time for a favourable balance of power before letting the CA resume its work is dangerous. To put it categorically, as this critic has noted before, any attempt to bring a split in the UCPN (Maoist), supposedly to “rightsise” it in the CA will be the most irresponsible approach to handling the current situation. Its breakup into rival forces is neither in the interest of Nepal, nor its neighbours.

lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com

"What are they waiting for?" Bipin Adhikari

It is very dangerous to buy time looking for drastic changes in the balance of power in the country before letting the CA resume its work. To put it more categorically, any attempt towards helping a split in the UCPN (Maoist), supposedly to “rightsize” it in the CA, is a most irresponsible approach to handling the situation. Its breakup into rival forces is not in the interest of Nepal.

BIPIN ADHIKARI

http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2010/06/16/oped/what-are-they-waiting-for/209491/

KATHMANDU, JUN 16 - It has already been 20 days since the tenure of the Constituent Assembly (CA) was extended on May 28 for an additional one year. Three days after, on June 1, CA Chairman Subash Nembang, otherwise an unassuming speaker, warned all the political parties represented in the CA that business as usual would not help to write a new constitution.

As he pointed out, strong commitment on the part of all and willingness of the three major parties — the UCPN (Maoist), Nepali Congress and UML — to implement the understanding signed with each other on the midnight of May 28 are the preconditions to get the job done. Since then, 17 days have already passed. But there has been no change either in the attitude or in the temperament or the modus operandi of the major contenders for power. Rather, what was written so clearly in the memorandum of understanding signed in the presence of UML leader Khadga Oli has become undecipherable.

It is not surprising though. Many agreements and understandings that were negotiated and signed in the past had met a similar fate. Agreements should not be signed if they are not going to be kept. A sort of “elitism” in the best sense of the term is so crucial for the success of any venture as demanding as writing a new constitution through a constituent assembly. None of the constitutional conventions, or a CA like ours, has ever succeeded in its mission unless it had proud “elitist” leaders who were a cut above the masses and who had extraordinary skills, abilities and wisdom, or commitment to the principles of public morality, democracy and the virtues of the rule of law.

In many cases, it is the elitist leaders, especially those with charismatic powers, who have helped regain the lost egalitarianism in many societies as the governing principle of the day and not vice versa. This egalitarianism and commitment to the consent of the “governed” provide the moral strength in the process of change. When there are such leaders, vocal and out for these values, they are able to find a democratic exit for the country, whether through the constituent assembly or otherwise.

One such “elite” leader in Nepal who could represent the mass with the strength of his personality and character was B.P. Koirala (1914-82) — probably the only politician in the country who could qualify for the term “statesman”. He was far ahead of his time. He practised atheism, defended secularism, advocated emotional (sexual) freedom, opined in favour of euthanasia, pleaded for the right to commit suicide in appropriate cases, and stood for modernity in all aspects of the law and society.

These qualities in him ignited most of the leaders of his generation, yet his life and work had a profound influence on the mental make-up of the nation, its social structure and intellectual development. As long as Koirala was alive, the political system had no other option but to maintain a façade of basic democratic values and nationalism, whatever was the political system of the day. He maintained the terms of the political culture and the processes of change, even though the system and its external patrons were always up to his neck. With his demise in 1982, the country lost a moral authority. The situation has not changed much even now.

When it comes to India, Jawaharlal Nehru (prime minister 1947-64), a highly educated “elite”, had a similar impact on the psyche of a newly unified India. He was the answer to the enormous challenges that the Constituent Assembly and several years of transitional problems thereafter that India had to face. Without him, not just his associates like Ambedkar but also Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad and Abdul Kalam Azad would not have been able to steer the CA process forward. The presence of Nehru in the Indian Constituent Assembly was a guarantee for the use of talents like B.N. Rau, the constitutional adviser, and S.N. Mukherjee, the chief draftsman of the Indian constitution. Nehru’s enlightened ideas and aspirations remained unchallenged in the assembly, and that provided the guarantee that an aspiring new democracy needed to draft a democratic constitution.

This is true about most of the American founding fathers as well. It was a very different generation by modern standards, but most of them who were taking the lead as signers of the declaration of independence or the framers of the new constitution were a highly motivated “elite” of the day. Whether as politicians or jurists or statesmen or soldiers or diplomats or ordinary citizens, their leadership gave not just a moral character to the changes on behalf of the common people, but also a human face to the changes. What is written in the formal document is one thing, but who have written it for posterity and who are implementing it is also no less important.

The fact that the CA is in limbo and that it is no one’s priority has become very clear to everybody in Nepal by now. Who wanted it and for what purpose is also becoming clearer to the educated masses of Nepal. There could be many discussions on whether those who steered the process forward had sustainable options available to them. There could be a number of charges against the existing leadership, their professional abilities, and their concept of right and wrong, and also the sense of change. But the most basic thing is that the CA must produce a constitution amid all these challenges and help the country emerge from the existing mess. A change in government, and more clearly, implementation of the three-point understanding of May 28 is crucial for this purpose.

It is very dangerous to buy time looking for drastic changes in the balance of power in the country before letting the CA resume its work. To put it more categorically, any attempt towards helping a split in the UCPN (Maoist), supposedly to “rightsize” it in the CA, is a most irresponsible approach to handling the situation. Its breakup into rival forces is not in the interest of Nepal.

lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com

१४ जेठको सेरोफेरो - डा. विपिन अधिकारी

आवरण : १४ जेठको सेरोफेरो
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संविधानको आठौं संशोधनले मुलुकलाई धेरै विषम परिस्थितिहरूबाट जोगाएको छ। तर, संविधानसभा बचाउने नाममा अपनाइएको यो प्रक्रियाबाट संसदीय बहुमत भएको वैधानिक सरकारलाई अवैधानिक तरिकाले विलुप्त हुन पार्ने नजिर पनि कायम भएको छ- प्रजातान्त्रिक नेपालमा । डा. विपिन अधिकारी को विश्लेषण

अहिले पनि संसारभर मौलिक अधिकार तथा स्वतन्त्रताप्रति अतिवादी दृष्टिकोण राख्ने अराजकतावादी धार, वर्गसङ्घर्षको पक्षधर मार्क्सवादी चिन्तन, कानूनको शासन, प्रजातन्त्र र संविधानवादलाई आत्मसात् गर्दै अगाडि बढ्ने लोकतान्त्रिक धारर अस्थिरताबाट फाइदा लुट्न पल्केको अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय तत्वबीच टक्कर छ। नेपालमा पनि आज यिनै चतुर्भुज मान्यताबीच द्वन्द्व छ। बृहत् शान्तिप्रक्रिया अशान्त हुँदै जानुको कारण यही हो।

नयाँ संविधान जारी हुने दिन अर्थात् १४ जेठ आम नेपालीका लागि एउटा दिवास्वप्न हुँदै इतिहासबाट बिदा भएको छ। त्यो दिन नेपालको सार्वभौम संविधानसभाले न संविधान दिन सक्यो, न त भविष्यमा बन्ने संविधान प्रजातान्त्रिक परम्परामै बन्नेछ भन्ने प्रत्याभूति। अन्तरिम संविधान-२०६३ को आठौँ संशोधन गर्ने कुरामा सरकार र प्रतिपक्षी एनेकपा मावादीबीच मुख मिलेपछि अन्ततः मध्यरातमा संविधानसभाको आयु भने एक वर्षको लागि थपिएको छ। ठूला राजनीतिक दलहरूबीच शक्तिसन्तुलनका कुरामा मोलतोल मिलेपछि म्याद त थपियो, तर यसपटक पनि दुइटा प्रश्न चाहिँ अनुत्तरित नै छन्― के थपिएको अवधिमा अन्तरिम संविधानमा अपेक्षा गरिएबमोजिम नयाँ संविधान बन्छ? बन्यो भने के त्यो प्रजातन्त्र तथा संविधानवादको विश्वव्यापी मर्यादामै आधारित भएर आउँछ?

अराजकवादका पिता भनिने फ्रान्सेली राजनीतिज्ञ पियार जोसेप प्रोधोँका मान्यताका पक्षधरहरू नेपालमा पनि छन्। प्रोधोँलाई कानून व्यवस्था वा सरकारमा विश्वास थिएन। उनले एउटा बहुचर्चित किताब पनि लेखेका थिए। त्यसको नाम थियो― द कन्फेसन्स् अफ अ रिभोल्युसनरी अर्थात् एउटा क्रान्तिकारीको साविती बयान। त्यो साविती बयानमा लेखिएको थियो, “क्रान्तिलाई हिंसा, रक्तपात, लुटपाट र मारामारको अर्थमा प्रयोग गर्ने जमातले संसारलाई उँभो लगाउन सक्ने छैन।” आफू अराजकतावादी भए पनि त्यस्तो परिपाटीको उनी भर्त्सना गर्दथे।

अठारौँ शताब्दीका यी दार्शनिक र द्वन्द्वात्मक भौतिकवादका व्याख्याता कार्ल मार्क्सबीच भनाभन भई बोलचालै बन्द भयो। मौलिक अधिकार र स्वतन्त्रताप्रति अतिवादी दृष्टिकोण राख्ने प्रोधोँ र यसलाई वर्ग सङ्घर्षको दृष्टिले प्रयोग गर्ने मार्क्सबीच मिलनबिन्दु पाउन गाह्रो थियो। यसलाई दोस्रो धार मान्न सकिन्छ। समसामयिक विश्वमा एउटा तेस्रो धार छ― कानूनको शासन, प्रजातन्त्र र संविधानवादलाई आत्मसात् गर्दै अगाडि बढ्ने लोकतान्त्रिक धार। चौथो धार हो― अस्थिरताबाट फाइदा लुट्न पल्केको अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय तत्व। ऊ सबैका साथमा हुन्छ र अन्तिममा फाइदा पनि उसैले लिन्छ। नेपालमा आज पनि यिनै चतुर्भुज मान्यताहरूबीच द्वन्द्व छ। बृहत् शान्तिप्रक्रिया अशान्त हुँदै जानुको कारण यही हो।

अन्तरिम संविधान जारी हुनुअघि र पछिका राजनीतिक घटनाक्रमहरू अब नेपाली मानसपटलबाट क्रमशः हराउँदै छन्। दोस्रो जनआन्दोलनका कर्ता तथा व्याख्याताहरू पनि पन्छिँदै गएका छन्। जनस्तरमा पनि यसको उपलब्धिबारे चर्चा हुन छाडेको छ। यति छोटो अवधिमै गणतन्त्र दिवसबारे कतै उत्साह देखिएन। धेरैलाई परिवर्तनको कार्यसूची र स्थिति कुनै एउटाको नियन्त्रणमा छैनभन्ने लाग्न थालेको छ। समाधान गर्नुपर्ने राजनीतिक समस्या धेरै छन्। धेरै काम भएका पनि छन्, तर तिनलाई टुङ्ग्याउन अझ् मेहनत नगरी हुँदैन।

समयाभावलाई दृष्टिगत गरेर अपेक्षा बमोजिम संविधान घोषणा गर्ने एउटा सरल विकल्प थियो। नेताहरूले राजनीतिक रूपमा धान्न सकिने गरी संविधानसभामा उठेका गम्भीर विषयहरू तत्काल छिनोफानो गरेर एउटा भविष्यमुखी सङ्क्षिप्त संरचनाको संविधान (फ्रेमवर्क कन्स्टिट्युसन) जारी गरेर संविधानसभालाई १४ जेठभित्रै सुखान्तमा परिणत गर्न सक्थे। यसलाई मस्यौदा गर्न धेरै समय लाग्ने थिएन। यसबाट मुलुकलाई अगाडि बढ्न गहकिलो राजनीतिक पूँजी प्राप्त हुनेथियो। परिवर्तनका वाहकहरूलाई आफ्नो वर्चस्व कायम राख्न गाह्रो हुने थिएन। तर यसमा पनि माथिकै चारवटा धारबीचको अन्तरविरोध तगारो भयो। शान्तिसम्झ्ौताको मूल उद्देश्य राजतन्त्र हटाएर संविधानसभाको माध्यमबाट सबैलाई मान्य हुने प्रजातान्त्रिक प्रणाली ल्याउनु थियो। तर, यसलाई सबैले आ-आफ्ना उद्देश्यका लागि मात्र प्रयोग गरे।

दुई वर्षभित्रै संविधान निर्माण गर्ने कार्यादेश संशोधन गरी संविधानसभाको कार्यावधि बढाउन सकिने स्पष्ट संवैधानिक आधार अन्तरिम संविधानमा थिएन। मुलुकमा धेरै छलफल भइसकेको अन्तरिम संविधानको धारा ६४ मस्यौदा गर्दा सम्बन्धित कसैबाट पनि त्यस्तो उद्देश्य राखिएको कुरा चर्चामा आएको पनि देखिँदैन। रणनीतिक हिसाबले पनि त्यस रूपमा सोचिएको कतैबाट स्पष्ट हुँदैन। तर, राजनीतिक नेतृत्वको अक्षमता र लोकतान्त्रिक प्रक्रियाप्रति मावादीको अस्पष्ट धारणाका कारण मुलुकमा बेथितिहरू बढ्दै जाँदा धान्न सकिने प्रजातान्त्रिक प्रणाली स्थापनातर्फ चाहिए जति मेहनत भएन। तथापि सङ्क्रमणकालको गुम्न सक्ने वैधतालाई स्थायित्व दिन संविधान संशोधन गरी संविधानसभाको कार्यावधि बढाउनुभन्दा सजिलो अर्को उपाय बाँकी रहेको थिएन। यस्तो परिस्थितिमा विवादास्पद रूपमै भए पनि संविधानको आठौँ संशोधनद्वारा संविधानसभाको आयु बढाउने काम भएको छ।

सङ्कटकाल घोषणा गरी संविधानको धारा-६४ बमोजिम संविधानसभाको आयु ६ महिनाका लागि थप गर्ने विकल्प नेपालको सार्वभौमसत्ता, अखण्डता वा कुनै भागको सुरक्षामा युद्ध, बाह्य आक्रमण, सशस्त्र विद्रोह वा चरम आर्थिक विशृङ्खलताको कारणले गम्भीर सङ्कट उत्पन्न भएको अवस्थामा मात्र प्रयोग गर्न सकिन्थ्यो। मन्त्रिपरिषद्को सिफारिसमा राष्ट्रपतिले सङ्कटकालीन अवस्था घोषणा गर्न सक्ने भए पनि त्यस्तो घोषणालाई संविधानसभाको दुईतिहाई समर्थन नभए एक महिनापछि स्वतः निष्त्रि्कय हुने व्यवस्था संविधानमै उल्लेख छ। यस्तो अवस्थामा सङ्कटकालको स्थिति नै नभई सङ्कटकाल लगाउने प्रक्रिया संविधानउपरको जालसाजीका रूपमा इतिहासमा दर्ता हुन सक्थ्यो। आठौँ संशोधनका कारण यो अभियोगबाट मुलुक बचेको छ।

तर, त्यस्तो जालसाजी नभए तापनि जुन नजिर कायम भएको छ त्यो प्रत्युत्पादक हुने खतरा छ। संविधानको आठौँ संशोधनले एउटा वैधानिक सरकारलाई संविधानसभा बचाउने नाममा अवैधानिक तरिकाले विलुप्त पार्न लागेको छ। राजनीतिक प्रक्रियामा सरकार आउनु-जानु भइरहन्छ। तर, संसदीय बहुमत कायम हुँदाहुँदै सडक आन्दोलन र प्रतिपक्षको गैर-संवैधानिक हठबाट सरकार परिवर्तन गराउन सकिने नजिर कायम हुँदैछ― नयाँ नेपालमा। सरकारबाट बिदा हुने शर्तमा गराइएको यो संसदीय प्रक्रिया सडक राजनीतिको मातहतमा लादिएको छ। समस्या बूढी मरिन् भन्ने होइन, काल पल्केला भन्ने हो। यसर्थ अहिलेको राष्ट्रिय सहमति लाई संवैधानिक र प्रजातान्त्रिक हिसाबले धेरै कमजोर धरातलमा उभिएको मान्नै पर्दछ।

अर्कोतर्फ नयाँ संविधान जारी नभएको अवस्थामा संविधान संशोधन पनि नभएको हुँदो हो त पुनर्स्थापित प्रतिनिधिसभाबाट जारी गरिएको नेपालको अन्तरिम संविधान-२०६३ का व्यवस्थाहरूमा संविधानसभा, विषयगत समिति, प्रक्रियागत समितिलगायत सबै संयन्त्रका अस्तित्व समाप्त हुनेथियो। संविधान निर्माण गर्ने सभाको वैधानिक हैसियत जान्थ्यो। यसैगरी, अन्तरिम संविधानमा संविधान घोषणा भएको अवस्थामा मात्र संविधानसभाले व्यवस्थापिका-संसद्को हैसियत पाउने उल्लेख गरिएकाले व्यवस्थापिका-संसद् पनि कायम रहने थिएन। व्यवस्थापिका-संसद्को अस्तित्व समाप्त भए पनि वैधानिक सरकार भने कायम रहने थियोतर, यसको हैसियत कामचलाउ वा केयरटेकर जस्तो हुनेथियो। मह140वपूर्ण निर्णय गर्ने वैधानिक हैसियत हुने थिएन।

व्यवस्थापिका-संसद्को अभावमा सबै संवैधानिक प्रक्रियाहरू प्रभावित हुनेथिए। राजस्व र व्ययको अनुमान, बजेट समीक्षा, विनियोजन ऐन पारित गर्नेलगायतका सबै कुरा जाने थिए। वैधानिक प्रतिपक्ष नै नरहेपछि प्रजातन्त्रको गुणस्तरको कुरै हराउँथ्यो। १४ जेठअघि वा पछि सङ्कटकालीन अधिकारको घोषणा वैध रूपमा एक महिनाभन्दा बढी गर्न सकिने थिएन। यो मन्त्रिपरिषद्को सिफारिसमा राष्ट्रपतिले गर्न सक्ने भए पनि संविधानसभा र व्यवस्थापिका-संसद्को अस्तित्व नरहँदा त्यसलाई एक महिनाभित्र व्यवस्थापिका-संसद्को बैठकमा पेश गर्न सम्भव हुने थिएन। त्यस्तो अवस्थामा त्यो घोषणा एक महिनापछि स्वतः रद्द हुनेथियो। संविधानको धारा-३६(ग) बमोजिम राष्ट्रपतिको पदावधि संविधानसभाबाट जारी हुने संविधान प्रारम्भ नभएसम्म लागू हुने भनिएकाले अर्को संविधान नआएसम्म राष्ट्रपति कायम त रहने थिए, तर निजलाई निर्वाचित गर्ने व्यवस्थापिका-संसद् नहुँदाको अवस्थाले पद र हैसियत दुवै प्रभावित हुन्थ्यो।

यस्तो संवैधानिक शून्यतामा जनमतसङ्ग्रहबाट निकास खोज्न पनि सम्भव हुने थिएन। किनकि त्यस्तो निर्णय व्यवस्थापिका-संसद्ले नै अनुमोदन गर्नुपर्ने हुन्थ्यो। त्यसैगरी, कामचलाउ सरकारको सिफारिसमा बाधाअड्काउ फुकाउने राष्ट्रपतिको अधिकार प्रयोग हुनसक्ने भए तापनि यसलाई एक महिनाभित्र व्यवस्थापिका-संसद्बाट अनुमोदन गराउनुपर्ने हुँदा यो बाटो पनि बन्द हुनेथियो। यी सबै अप्ठ्याराहरूमाझ् अन्तरिम संविधान कायमै रहेपछि निर्वाचित प्रतिनिधिहरूको अभावमा यसले कानूनको शासन र संविधानवादको प्रत्याभूति दिनसक्ने थिएन।

संविधानसभाको कार्यावधि समाप्त हुनासाथ मुलुक दुई वर्षअघिदेखिको यथास्थितिमा नरहनु यस्तो परिस्थितिको एउटै टड्कारो परिणति हुन्थ्यो। संविधान बनाउन २८ चैत २०६४ मा भएको निर्वाचनले अहिलेको संविधानसभालाई दिएको कार्यादेश फिर्ता हुनेथियो। म्यादभित्र नयाँ संविधान नबन्दा र संविधानसभाको कार्यावधि पनि नथप्दा कसरी अगाडि बढ्ने भन्ने सम्बन्धमा संविधान स्पष्ट नभएकाले शासकीय निर्णयहरू राजनीतिक आधारमा हुन जान्थे। वर्तमान संविधानले द्विविधा भएको अवस्थामा सर्वोच्च अदालतबाट राय माग्ने पुरानो संवैधानिक परम्पराको पनि अन्त्य गरिसकेको हुनेथियो। यी सबै यथार्थहरूले संवैधानिक संयन्त्र असफल भएको पुष्टि गर्ने थियो।

त्यस्तो परिस्थितिमा शक्तिसन्तुलनका घटकहरूले चाहे पनि नचाहे पनि अवरुद्ध संवैधानिक संयन्त्रलाई सहज बनाउन नयाँ कार्यादेशका लागि अर्को आमचुनाव गराउनुको विकल्प रहने थिएन। तर त्यस्तो चुनाव पनि संविधान संशोधन नगरी वैधानिक तरिकाले सम्भव हुने थिएन। वर्तमान संविधानले दोस्रो पटक आमचुनाव हुनसक्ने प्रावधान उल्लेख नगरेको अवस्थामा कुनै वैध निकास निस्कन नसक्ने यस्तो परिस्थितिबाट स्पष्ट रूपमा मुलुकमा संवैधानिक सङ्कट हुने अवस्थालाई कसैले रोक्न सक्ने थिएन। उपरोक्त संवैधानिक सङ्कटसँगै मुलुकले आन्तरिक सुरक्षा चुनौतीहरू पनि सामना गर्नुपर्ने थियो।

कतिपयले संविधान संशोधन नभए १४ जेठपछि संविधानसभा निष्त्रि्कय मात्र हुने र संविधान संशोधन गरिसकेपछि पुनः सक्रिय हुने दृष्टिकोण पनि राखेको पाइयो। यस्तो तर्कको कुनै संवैधानिक आधार भने थिएन। चुनावबाट स्थापित निकायहरू निश्चित अवधिका लागि हुने हुँदा त्यो अवधि समाप्त भएपछि स्वतः समाप्त हुनुको विकल्प रहँदैन। विघटित संसद्लाई सडक आन्दोलनबाट बलमिच्याइँका साथ पुनर्स्थापित गरिएको सन्दर्भमा यस्तो तर्क आउनु अस्वाभाविक भने थिएन। तर यो प्रक्रिया घोर गैरसंवैधानिक हुन्छ।

कतिपय आमसञ्चारमाध्यम वा कार्यक्रमहरूमा राजनीतिक रूपमा अतिवादी दृष्टिकोणहरू देखिँदै आएका थिए। अघिल्लो महिना मावादीको हडताल स्थगित नभएको भए त्यसले राजनीतिक धु्रवीकरणको प्रक्रियालाई अझ् बल पुर्‍याउने थियो। खासगरी सर्वसाधारणलाई अत्याउने खालका गतिविधिबाटै हतियार प्रयोगसम्मको स्थितिको आउने भएकाले १४ जेठपछिको शान्तिसुरक्षासम्बन्धी चुनौतीका लागि सुरक्षा संयन्त्रलाई तयार राख्नुपर्ने हुन्थ्यो। कुरा सुरक्षा निकाय परिचालनको मात्र थिएन। खानेपानी, खाद्यान्न, खतीमूलो, तेल आपूर्ति, सार्वजनिक आवागमनलाई सुचारु राख्नुपर्ने आदि जिम्मेवारीबाट सरकार विमुख हुनसक्ने थिएन। तर, व्यवस्थापिका-संसद् नरहेको स्थितिमा कुनै पनि सरकारले सङ्कटको सामना गर्दा आफूलाई संवैधानिक परिधिभित्र सीमित पार्न गाह्रो हुने कुरा प्रस्टै छ।

यस्तो राजनीतिक परिस्थितिले राष्ट्रपतिलाई पनि संवैधानिक भएर बस्ने वातावरण दिने थिएन। संवैधानिक शून्यतामा सहजकर्ताका रूपमा राष्ट्रपतिको भूमिका स्वतः देखापर्ने थियो। संविधान संशोधन गरेर अगाडि नबढ्दाको स्थितिमा राष्ट्रपतिलाई रोक्न गाह्रो हुनेथियो। किनकि, त्यो स्थितिमा राष्ट्रपतिको जिम्मेवारी स्वतः बढ्ने थियो। आफ्नो राजनीतिक हैसियत गुम्दै जाँदा कामचलाउ सरकारले पनि राष्ट्राध्यक्षको सहयोगमा अगाडि बढ्नुको विकल्प हुने थिएन। संवैधानिक शून्यताको स्थितिमा निर्वाचन गराई निर्वाचित सरकारले शपथ ग्रहण नगर्दासम्म र शपथ ग्रहण भइसकेपछि नयाँ व्यवस्थापिका-संसद्बाट संविधान संशोधन नहुन्जेलसम्म संवैधानिक दुष्चक्र (भिसियस सर्कल अफ अनकन्स्टिट्युस्नालिटी) को जोखिम टाउकामाथि घुमिरहने यथार्थ प्रस्टै छ।

अत्यधिक अस्थिरता वा प्रजातान्त्रिक प्रक्रियाले निकास दिन नसक्दा गत दुई शताब्दीमा संसारभरि अधिनायकवादी व्यवस्थाहरू च्याउसरी उमि्रए। संसारमा तानाशाहका विभिन्न रुप छन्। हरेक तानाशाह आफ्नो समयको उपज हुन्छ। तानशाह अचानक जन्मदैन बरु वैध शक्तिको कमि-कमजोरीहरूबाट त्यसको आवश्यकता गहिरोसँग सृजना हुँदै गएको हुन्छ। युरोपमा देखापरेको फासीवादी वा साम्यवादी अधिनायकवादबाट मात्र होइन एसिया र ल्याटिन अमेरिकी मुलुकहरूले भोगेको सैनिक वा आदर्शवादी तानाशाही व्यवस्थाबाट पनि बुझ्िने कुरा यही हो। सैद्धान्तिक रूपमा शुरुमा को, कुन कित्तामा उभिएको थियो भन्ने विषय कालान्तरमा गौण हुँदै जान्छ। सबैजसो अधिनायकवाद अस्थिरताको फाइदा उठाउँदै आएको इतिहासले देखाउँछ। बर्मादेखि अफगानिस्तानसम्म, चीनदेखि श्रीलङ्कासम्म अधिनायकवादी शासनको उत्थान र पतन सबैले देखिआएकै हो। नेपाललाई यो सम्भावनाबाट बचाउनु सबै राजनीतिक शक्तिहरूको जिम्मेवारी थियो।

मुलुकको सामर्थ्य र योग्यतालाई बुझने प्रयासै नगरी भइरहेको नेपालको परिवर्तन निःसन्देह रूपमा एउटा कठिन मोडमा आएको छ। तर, सम्भावनाको कुरा गर्दा सबैभन्दा सहज र सरल उपाय अहिले पनि राष्ट्रिय सहमति र सहकार्य नै हो। अराजकतावाद सभ्य समाजको आधार हुन सक्दैन। त्यस्तै, वर्ग सङ्घर्षको दृष्टिकोणले मात्र हेरियो भने पनि प्रजातान्त्रिक मूल्यमान्यताहरू स्थापित हुन सक्तैनन्। नेपाली राजनीतिकर्मीहरू देश र जनताप्रति प्रतिबद्ध नभएसम्म यो मुलुकलाई क्रमशः औपनिवेशीकरण गर्दै लैजाने तत्वले आफूलाई कमजोर पाउने छैनन्।

संविधानको आठौँ संशोधनले मुलुकमा सृजना हुनसक्ने धेरै विषम परिस्थितिहरू अहिलेलाई टारेको छ। जानेर वा नजानेर भइरहेका परिवर्तनहरूलाई प्रजातन्त्र र राष्ट्रवादतर्फ मोड्न सरकारले मावादीसँग गरेको बृहत् शान्तिसम्झ्ौता र मावादीले संवैधानिक प्रजातन्त्र तथा मानवअधिकारतर्फ आफ्नो प्रतिबद्धतालाई प्रस्ट गर्ने हो भने मुलुकको शासन कसले चलाएको छ भन्ने विषय गौण हो। खासगरी दुई वर्षको अनुभवका आधारमा मावादीबाट पूरा हुन नसकेका प्रतिबद्धताहरूका सम्बन्धमा पुनः सम्झ्ौता गरी सबैभन्दा ठूलो पार्टीका रूपमा उसलाई सरकार चलाउने अवसर र संविधानसभालाई सुखान्तमा परिणत गराउने राजनीतिक जिम्मेवारी दिनु नराम्रो होइन।

निश्चित रूपमा प्रजातन्त्रवादीहरू मावादीको प्रतिपक्षविहीन शासकीय स्वरुप, जातीय सङ्घीयता र संसद्मुखी न्यायपालिकाको अवधारणाप्रति सन्देह राख्दछन्। त्यस्तै राष्ट्रिय सहमतिबमोजिम नै लडाकूहरूको व्यवस्थापन हुनुपर्ने विषयमा पनि मावादीहरू संवेदनशील हुनु जरुरी छ। अहिलेको समय भनेको सन्देह र त्यसका आधारहरूको छिनोफानो गर्ने समय हो।

सो हुनसके संविधानसभाको बाँकी अवधिका लागि मावादीको नेतृत्वप्रति कसैको गुनासो रहने छैन। उनीहरूको सहभागिताले संविधानसभालाई संवैधानिक निकाससहित वैध रूपमा अगाडि बढ्न बल पुर्‍याउनेछ। तर दुर्भाग्य के हो भने अहिलेको सहमति पनि शक्ति-सन्तुलनका लागि भएको छ, मुलुकलाई एउटा प्रजातान्त्रिक तथा संवैधानिक मर्यादामा आधारित संविधान दिन होइन। आमजनताले प्रजातन्त्र र संविधानवादको लडाइँ लड्नुपर्ने अहिलेको विवशतालाई संविधानसभाको नयाँ कार्यावधिभित्र निराकरण गर्न सक्नुपर्छ। त्यसो हुन नसके थपिएको समयमा पनि नयाँ संविधान घोषणा हुने छैन। मुलुकको राजनीतिक स्थिरता अझ् क्षीण हुँदै जानेछ।

संविधानसभाबाट नयाँ संविधान आएको हेर्न नेपाली जनताको चाहना केन्याली जनताको जस्तै अपुरो भई सधैँका लागि थन्किने सम्भावना पनि प्रशस्त छ। नयाँ संविधानका लागि सन् २००२ देखि लागेका केन्यालीहरूको प्रयास अन्ततः एउटा संविधानसभा (कन्स्टिट्युस्नल कन्फेरेन्स) बाट बनाइएको संविधानलाई जनमतसङ्ग्रहको साधारण बहुमतले अनुमोदन गर्न नसकेपछि दुखान्तमा परिणत भएको थियो। त्यसपछि केन्याली संविधान बनाउने अभिभारा एउटा विशेषज्ञ समितिले पायो जुन नेपालमा २०४७ को संविधान मस्यौदा गर्ने विश्वनाथ उपाध्याय नेतृत्वको आयोग जस्तै हो। केन्याली विशेषज्ञ समितिले तयार गरेको मस्यौदा जनमतसङ्ग्रहमा पठाउनका लागि संसद्ले अनुमोदन गरिसकेको छ। अहिले जनस्तरमा छलफल गरिँदैछ। त्यसबारे आगामी साउनमा हुने जनमतसङ्ग्रहमा केन्याली जनताले निर्णय गर्नेछन्, मस्यौदा संविधान स्वीकार्य छ कि छैन भनेर। लामो समय विवादमा अल्झ्िएको संविधानसभाले संविधान बनाउने विश्वास केन्याली जनतालाई भएन।

नेपालको पनि नियति यही त होइन? होइन भने, राजनीतिक दलहरूसँग आफूलाई प्रजातान्त्रिक र राष्ट्रवादी प्रतिबद्धताहरूमा सच्याउनुको विकल्प छैन।

Credibility at stake

The position of prime minister in the model of democracy that Nepal is practicing is no longer powerful and exulted. He does have many powers, as far as theory goes, but he can exercise them only upon the aid and advice of others, seen or unseen in the formal structure of the state. In a way, the executive prime minister of Nepal has long become a ceremonial prime minister. The revolutionary change in his status has gone largely unnoticed.

BIPIN ADHIKARI

http://www.ekantipur.com/2010/06/06/oped/credibility-at-stake/315824/

The position of prime minister in the model of democracy that Nepal is practicing is no longer powerful and exulted. He does have many powers, as far as theory goes, but he can exercise them only upon the aid and advice of others, seen or unseen in the formal structure of the state. In a way, the executive prime minister of Nepal has long become a ceremonial prime minister. The revolutionary change in his status has gone largely unnoticed.

The recent helplessness of the prime minister is a new case in point. The winter session of the legislature has been put off, while the demand for his resignation is still unsettled. The parties in the House were allowed to discuss his fate, but he was not called to cut short the discussion and register a confidence motion to show whether he deserves continuation or needs to resign as somebody who does not command the confidence of his electors.

The question is how could a system of government, where the principal executive of the country has been deliberately kept at such a low ebb in the power structure, guarantee a functioning democracy, not to mention adoption of a new constitution. Unfortunately, the party bosses of the present coalition have underscored how educative the Article 55A process must have been to the people as to the demand for the prime minister’s resignation amid the current political wrangling and its legitimacy.

Instead, the prime minister has been put on hold. He is under a bond to resign no sooner than there is a consensus between major parties clearing the way for another national government. The consensus seems to be elusive because all the considerations that are involved in the negotiations are not on the table. For the purpose of the ongoing transition, it hardly matters whether the UCPN (Maoist) runs the government or one of the present coalition partners, or the government of Madhav Kumar Nepal, with or without any reshuffle.

The major issue is whether there is a guarantee that that Constituent Assembly is going to produce a “democratic” constitution based on civilised parameters, and whether such a constitution is designed to protect Nepal’s independence and its national interest. This concern must not be evaded in the process. Yet, that is not the concern anymore.

The term of the CA has been extended for one additional year without really putting this issue on the table, and making it a significant item on the agenda. There was not even a debate whether it needs a one-year extension, or a three-month or six-month extension. While the Maoists did not have any particular proposal, the Nepali Congress had proposed only a six-month extension. The fact, however, remains that even the government had no position in this matter. When CA Chairperson Subas C. Nembang strongly pressured the prime minister to lodge the constitutional amendment bill by May 16, the government agreed to do it. The move was intended to allow sufficient time for in-house procedures, should there be a decision to extend the life of the CA, based on any forthcoming consensus between the parties. The one-year extension was just the proposition of the legal draftsmen who worked on the draft bill, knowing that there could be pressure to reduce the term. Not even the UML had cleared it as proposed.

Be that as it may, there is no controversy that CPN-UML leader K.P. Oli (acting on behalf of the coalition partners) had agreed to the resignation of the prime minister within five days at the time when the three-point understanding was signed between his party, the Maoists and the Nepali Congress at midnight of May 28. Unprincipled though it was to sign such an indenture without sorting out the crucial issues of divergence between the present coalition and the Maoists, it is the truth that the resignation of the prime minister was negotiated in the same spirit in which the Maoist leaders have been claiming it now. There could be questions on whether an understanding on this particular issue should have been sought or not. But the attempt to back out from the understanding, so cleanly worked out, does not help the credibility of the political parties and their ability to bring changes.

Quite the contrary, after some initial hesitation, the UML has now concluded that the prime minister does not have to quit unless the parties arrive at a consensus on implementation of past agreements on the peace process and constitution drafting. It was said that the first point of the three-point understanding, which is about implementing past agreements, and the third point on immediate resignation of the prime minister should be implemented simultaneously. Additionally, some UML and Nepali Congress leaders have said that there was no such understanding, and that there should be an agreement on integration of Maoist combatants, return of properties seized during the insurgency and dismantling of the paramilitary structure of the Young Communist League (YCL) before the prime minister resigns. Maybe these arguments have elements of truth, but the understanding signed between the major parties unconditionally states that the prime minister shall resign. No arguments can vitiate what has been written in black and white.

It is not clear what loss the present coalition would suffer if the prime minister resigns as agreed. Such a resignation does not mean that the leader of the opposition is going to form a government at once. As long as the coalition is intact, the opposition cannot make any dent in the current balance of power. Rather, such a resignation would fulfill the main Maoist demand at the moment. It would then be their turn to implement what they had agreed on through the three-point understanding. Such an arrangement would allow the government to continue as a “caretaker” and also create the political environment for forward progress.

A caretaker government can continue performing the rudimentary duties of the state (including maintaining law and order and ensuring that its machinery continues to function so that the day-to-day task of administration can be carried out). It cannot remain in that capacity for more than a reasonable period. But this environment will help the major parties to work on compromise solutions. If the remaining part of the three-point understanding is not honestly implemented, the government can always activate the constitutional process and reclaim its lost status as a full-fledged government. It is not clear why this straight constitutional way out is being ignored by the government and its coalition partners.