Thursday, October 22, 2009

Loose ends

Bipin Adhikari (Source: http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2009/10/22/Oped/Loose-ends/1243/index.html)

KATHMANDU, OCT 22 - In the context of devolution of power from the centre to the provinces, one of the key issues that the Constituent Assembly (CA) has to respond to is how the obligations that Nepal has made under the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972 are going to be achieved in the new set-up.

Under this convention, Nepal has undertaken to identify and delineate the different “cultural heritage” and “natural heritage” situated on its territory. As a member state, it is the duty of Nepal to ensure the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural heritage on its territory. Each member state under the convention has to endeavour to adopt a general policy which aims to give the cultural and natural heritage a function in the life of the community and to integrate the protection of that heritage into comprehensive planning programmes.

In addition, the quest for the function and values of cultural expressions and practices and of monuments and sites, led by UNESCO, has paved the way for various new approaches to understanding, protecting and respecting cultural heritage of each country. These approaches, which involve the recognition of communities and groups as those who identify, enact, recreate and transmit the intangible or living heritage, found their culminating point in the adoption of the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage.

This convention which Nepal has shown willingness to ratify states that the “Intangible Cultural Heritage” is manifested — inter alia — in the following domains: ?oral traditions and expressions including languages as a vehicle of the intangible cultural heritage; performing arts (such as traditional music, dance and theatre); social practices, rituals and festive events; knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe and traditional craftsmanship.

Under the present constitution, which provides for an interim arrangement until a new constitution is adopted by the CA, the words and phrases employed to help preserve national heritage do not adequately reflect the authoritative expressions of the 1972 convention, the 2003 instrument, other conventions and many soft norms established in recent years. Although certain norms established in the rights perspective, as far as religion, culture, language and script and the arts, there is enough room for improvement taking the overall issue of the preservation and management of national heritage in the broader UNESCO perspective.

Nepal is renowned for its natural and cultural heritages. As far as the current legal regime is concerned, the power of preservation of national heritage has been provided for by the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act 1956, the Local Self-Governance Act 1999, various forestry and national park related laws, the Religious Endowments (Guthi) Corporation Act and so on. The Ministry of Culture and State Restructuring is the overall responsible body at the central level for safeguarding and promoting the cultural heritage, both intangible and tangible. The Department of Archaeology under the ministry has the responsibility for the preservation of the tangible cultural heritage. It has historically played a crucial role in its area of business.

The legal system also provides for specific institutions like the Cultural Corporation, the Nepal Copyright Office and similar institutions dealing with related components of national heritage. In 2007, the government also established new institutions in the form of the Nepal Academy for Language and Literature, the Academy of Fine Arts and the Academy of Music and Performing Arts with three separate statutes.

Mention may also be made of trusts like the Lumbini Development Trust and the Pashupati Area Development Trust, which operate under their defined jurisdiction. Similarly, there are councils like the Greater Janakpur Development Council, development committees for religious areas, i.e., Deoghat area, Manakamana area, Halesi area, Bouddhanath area, Budhanilkantha area, Pathibhara area and others which cater to the requirements of preservation and management of the national heritage.

Now while the CA is drafting a new constitution for Nepal is the time to deliberate on how the existing legal regime — crafted along the principles of a unitary system of government — should be restructured into a central-provincial framework. Such a discussion must look into relevant pragmatic technical and jurisdictional aspects of institution and site management, including funding considerations and human resource concerns for public cultural institutions in the new system.

What responsibilities are to be retained by the national government at the central level and what powers are to be devolved to the provincial units at the sub-national level are the main questions here. The devolution is not only to the provinces, but also to the regional, local and village levels. Similarly, a constitutional framework of devolution must respond to various managerial, financial and legislative issues as far as the devolved power and responsibilities are concerned. Unless the constitution makers discuss what the strengths or weaknesses of the present system are, it will be difficult for them to decide how the new arrangements must be made in the given perspective.

There could be several suggestions towards new, effective and sustainable arrangements. It might also be necessary to arrange for a national body to enforce national standards in the matter of preservation of national heritages and their multifarious uses. For example, the constitution makers may consider establishing something like a Nepal Heritage Council as a body of heritage experts to work as the Nepal Government’s independent expert advisory body on heritage matters. The council can play a key role in assessment, advice and policy formulation and support for major heritage programmes. Such a council could be far more effective than the existing multiple agency approach being applied hitherto.

To this day, the reports of the CA have not touched on the issue of national heritage as an exclusive issue. The Committee on the Determination of Bases for Cultural and Social Solidarity, which has already submitted its report, should have dealt with this issue at length. Failing this, one can only hope that the Committee on Restructuring of the State and Allocation of State Powers and the Committee on the Allocation of Natural Resources, Financial Powers and Revenues, which are the two remaining thematic committees on this issue, must take time and reflect on the new framework.

(lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com)

Saturday, October 17, 2009

रिपोर्ट: नयाँ संविधान बनाउने र जोगाउने चुनौती - डा. विपिन अधिकारी

(Photo: Kiran Nepal) प्रजातान्त्रिक दिल्ली होस् वा जनवादी चीन त्यहाँका सरकारहरूले गर्ने राजनीतिक निर्णयहरू सक्षमतापूर्वक लागू गर्ने राज्यशक्तिको आधार भनेको तिनका सुरक्षा संयन्त्र नै हुन्। हाम्रा पनि संवेदनशील विषय तथा क्षेत्रहरू कुन हुन् भन्ने कुरा प्रस्ट भइसकेको छ। त्यसैले हाम्रो नयाँ संविधान लागू भइसकेपछि आउन सक्ने व्यवधानहरूको सामना गर्ने योजना र तयारी पनि अहिलेदेखि नै गरिनुपर्छ।

http://www.himalkhabar.com/news.php?id=2778 (वर्ष १९, अङ्क १३पूर्णाङ्क २५०, १-१५ कात्तिक २०६६
18 Oct-1 Nov 2009)


भनिन्छ; सम्राट जुलियस सिजरको हत्यापछि रोम शहर शोकको सागरमा डुबेको थियो। सारा नगरवासी रोएका थिए। तर पनि शहरका कतिपय क्षेत्रमा त्यो रोदन र शोकको प्रभाव थिएन। शहरका यौनकर्मीका पसलहरू खुलै थिए। र, त्यहाँ आउने-जानेहरूको पनि कमी थिएन। त्यहाँ नाचगान, भोग र लिप्साको क्रम अनवरत चलिनैरहेको थियो।

केही मान्छेलाई देशको पतन वा उत्थान कहिल्यै पनि व्यक्तिगत चासोको विषय बन्ने गर्दैन। निजी सुख-सुविधा र भोगविलास, परिवार तथा आफन्तको स्वार्थबाट अलग्गिएर देश र समाजको भविष्यमाथि घोरिन तिनलाई फुर्सद नै हुँदैन।

आज नेपालको हविगत लगभग जुलियस सिजर मारिएका बेलाको रोम साम्राज्यको जस्तै लाग्छ। संविधानसभाले नयाँ संविधान बनाउने काम शुरु गरेको १६ महिना पुगिसकेको छ। जतिजति दिन बित्दैछन् त्यति-त्यति आम मानिसलाई नयाँ संविधान बन्दैन कि भन्ने लाग्दै गएको छ। यसो त संविधान बनाउनका लागि संविधानसभाले लाखौँ सुझ्ाव पाएको छ।

संविधानसभाका ६ वटा विषयगत समितिले व्यापक अध्ययन, मनन तथा विश्लेषणका आधारमा नयाँ संविधानको लागि प्रारम्भिक मस्यौदा पनि प्रस्तुत गरिसकेका छन्। बाँकी रहेका समितिहरू पनि जोडतोडले आफ्नो काम फत्ते गर्न लागेकै देखिन्छन्। अवधारणापत्र तथा प्रारम्भिक मस्यौदा अध्ययन समितिले विषयगत समितिहरूद्वारा प्रस्तुत प्रतिवेदनहरूको अध्ययन तथा संशोधन (मोडेरेसन) गर्ने कार्य शुरु गरिसकेको छ। अबका सात महिना कस्सिएर लाग्ने हो भने संविधान जारी गर्न असम्भव लाग्दैन। तर यही बेला, संविधान बनाउने भन्दा यो मौकालाई अन्य उद्देश्यका लागि प्रयोग गर्नेहरूको डाँको बलियो हुँदै गएको छ।

आजको नेपाल एउटा ठूलो विपत्तिमा फँसिसकेका सङ्केतहरू देखिँदादेखिँदै र राज्यप्रणाली निरन्तर पतनोन्मुख हुँदाहुँदै पनि यो देश आत्मसमर्पण नै गर्ने अवस्थामा भने अझ्ै पुगेको छैन। सामरिक महत्वका ठूला ठूला हिमशिखरहरू, यसको स्वच्छ पानीको निरन्तर स्रोत, करोडौं हेक्टर जमिन सिंचाई गर्न सक्ने जल उत्पादनको क्षमता, जलविद्युत् विकासका लागि प्राकृतिक पूर्वाधारहरू, हावापानी तथा भविष्यमा वित्तीयलगायत विभिन्न क्षेत्रहरूमा दह्रो रूपमा फड्को मार्न सक्ने क्षमता अहिले पनि नेपालमा विद्यमान छ। र, यही क्षमता नै मुलुकको दुष्चक्रको कारण पनि बन्ने गरेको छ। सबैलाई यसको भौगोलिक अवस्थितिले लोभ्याएको छ। सँगसँगै गौरवशाली नेपाली जनता तथा आफ्नो मुलुकको स्वाधीनता तथा आत्मसम्मानप्रति चनाखो उनीहरूको दृष्टिकोणले आन्तरिक रूपमा कमजोर मुलुकहरूलाई त्रस्त पनि पारिराखेकै छ। त्यही त्रासको मानसिकताका कारण यहाँ विभिन्न अपरेशनहरू गरिँदैछन्। त्यस्तै अपरेशनको प्रभाव परेको छ संविधानसभामा पनि।

अबको दुई महिनापछि, २०६६ साल मङ्सिर ३० गते नेपालको सातौँ संविधानको पहिलो मस्यौदा आउनुपर्नेमा दुईमत छैन। पुसको पहिलो हप्ताभित्र त्यो मस्यौदा संविधानसभाको पूर्ण बैठकमा पेश हुन नसके १४ जेठ २०६७ मा नयाँ संविधान जारी हुन सम्भव हुने छैन। तर आज जुन रूपमा काम हुँदैछ, त्यसबाट दुईथरीका प्रश्न उठेका छन्। पहिलो; के यो संविधानसभाले बनाएको संविधान पूर्णतः प्रजातान्त्रिक मूल्य र मान्यतामा आधारित होला? यो प्रश्नको जवाफ हालसम्म भएका काम कारबाहीका आधारमा खोज्नुपर्ने हुन्छ। मुखले कसले के बोलेको छ भन्ने कुरा भन्दा पनि संविधानको प्रारम्भिक मस्यौदा बनाउनेतर्फ भएको प्रगति तथा त्यसमा उल्लिखित प्रावधानहरू यस प्रश्नको जवाफका लागि अहम् पक्षहरू हुनेछन्। दोस्रो प्रश्न हो- के त्यसरी बनाइएको संविधान आम नेपालीलाई स्वीकार्य होला? सम्पूर्ण राष्ट्रलाई स्वीकार्य हुनको लागि प्रस्तावित संविधानले नेपालीहरूको राष्ट्रवाद, प्रजातन्त्र प्राप्तिका लक्ष्यहरू तथा जातीय स्वाभिमान समेतको रक्षा गरेकै हुनुपर्नेछ। अब यो प्रश्नमा देश धेरै अल्मलिएला जस्तो लाग्दैन।

आजका मितिसम्म, प्रस्तावित नेपालको शासकीय स्वरुप कस्तो हुने र राज्यको पुनर्संरचना कसरी गर्ने भन्ने विषयमा संविधानसभाबाट कुनै प्रस्ताव पारित हुनसकेको छैन। यसको अभावमै व्यवस्थापिकीय अङ्गको स्व्ारुप निर्धारण समिति ले प्रस्तावित संसद्को प्रारुप तयार पारेको छ। संविधानसभाको न्यायप्रणालीसम्बन्धी समितिका बहुमत सदस्यहरूले स्वतन्त्र तथा व्यावसायिक न्यायपालिकाप्रति स्पष्टतः अविश्वास प्रकट गरिसकेका छन्। उनीहरूले न्यायाधीशको नियुक्ति र कारबाहीको अधिकार केन्द्रीय व्यवस्थापिकाअन्तर्गत गठन हुने समितिलाई दिने प्रस्ताव पारित गरेका छन्। त्यस अनुसार सर्वोच्च अदालतलाई संविधानका मूलभूत पक्षहरूमा व्याख्याको अधिकार रहने छैन। राष्ट्राध्यक्ष, कार्यकारिणी प्रमुख वा व्यवस्थापिकाद्वारा निर्वाचित पद र अधिकारसँग सम्बन्धित प्रश्नको छिनोफानो पनि अदालतले गर्न पाउने छैन। राजनीतिक विषयसँग प्रत्यक्ष सरोकार राख्ने विषय र संविधानसँग कानून बाझ्िएको विषयमा पनि व्याख्याको अधिकार व्यवस्थापिकासँगै हुनेछ। यसले अदालतको काम संविधानवादको रक्षा नभएर आलीधुर तथा सम्पत्ति जस्ता विषयसँग मात्र सीमित हुने सम्भावना प्रस्ट देखाएको छ।

संविधानसभाको न्याय प्रणालीसम्बन्धी समितिका बहुमत सदस्यले पारित गरेको मस्यौदा नै भावी संविधानको अङ्ग बन्ने हो भने त्यस उप्रान्त सर्वोच्च अदालतको न्यायाधीश भएरै न्याय सम्पादनको लामो अनुभव बटुल्नु प्रधानन्यायाधीश हुनको लागि जरुरी हुने छैन। न्यायाधीशको काम कारबाहीका सम्बन्धमा संसदीय समिति आफैंले गठन गरेको विशेष अदालतमा मुद्दा दायर हुने र उक्त अदालतले गरेको फैसला नै अन्तिम हुने प्रस्ताव समेत हेर्दा नयाँ संविधान मुलुकको मूल कानूनका रूपमा पनि रहन सक्ने देखिँदैन। नयाँ संविधानको संरक्षक सर्वोच्च अदालत नहुने भएपछि देशमा कानूनी शासनको भविष्य के होला- सोच्न सकिन्छ।

त्यस्तै निर्वाचित सरकारमाथि पनि विश्वास रहने अवस्था देखिँदैन। व्यवस्थापिकालाई कार्यकारिणी क्षेत्रमा प्रवेश गराउने प्रावधानहरू पनि अगाडि सारिएका छन्। संवैधानिक निकायको संरचना निर्धारण समिति ले समानता तथा विभेदविरुद्धको समान संरक्षणसम्बन्धी विषयहरूमा ६ वटा बेग्लाबेग्लै आयोगहरू प्रस्ताव गरेर सबैलाई चकित पारिदिएको छ। सबै कुरा स्वतन्त्र आयोगहरूले नै गर्ने भए करोडौं खर्च गरेर चुनावबाट आएको सरकारले चाहिँ के गर्ने नि भन्ने बारे धेरै प्रश्नहरू उपस्थित भएका छन्। उदाहरणको लागि, मधेशी आयोग जरुरी हुन्छ भने हिमाली आयोग किन जरुरी हुँदैन? दलितको लागि बेग्लै आयोग चाहिने भए सीमान्तकृतका लागि त्यस्तै आयोग किन नचाहिने? अनि, के असमानता तथा विभेद खप्नु परेका सबै समुदाय वा क्षेत्रका समस्यालाई एउटै बलियो आयोगले हेर्न सक्दैन? विशेषता प्राप्त आयोग स्थापनामा पनि भागबण्डाको राजनीति आश्चर्यजनक छ!

संविधानसभाको सांस्कृतिक र सामाजिक ऐक्यबद्धताको आधार निर्धारण समिति ले नेपाली भाषा केन्द्रीयस्तरको सरकारी कामकाजको भाषाका रूपमा स्थापित हुन संविधानसभा वा संसद्को दुईतिहाई बहुमतले पारित हुनुपर्ने तर हिन्दीभाषालाई केन्द्रीय सरकारी कामकाजको भाषाका रूपमा स्थापित गर्न भाषा आयोगको सिफारिसमा संसद्को सामान्य बहुमतबाटै सम्भव हुने क्रान्तिकारी व्यवस्था सार्वजनिक गरेको छ। स्थानीय भाषाहरूलाई अवसर दिने प्रयोजनबाट सिर्जित यो प्रावधानले विदेशी भाषालाई पनि स्थापित गरेरै छोड्ने छाँट देखिन्छ। यदि नयाँ संविधानमा यो समितिको सिफारिस बमोजिम नै भाषा नीति कायम गरियो भने नेपालका कम्तीमा आठ-दश वटा भाषा नजान्ने व्यक्तिले केन्द्रीयस्तरको कर्मचारी भएर काम गर्न सक्ने छैनन्। अल्पसङ्ख्यक तथा सीमान्तकृत समुदायको हकअधिकार संरक्षण समिति ले यो मुलुकलाई उत्पीडकको रूपमा परिभाषित हुनसक्ने गरी इतिहासमा गरेको पीडाको लागि राज्यले क्षतिपूर्ति दिनुपर्ने व्यवस्था प्रस्ताव गरेको छ। त्यसैगरी जातिगत आधारमा राज्यको पुनर्संरचना गरी राज्यलाई मूल जातिहरूबीच बाँडफाँड गर्नेतर्फ देशलाई अगाडि बढाउँदै गर्दा भइरहेका विवादहरूको समाधानभन्दा पनि मुलुक नयाँ विवादहरूतर्फ अग्रसर हुँदै गएको प्रस्ट देख्न सकिन्छ।

राष्ट्रिय हितको संरक्षण समिति ले नेपालको राष्ट्रिय हितको पहिचान गर्दा न त मुलुकले वर्षौंदेखि शोषण खपिरहनु परेको राष्ट्रिय इन्धन आपूर्ति नीतिको बारेमा केही उल्लेख गर्न सकेको छ, न खाद्य आपूर्तिसम्बन्धी व्यवस्थाका बारेमा नै केही बोलेको छ। नेपाल भूकम्पजन्य धरातलमा रहेको मुलुक हो। भुइँचालो गई लाखौंको ज्यान धरापमा परेको अवस्थामा जीउज्यानको सुरक्षा कसरी गरिनेछ? कसैलाई चासो भएको देखिएन।

संविधानसभामा प्रकट भएका यस्ता सबै विषय र व्याख्याहरूबाट के प्रस्ट हुँदै गएको छ भने नेपालमा सरकार बनाउने कुनै पनि दलले वा संयुक्त सरकारले नेपालको राजनीतिक सार्वभौमसत्ताको निरपेक्ष प्रयोग अरू धेरै दिनसम्म गर्न पाउने छैनन्। धेरै वर्ष भइसक्यो मुलुकविरुद्धका धम्कीहरूलाई नेपालको सरकारले कूटनीतिक प्रक्रियाद्वारा मुकाविला गर्ने क्षमता गुमाएको। आफ्नो अस्तित्व जोगाउनका लागि आर्थिक शक्ति बढाउने तथा सोको प्रयोगबाट अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सहयोग प्राप्त गर्ने वातावरण क्रमशः निखि्रँदै गएको छ। देश विरुद्ध सञ्चालित आतङ्कवादी गतिविधिलगायतका राष्ट्रिय सङ्कटहरू आइपर्दा त्यसको सामना गर्ने योजना तथा नागरिक प्रतिरक्षाको कार्यक्रम पनि यो मुलुकसँग बाँकी रहेको देखिँदैन।

यस्तो सङ्कटापन्न अवस्थामा मुलुकको अस्तित्व जोगाउने शक्ति भनेका देशका संवेदनशील संरचनाहरू (क्रिटिकल इन्फ्रास्ट्रक्चर) हुने गर्छन्। तर दुर्भाग्यवश त्यसमा पनि आजको नेपालको कुनै पकड छैन। संविधानसभा वा व्यवस्थापिकाको कार्यसूचीमा यस्ता कुराहरू पर्ने गरेको पाइदैंन। देशमा पैसाको र लगानीकर्ताहरूको कमी छैन। तर पनि कुनै नियोजित षड्यन्त्रअन्तर्गत मुलुकमा नयाँ विद्युत् उत्पादन कार्य लगभग शून्य अवस्थामा छ। इन्धन, दूरसञ्चार जस्ता आधारभूत वस्तु र सेवाहरूको सञ्चालन र नियन्त्रण विदेशीलाई जिम्मा लगाइसकेको सरकारले राष्ट्रिय सङ्कटहरू आइपर्दा स्थितिलाई कसरी सम्हाल्न सक्ला? खाद्यान्नको स्टक पटक्कै नभएको देश हो नेपाल। चाहिएको बेलामा दुईचार अर्ब डलर अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय ब्याङ्क वा वित्तीय कम्पनीहरूबाट खुरुक्क झ्िक्न सक्ने भरड्राफ्ट सुविधाको व्यवस्था आजसम्म कुनै सरकारले गर्न सकेको छैन। आफ्नो अस्तित्व समेत बोध गराउन अक्षम सरकारलाई अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय साहुहरूले कसरी पत्याउनु?

यसरी कोट्याउँदै जाँदा कहालीलाग्दो भुमरीमा परेको छ मुलुक। यसको गृह वा सुरक्षा स्वार्थको अध्ययन तथा अनुसन्धान गर्ने कुनै कारगर गुप्तचर सेवा सञ्चालनमा नरहेको धेरै वर्ष भइसक्यो। मन्त्रिपरिषद्का गोप्य निर्णयहरू मन्त्रालय पुग्नुभन्दा पहिले दूतावास पुग्दा आश्चर्य मान्न छोडिएको छ। आफ्नो कागजातको सुरक्षा गर्न नसक्ने मुलुकले अन्य देशले यसविरुद्ध सञ्चालन गरेका कामकारबाहीका सम्बन्धमा कसरी जासूसी गर्न सक्ला? गोप्यता भन्ने कुरा सरकारी संयन्त्रमा बाँकी नै नरहेको देखिन्छ। यहाँका संसूचनाहरू वर्गीकृत रूपमा विदेशी जासूसी संस्थाहरूले सङ्कलन गरी प्रयोग गरिरहेको पाइन्छ। लाग्छ; काउन्टर इन्टेलिजेन्सी सेवाद्वारा राष्ट्रिय हित संरक्षण गर्ने कुनै सोचसम्म छैन हामीसँग। यस्तो अवस्थामा कसरी कुनै सरकारले यो मुलुकको आर्थिक, सैनिक तथा राजनीतिक शक्तिलाई नेपाली जनताको सार्वभौम हितका लागि प्रयोग गर्न सक्ला? यो देशको विपत्ति कसले खप्ने तथा यसमा आइपर्दा को जाइलाग्ने भन्ने कुनै अवधारणा क्रियाशील देखिँदैन। के गणतन्त्र स्थापना गर्नुको अर्थ यस देशका राष्ट्रिय स्वार्थ नै छैनन् भन्ने हो र?

माथिको पृष्ठभूमिले एउटा प्रजातान्त्रिक, समावेशी र न्यायपूर्ण संविधान जारी गर्ने बाटोमा देखिएका चुनौतीहरूलाई एक/एक गरेर समाधान गर्दै नयाँ संविधान जारी गराउनुपर्ने नेपालको वर्तमान नेतृत्ववर्गको बाध्यतालाई छर्लङ्ग पार्छ। बाटो विकट त छ नै- तर त्यो विकटताभन्दा पनि ठूलो जोखिम भनेको यत्रो प्रजातान्त्रिक प्रयोग गरेर ल्याउने भनेको संविधान बनेकै दिनदेखि जलाउन लागियो भने त्यसको परिणति के होला? जस्तोसुकै राम्रो संविधान आए पनि यसका विरुद्ध जाइलाग्ने अवयवहरू अहिले नै प्रस्ट देखिइसकेका छन्। यस्तो अवस्थामा केही वर्ष अघिदेखि नै धरापमा परिसकेको नेतृत्व वर्गले दिएको निकासले त्यस्ता विवादहरूकोसमाधान कति सम्भव होला?

यो सङ्कटको घडीमा नेपाली सेनाले आफ्नो भूमिकालाई कुन रूपमा बुझनेछ, नेपालको प्रजातान्त्रिक भविष्य त्यसैमा निहित हुनेछ। सबै संयन्त्रहरूको ढाड भाँचिसकिए तापनि करिब एक लाख जवानको क्षमता भएको एउटा बलियो राष्ट्रिय सेना मुलुकमा विद्यमान नै छ। यदि संविधान आउन सकेन अथवा आएर पनि त्यसले प्रजातान्त्रिक मूल्य र मान्यतालगायत राष्ट्रिय स्वार्थहरूलाई कायम राख्न सकेन भने कुनै पनि सरकारले यो देश धान्न सक्ने छैन। दुवै अवस्थामा फाइदा लिएरै छोड्ने विदेशी दृष्टिकोणका कारण भविष्य आकलन गर्न गाह्रो छैन। मुलुकको एकता र अखण्डताको सवालमा कुनै पनि देशको सेना तटस्थ बसिराख्न सम्भव हुँदैन। नागरिक संयन्त्र काम नलाग्ने भएपछि सैनिक संयन्त्र अगाडि आउँछ नै। त्यसैले पनि हुनसक्छ कतिपय पक्षहरूले यो सेनाको राष्ट्रवादी चरित्रलाई पनि कुनै न कुनै हिसाबले कमजोर पार्नुपर्छ भन्ने आशयका विभिन्न प्रस्तावहरू गर्दै हिँडेका छन्। यहाँ फस्ने सम्भावना दह्रो भएर आएको छ- सरकार तथा सेना दुवैको।

राज्य संस्थापनको क्रममा प्रजातान्त्रिक भारत नटुक्रिरहन सकेन। त्यसपछि पनि त्यसले लगातार रूपमा आन्तरिक विखण्डन तथा विद्रोहका प्रयासहरू भोग्नु परिरहेको छ। संसारमा अत्यधिक हिंस्रक आन्दोलनहरू खप्ने देशहरूमा भारतको नाम सबैभन्दा अगाडि आउँछ। चाहे नागाल्याण्ड आदि उत्तरपूर्वी भूभागहरू होउन् या कश्मिर र पञ्जाव क्षेत्रमा भएका र भइरहेका― हिंसात्मक द्वन्द्वहरू भारतले खपिनैरहेको छ। चीनबाट आफ्नो भनी दाबी गरिएको अरुणाचल प्रदेश अहिले पनि अस्थिर नै छ। राष्ट्रिय एकताका यस्ता चुनौतीहरू भारतका लागि नयाँ होइनन्। तर भारतका हरेक सरकार राष्ट्रियता तथा सार्वभौमसत्तालाई मोलतोल नगरिकन प्रजातान्त्रिक प्रक्रियाबाट ती समस्याहरूको हल गर्दै आएका छन्। विद्रोही र सरकारहरूसँगको वार्तालाई टेवा दिने शक्ति न त भारतको राजनीतिक एकता थियो, न त यसको आर्थिक क्षमता। यसको एउटै आधार थियो राष्ट्रप्रति समर्पित भारतको सेना तथा समग्र सुरक्षा संयन्त्र। भारतमा राष्ट्रिय अखण्डता र राष्ट्रवादको ग्यारेन्टी बनेको छ त्यहाँको सेना।

त्यसैगरी जनवादी चीनले पनि चाहे आन्तरिक रूपमा होस् वा बाह्य रूपमा आफ्नो सरहदभित्र विभिन्न किसिमका सङ्कटहरू खपेको छ। राजधानी बेइजिङ्ग आफैं नै सुरक्षाको हिसाबले असाध्यै संवेदनशील क्षेत्र मानिन्छ। यसलाई स्थिर राख्न चीनले आफ्नो सारा क्षमता लगाउँदै आएको छ। तैपनि त्यहाँ सुरक्षा दुर्घटनाहरू भइरहेकै हुन्छन्। सन् १९५० देखि तिब्बत द्वन्द्वकै अवस्थामा छ। पश्चिमको सिन्जियाङ प्रान्तमा तीन महिना अगाडि भएको भीषण जातीय आन्दोलन चीनले खपिरहेको आन्तरिक स्थितिको एउटा ताजा उदाहरण हो। विदेशीबाट सल्काइएको भनेर चीनले आरोप लगाएको यस आन्दोलनमा दुई सयभन्दा बढी व्यक्तिहरूको ज्यान गयो। तर पनि आन्तरिक सुरक्षाको सवालमा चीन असाध्यै दह्रो मुलुक हो। चीनको करिब ३० लाखको जनमुक्ति सेना कुनै पनि विद्रोहलाई दबाउने क्षमता राख्दछ। आन्तरिक अस्थिरतासँग जुध्न बनाइएको ६ लाख ६० हजार जवानसहितको सैनिक प्रहरीले निरन्तर रूपमा प्रहरी प्रशासनलाई पछाडिबाट ब्याकअप सहयोग पुर्‍याइरहेको हुन्छ। आजसम्म चीन एउटा अभिभाज्य तथा सार्वभौमसत्ता सम्पन्न रहनुको प्रमुख कारण उसको सेना तथा सुरक्षा संयन्त्र नै हो।

चीनमा हाल पनि अधिनायकवादी व्यवस्था छ। तर सोचेर, बुझ्ेर र विस्तारै प्रजातान्त्रिक संस्थाहरूलाई संस्थागत गराउनुपर्छ भन्ने मान्यता चिनियाँ नेताहरूले राख्दै आएका छन्। चीनको शासक वर्ग हाम्रा नेताहरूले झ्ैं संसद्मा अनुत्तरदायी र प्रजातन्त्रविरोधी कुरा राख्दैनन््। प्रजातान्त्रिक प्रक्रियालाई सोचेर, बुझ्ेर स्थापित गर्दै लैजानुपर्छ भन्ने उनीहरूको नीति रहेको देखिन्छ। यस बमोजिम नै उनीहरू आर्थिक क्षेत्रमा विधिको शासन लागू गर्दै अगाडि बढ्दैछन्। खर्बौं डलरको लगानी भित्र्याउँदै आफ्नो मुलुकलाई बलियो आर्थिक गति दिन सक्षम भएको छ चीन। प्रजातन्त्रलाई हतियार बनाएर अन्य मुलुकहरूले हामीलाई सिध्याउने हुन् कि भन्ने डरमा त्रस्त छन् चिनियाँहरू। हामी चिप्लियौँ भने उठ्न सक्ने छैनौँ भन्ने धारणाका कारण चीन जतिसुकै बेला पनि आफूलाई प्रतिरक्षा गर्न सक्ने तागत लिएर उभिएको छ।

प्रजातान्त्रिक दिल्ली होस् वा जनवादी चीन त्यहाँका सरकारहरूले गर्ने राजनीतिक निर्णयहरू सक्षमतापूर्वक लागू गर्ने राज्यशक्तिको आधार भनेको तिनका सुरक्षा संयन्त्र नै हुन्। हाम्रा पनि संवेदनशील विषय तथा क्षेत्रहरू कुन हुन् भन्ने कुरा प्रस्ट भइसकेको छ। त्यसैले संविधानसभाबाट आउने संविधान प्रजातान्त्रिक तथा समावेशी हुनुका साथै बृहत् राष्ट्रिय स्वार्थहरूलाई संरक्षण गर्ने उद्देश्यबाटै प्रेरित हुनुपर्छ। हाम्रो नयाँ संविधान लागू भइसकेपछि आउन सक्ने व्यवधानहरूको सामना गर्ने योजना र तयारी पनि अहिलेदेखि नै गरिनुपर्छ। नयाँ संविधानको सफल कार्यान्वयन र बचाउका निम्ति आवश्यक शक्ति र उपायहरूको बन्दोवस्त त्यही संविधानमै पनि गरिएको हुनुपर्छ। अहिलेदेखि नै तयारी गर्नुको अर्को विकल्प छैन।

Wednesday, October 7, 2009

Moderators’ plight - Bipin Adhikari

One can easily map the plight of the members of the moderating committee at the Constituent Assembly. Doing something in moderation means not doing it excessively. It is not perhaps out of place here to mention that in ancient Greece, the temple of Apollo at Delphi bore the inscription Meden Agan (nothing in excess) for posterity to remember. For this to materialise again, this country needs the sincere and nationalist support of the senior leaders to the moderation committee.

[Source: The Kathmandu Post, October 08, 2009]
http://www.ekantipur.com/tkp/news/news-detail.php?news_id=843

It has already been more than five months since the Constituent Assembly (CA) created a committee to study the concept papers and preliminary drafts produced by the different thematic committees. This committee is supposed to moderate these documents according to the given terms of reference and present a report to the full house for final adoption.

Once its recommendations are discussed in the full house, and adopted according to the CA rules, they lead to the Constitutional Committee for comprehensive drafting purposes. Although the role of the committee is very important, it has not been able to make much progress in its job for various reasons.

The purpose of the drafting phase in the constitution making business in Nepal is to establish an integrated constitutional proposal. This proposal — in the form of the first comprehensive draft of the new constitution — is to be done by the CA Constitutional Committee, which is one of the 11 thematic committees working in the house.

The Constitutional Committee can prepare the first integrated draft only after it is able to move from the strong but unstructured common constitutional will of the earlier phase. The drafting phase leads all the exercises done in the earlier phase to the formation of a common will around a precise integrated constitutional proposal.

The job of the draftsmen in the Constitutional Committee, however, is not easy. As the concept paper and preliminary drafts produced by six of the thematic committees have shown, there is lack of consistency in their approach to the new constitution. There is too much influence of the political party of the committee chairman on the committee concept papers and preliminary draft in some cases.

For example, the Committee on the Determination of Legislative Organ has produced its report based on the parameters of the parliamentary system because the committee leadership belongs to the Nepali Congress. In the same vein, the Committee on the Judicial System produced its report proposing a judiciary almost committed to the government becase its chairperson belongs to the UCPN (Maoist), which does not believe in the independence of the judiciary and its power of judicial review of issues of unconstitutionality. The values that both these parties have built are almost irreconcilable on fundamental grounds.

There are clear-cut ideological divisions between the UCPN (Maoist) members, who form the largest group in the house, and the others. There are dissenting notes signed by Tarai-based parties as well. On several issues, the CPN (UML) has marked differences with Nepali Congress priorities, although both these parties have a liberal orientation. There is little that has been done to sort out these differences in camera.

Issues like the nature of the electoral system or the number of provinces that the country is going to have should have been settled between the major parliamentary parties without much controversy. The situation has been further aggravated by issues of emotional value. The issue of whether to continue with the age-old flag of Nepal or to design a new one has been made controversial because the parties have done little homework.

Above all, three crucial issues — the form of government, nature of provincial arrangements and devolution, and the rest of the issues of state restructuring — do not show any trace of judicious resolution. The demand for ethnic demarcation of provinces, the question of “premium rights” (the so-called agradhikar), and the efforts to colour developmental issues in the periphery of ILO instrument 169 as overtly political issues will further complicate the prospect of any workable moderation. The forces which have almost lost the claim of “one Madhes one province” at the political level have re-energized themselves with the demand of Hindi as a new programme for the balkanization of the Tarai.

As the thematic committees in the unicameral CA started working on their part of the constitution making business without any “objective resolution” — or the basic principles which must be honoured in every case — the concept papers and preliminary drafts of their portion of the constitution are being produced independently of common governing (underlying) principles.

According to Radheshyam Adhikari, a senior member of the committee to study concept papers and preliminary drafts produced by different thematic committees (one can roughly describe it as a moderation committee), this group is working on the reports of four out of six committee reports so far produced and discussed in the house. These reports are being examined to see whether they have covered all the constitutional subjects under their terms of reference, and whether there are any jurisdictional overlaps or theoretical discrepancies in them.

It is the responsibility of this committee to see all the reports in their entirety and suggest necessary moderations to the full house, where applicable. If accomplished in its proper spirit, this moderating committee will definitely help the full house to consider all the propositions that they make to develop an integrated approach, adopt them with necessary treatment, and forward them to the Constitutional Committee for drafting an integrated constitutional proposal.

As the process of moderation at this level involves eliminating or lessening extremes, it will not be possible to do it without the serious commitment of senior leaders of major political parties. Ensuring consistency and accuracy also demands expert inputs at all levels within the committee. These inputs may help the committee members to get new ideas and alternative approaches for their consideration.

At the end, the problem is that moderation is never a militant approach. It is a process to make sure that assessments are valid, fair and consistent. It is a type of quality assurance to make sure thematic committee members’ formulations are consistent across the valid constitutional standards and universal principles. But nobody can reconcile what is inherently irreconcilable.

One can easily map the plight of the members of the moderating committee. Doing something in moderation means not doing it excessively. It is not perhaps out of place here to mention that in ancient Greece, the temple of Apollo at Delphi bore the inscription Meden Agan (nothing in excess) for posterity to remember. For this to materialise again, this country needs the sincere and nationalist support of the senior leaders to the moderation committee.

(lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com)

Thursday, September 24, 2009

Just a minute


"Everybody knows that the Maoists after spoiling many important months of parliament need a facelift to reach a compromise that does not create any political value except for their cadres sweating on the campaign for civilian supremacy."

The Kathmandu Post
http://www.kantipuronline.com/news/news-detail.php?news_id=300727

By Bipin Adhikari
lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com


Sep 24, 2009 - While Nepal’s Constituent Assembly (CA) has only eight months left to finish its alleged historical mission of drafting a new constitution, certain forces seem to be trying desperately to make a case for a seventh amendment to the Interim Constitution. An enabling political environment is being created to table the seventh constitution amendment bill in parliament as soon as the Dashain-Tihar festive weeks end. The political exercises towards this end painfully remind critiques of what poet Bhupi Sherchan (1937-1990) so skilfully described in his poem “We” a few decades ago:

We are the Ekalabya in the tale of the Mahabharata
In every generation [or amendment?] a Dronacharya comes to us
And we gladly, at his signal,
Cut off our thumb and offer it to him as a preceptor’s fee,
Destroying our own existence we hand it over to him
And we are ecstatic about our devotion to our teacher
About the strength of our own souls.

This time around as well, the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) is going to create a popular cause for such a move. It is basically the demand of this party that the constitution be amended once again. They have been insisting that the president, who had no power to ask the government to pursue the objective of dismissing the then chief of army staff Rookmangud Katawal according to the prescribed statutory procedures, and not to act on the decision made going beyond the standard traditions, was acting ultra vires. They interpreted it as an operation of the president with the assistance of the army, which led to the (enforced) resignation of their Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal.

With the alleged seventh amendment, the Maoists want to make sure that the president, a constitutional head, does not abuse his power once again. Everybody knows that the Maoists after spoiling many important months of parliament need a facelift to reach a compromise that does not create any political value except for their cadres sweating on the campaign for civilian supremacy. But their move has meaning for somebody else.

It is not a new phenomenon. It has been happening ever since April 2006, when King Gyanendra was forced to reinstate parliament and end his direct rule due to strikes and street protests in Kathmandu. The idea then was to restore the constitutional machinery that had become inoperative because the Maoists did not allow the government of the day to conduct elections to parliament whose term had already ended. On the contrary, as soon as the dead parliament was reinstated, it started acting against the very constitution which it wanted to restore.

The nine-point declaration unanimously passed by it aimed to keep the king out of the process while meeting many of the Maoist rebels’ conditions for taking part in the upcoming elections. Tabled by Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, the resolution left the king with only a ceremonial role by ending his title of commander-in-chief of the army, declaring the king’s income and assets taxable, removing his power to select an heir and changing the name of the government from “His Majesty’s Government” to “Nepal Government.” The reinstated parliament also dissolved the king’s advisory council. The resolution also declared parliament the supreme legislator and nullified any current laws that contradicted these points. The political developments have gone far beyond the May 2006 parameters for the restoration of democracy under a road map which is not clear to anybody.

The trend continues even now, although an elected CA is already in place under the Interim Constitution, the source of most of the instabilities of this country. It has been subjected to six amendments since it came into existence. Each amendment was sought on certain legitimate grounds; but in the final act, it ended up severely circumscribing the legitimate powers of the CA to take decisions on all issues made controversial at the hands of the seven-party alliance and the CPN (Maoist).

Whether it is about the declaration of the abolition of the monarchy or the decision to kick off the CA process without adopting an objective resolution, the Interim Constitution was played out with deliberate efforts. Similarly, the concept of federalism was imposed on the country pre-empting the power of the CA to take an appropriate decision in this regard. The constitution was also ruthlessly amended to allow every willing Indian living in Nepal or abroad to acquire Nepali citizenship.

The people of this country still do not know who are the 5.2 million people who have been given citizenship by committing fraud against the CA. It all went on as all covert operations in Nepal have shown — changing the demographic structure of the country overnight without giving any opportunity to the CA to decide if there were any legitimate claims for such a move at all. There is no reason to believe that the impending constitutional amendment is going to be any different.

Despite all these manoeuvrings, the present composition of the CA cannot be changed; and certain proposals for the new constitution cannot be passed by a two-thirds majority of the house, no matter how covert the operations are. In a way, recent political controversies regarding Vice President Parmanand Jha’s refusal to comply with the court’s directive to retake the oath of office in Nepali has sufficiently educated the people of this country as to what their motherland has really become in the hands of forces who have neither loyalty to this country nor commitment to constitutional democracy or the rule of law. This education has come as a blessing in disguise.

Everybody wants peace in Nepal. It comes only when Nepalis are left to decide their destiny themselves. They understand what gives them the pride of a nation. The CA should be allowed to take decisions on all important matters inside the house itself. Any policy decisions by way of a new constitutional amendment evading CA procedures is not a proper course of action.

Such excessive interventions and enforced compulsions for the political parties in Nepal will only result in further erosion in their capacity to organize their people. The decreasing faith of the common people in their leaders is not good for anybody. Moreover, Nepalis are no longer interested in paying any gurudakshina (a preceptor’s fee) anymore. The alternative is another conflict and chaotic Nepal.

Friday, September 11, 2009

Judge for yourself

In fact, the CA Committee on Judicial System has not spent its energy on how justice can be made accessible to all the deprived and downtrodden people of this country, which is the major issue of the day. It has rather focused on how judicial power can be belittled, and the doctrine of the separation of powers to protect the liberty of the common people be kept at the mercy of the majority party in the legislature.

Bipin Adhikari
lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com


Source: The Kathmandu Post, September 10, 2009)
http://www.ekantipur.com/news/news-detail.php?news_id=300076

While the Constituent Assembly (CA) is losing its sense of direction, the Committee on Judicial System (CJS) has now proposed a strange concept paper and preliminary draft on the form and nature of the judiciary under the new constitution.

Submitted for discussion in the full house, this proposal is yet another example of how vulnerable Nepal has become as a country adhering to the principles of the rule of law and independence of the judiciary in the hands of illiberal constitution makers.

Although the committee proposal has not been unanimously decided, and the full house of the CA can still reshape it, the fact that some political forces at the committee level can go to this extent is ever disturbing. Led by a Maoist member, Prabhu Shah, the Committee on Judicial System enables the appointment of the chief justice who is not a sitting Supreme Court (SC) justice. Even knowing that this provision could have lethal use in the prevailing political culture, some Madhesi parties have joined the Maoists to allow them to form a majority. This provision has been introduced undoubtedly to break with the past, resize the concept of the independence of the judiciary, and create a judiciary committed to the government.

The provision of direct appointment of the chief justice from outside the Supreme Court is not problematic per se, but it must be seen among other changes to be put in place. The proposal also provides for a committee within the legislature to appoint judges and take action against them when they breach justice.

Details are not provided, but it is this committee which will have the power to interpret the constitution, where necessary, thereby stripping the Supreme Court of its role as the guardian of the constitution. Once passed, it will no longer be the Supreme Court which will have the final word on what the constitution says, or does not say, on a particular constitutional issue, and leave the responsibility to the legislature.

But that does not seem to be enough, though. Reforms being contemplated by the Committee on Judicial System make explicit that the legislature will have complete jurisdiction to decide issues involving the position and powers of the head of state, the chief executive of the country, and officials to be elected by the legislature (like the speaker, deputy speaker, committee chairs and so on).

All political issues, even if they involve legal constitutional questions, and issues of laws contradicting the constitution, will be taken care of by the legislature itself in the future. Besides, a special court could be created by the legislature, whenever there is a vacancy, to take action against judges (should they breach the trust of the legislature), and give the final verdict, with no scope for an independent judicial review.

These changes are coming against a background of Maoist allegations that the judiciary and the Nepal Army, two stable state apparatus in Nepal still not shattered by belligerent winds, must be overcome to establish a genuine “people’s democracy” in the country. An independent judiciary, which does not want to be guided by the government, and the national army, which is said to be firm on certain national security issues, do not help the transition towards an authoritarian regime.

In fact, the committee has not spent its energy on how justice can be made accessible to all the deprived and downtrodden people of this country, which is the major issue of the day. It has rather focused on how judicial power can be belittled, and the doctrine of the separation of powers to protect the liberty of the common people be kept at the mercy of the majority party in the legislature.

The template for this change is without doubt not democratic. Even in China, wherefrom these constitutional arrangements are said to have been imitated, things have been changing. In the past 30 years, owing to the tragic experience of the Cultural Revolution and the urge for economic development, China attached great importance to the independence of the judiciary and reform of its legal system. It is trying to catch up with other technically advanced nations in the world and has begun to actively co-exist in the global economic system.

Every modern Chinese believes that a credible judiciary and legal system can provide a solid base for developing a market economy. Economic construction replaced class struggle as the basic task of the Chinese Communist Party. Its growing legal system has quickly become a new means relied on both by this party for its governance and by Chinese citizens as a safeguard for their increasing individual rights.

Under economic reform and an open-door policy, an increase in individual autonomy and contacts with the outside world has further raised the expectations of the people for more protection of their basic rights. As a result, legal reform has become an urgent task to resolve the rising conflicts and expectations in society. To meet these expectations of the citizenry, China has even started ushering in periodic plans to modernize the judiciary, comply with international standards and rationalize the legal system.

Much of the study of their legal reform efforts concerns the struggle to adapt international norms to local conditions. As a huge country with a fast growing economy and fears of internal instability and external security threats, Chinese policymakers are careful not to jump on everywhere without stabilizing changes. Although not without limitations, the direction is certainly positive.

Even now, the structure of China’s government, especially the judiciary, is very peculiar. It is one of the five organs of the National People’s Congress. There is no special status given to it by the constitution. The other four organs are the president of China, the State Council, the Central Military Commission and the Supreme People’s “Procuratorate”. The Communist Party of China still prevails everywhere. In this environment, the judiciary is yet to emerge as a fully independent institution — based on the doctrine of separation of powers.

Yet, China is certainly trying to emerge from the rubbish of the past. It is so strange that the Maoists of Nepal are still attracted to people’s courts which existed in China from 1949-78 as component parts of the corresponding government.

Saturday, August 29, 2009

राजनीतिक घेरामा न्यायालय - बालकृष्ण बस्नेत

'जसले शासन चलाउँछ, कानुन बनाउँछ । उसैलाई संविधान व्याख्या गर्न दिनु स्वेच्छाचारिताको पराकाष्ठा हो,' युवा संविधानविद् बिपिन अधिकारी न्यायिक समितिले पारित गरेका प्रावधानले मुलुकमा ठूलो दुर्घटना निम्त्याउनसक्ने औंल्याउँछन् । बाहिरबाट प्रधानन्यायाधीश नियुक्त गर्ने प्रावधान पनि एकलौटी शासन सञ्चालनको हतियार बन्ने उनको तर्क छ ।

Kantipur Daily, August 29, 2009 (13 Bhadau 2066)

काठमाडौं, लोकतान्त्रिक पद्धतिमा जसले कानुन बनाउँछ उसैलाई व्याख्याको अधिकार कहीँ छ ? संविधानसभा न्यायिक समितिले शुक्रबार पारित गरेको प्रस्ताव जस्ताको तस्तै नयाँ संविधानमा लेखियो भने त्यो नेपालमा हुनेछ । 'दुर्भाग्यबस त्यसो भयो भने' कानुनमै कपाल फुलाएका मोतीकाजी स्थापितका शब्दमा 'नयाँ संविधान मात्र बन्दैन, साथमा नयाँ खालको निरंकुशतासमेत आउनेछ ।'

एकीकृत माओवादीको अगुवाइमा संविधानसभा अन्तर्गतको न्यायिक समितिले न्यायालयको क्षेत्राधिकार एकपछि अर्को कटौती गरेको छ । 'यथास्थितिवाद हटाउन र न्यायालयका समस्यालाई जरैबाट उखेल्न' नयाँ मोडलको न्यायपालिकाको खाका माओवादीले कोरेको छ । त्यसमा मधेसी जनअधिकार फोरमलगायत मधेसवादी दलले साथ दिएका छन् । कांग्रेस, एमाले सहित दल भने समितिमा अल्पमतमा परे ।

न्यायाधीशको नियुक्ति र कारबाहीको अधिकार केन्द्रीय व्यवस्थापिकाअन्तर्गत गठन हुने समितिलाई दिने प्रस्ताव पारित भएको हो । त्यतिमात्र होइन, संविधान व्याख्याको अधिकारसमेत सोही समितिलाई दिएपछि माओवादी प्रस्ताव शंकाको घेरामा
परेको छ । अहिले नियुक्ति र कारबाही अधिकार न्यायपरिषद् र संविधानको सम्पूर्ण व्याख्याको अधिकार सर्वोच्च अदालतलाई छ । एकात्मक र शक्तिशाली व्यवस्थापिकाको अडान राख्दै आएको माओवादीले त्यही निकायलाई न्यायालयको अधिकार दिनुपर्ने तर्क गरेपछि विवाद चुलिएको हो ।

'लिखित संविधान भएका, झन् संघीय प्रणाली अवलम्बन भएका कुनै देशमा पनि संविधान व्याख्याको अधिकार संसदलाई हुँदैन,' वरिष्ठ अधिवक्ता स्थापितले कान्तिपुरसँग भने । धेरै संघ/राज्यहरू भएपछि अधिकार बाँडफाँडलगायत ठूला विवादमा स्वतन्त्र निकायको खाँचो हुन्छ । त्यस्ता विवाद स्वतन्त्र र सक्षम न्यायालयबाटै समाधान गर्नुपर्ने विश्वव्यापी मान्यता र अनुभव छन् ।

तर न्यायिक समितिले राष्ट्राध्यक्ष, कार्यकारी प्रमुख वा व्यवस्थापिकाद्वारा निर्वाचित पद र अधिकारसँग सम्बन्धित प्रश्न, राजनीतिक विषयसँग प्रत्यक्ष सरोकार राख्ने विषय र संविधानसँग कानुन बाझिएका विषयमा व्याख्याको अधिकार व्यवस्थापिकालाई हुने निर्णय गरेको छ । यसअघि बिहीबार न्यायाधीशको नियुक्ति, कारबाहीको अधिकार सोही समितिलाई हुने र प्रधानन्यायाधीश पदमा न्याय सेवा बाहिरबाट समेत नियुक्त गर्नसक्ने व्यवस्था पारित भएका थिए ।

'जसले शासन चलाउँछ, कानुन बनाउँछ । उसैलाई संविधान व्याख्या गर्न दिनु स्वेच्छाचारिताको पराकाष्ठा हो,' युवा संविधानविद् बिपिन अधिकारी न्यायिक समितिले पारित गरेका प्रावधानले मुलुकमा ठूलो दुर्घटना निम्त्याउनसक्ने औंल्याउँछन् । बाहिरबाट प्रधानन्यायाधीश नियुक्त गर्ने प्रावधान पनि एकलौटी शासन सञ्चालनको हतियार बन्ने उनको तर्क छ ।

न्यायपालिकासम्बन्धी माओवादी अवधारणा विवादास्पद र विरोधाभासपूर्ण छन् । एकातिर उसले न्यायसम्बन्धी सम्पूर्ण अधिकार अदालतमा निहित हुने प्रस्तावमा सहमति जनाएको छ । त्यसैलाई खण्डन हुने गरी नियुक्ति, कारबाही र व्याख्यामा नयाँ व्यवस्था छ । न्यायालयलाई सत्ताको प्रत्यक्ष नियन्त्रणमा राखी माओवादीले जनवादी शासन व्यवस्था स्थापित गर्न खोजेको भनी यस्ता प्रस्तावको विरोध भएको हो ।


न्यायालयसम्बन्धी आफ्नो अवधारणाको गलत बुझाइरहेको माओवादी तर्क छ । 'व्यवस्थापिकालाई अधिकार थप्नु जनप्रतिनिधिलाई बलियो बनाउनु हो । सत्ता कब्जा होइन' माओवादी सभासद एकराज भण्डारीले कान्तिपुरसँग भने ।

यथास्थितिवाद, संसदीय गलत परम्परा र शक्ति सन्तुलनको दुरुपयोगमा रमाइरहेकाहरूले मात्र आफ्नो प्रस्ताव विरोध गरेको माओवादी तर्क छ ।

'पुराना खराब संरचनालाई हटाई नयाँ व्यवस्थामा जाँदा स्वाभाविक विरोध हुन्छ । तर परिवर्तनका लागि हिजोका संरचनामा फेरबदल अनिवार्य छ,' उनले भने । माओवादीको अगुवाइमा पारित प्रस्तावमा केन्द्रमा संघीय व्यवस्थापिका न्यायसमिति, राज्यमा राज्य व्यवस्थापिका न्यायसमिति र जिल्लामा प्रतिनिधिसभा न्यायसमितिलाई प्रधानन्यायाधीश सहित सबै तहका न्यायाधीशको नियुक्ति, कारबाही र न्याय प्रशासनसम्बन्धी अन्य कुराहरूको सिफारिस अधिकार दिइएको छ । त्यसका लागि सम्बन्धित व्यवस्थापिका उपाध्यक्षको अध्यक्षतामा एक कानुनमन्त्री र बाँकी सबै संसद सदस्य हुनेगरी ११ सदस्यीय समिति गठन हुने उल्लेख छ ।

न्यायाधीशको कारबाहीका लागि संसदीय समिति आफैंले गठन गरेको विशेष अदालतमा मुद्दा दायर हुने र उक्त अदालतले गरेको फैसला नै अन्तिम हुने 'जबर्जस्त' व्यवस्था पनि प्रस्तावमा छ ।

व्यवस्थापिका, कार्यपालिका र न्यायपालिका एक अर्कामा सन्तुलित हुने शक्ति पृथकीकरण सिद्धान्तको व्यापक दुरुपयोग गरिएको, न्यायालयमा चरम भ्रष्टाचार हुँदा अहिलेको संरचनाले काम नगरेको अधिवक्ता भण्डारीको ठम्याइ छ ।

'शक्ति पृथकीकरणको व्यावहारिक कार्यान्वयन अहिले पनि कहाँ भएको छ ? सबै दलले राजनीतिक हस्तक्षेप गरेकै छन् । अदालत झन् गैरजिम्मेवार र अनुत्तरदायी छ,' उनले भने ।

Friday, August 28, 2009

Restructuring Nepal's Judiciary - Few changes needed to add constituent unit dimension to court system - Bipin Adhikari

http://www.forumfed.org/en/products/magazine/Nepal2009/Nepal-judiciary.php

One of the major issues before the Constituent Assembly of Nepal is deciding on the mechanics of devolving judicial power to the far-flung villages in the new state structure.

The Constituent Assembly (CA), a body of 601 members formed in the election held on 10 April 2008, is tasked with writing a new constitution for Nepal within two years under the authority of the interim constitution.

The history of the modern independent judiciary in Nepal dates back to 1950, when a revolution overthrew the hereditary and despotic prime ministerial system, a system in which the post of prime minister was passed from one member to another member in the same family. It was replaced by an interim constitutional regime meant to be a modern constitutional democracy. Different forms of judiciary have been in place during the last 58 years within the framework of Nepal’s unitary state. Thus, one of the key subjects of national debate in modern Nepal is restructuring the judiciary – in particular, devolving judicial power to the autonomous constituent units, according to the aspiration of the people of Nepal.

How Nepal's judiciary works today

Nepal’s judiciary operates within the framework of its parliamentary democracy. All powers relating to justice in the country are exercised by courts and other judicial institutions in accordance with the constitution, the laws and the recognized principles of justice. Judicial procedures are adversarial, largely based on common-law principles and lawyers play a key role in the process of judicial decision making.

Nepal has a National Code which deals with traditionally important:

• civil laws
• penal laws, and
• court procedures

Many of the modern areas of criminal and civil laws are not covered by the National Code as such. They were dealt with by special statutes enacted by the legislature after 1962 on different dates.

The judicial branch is led by the Supreme Court, the highest court in the judicial hierarchy of the land. In this capacity, the constitution confers upon the Supreme Court not only original and appellate jurisdiction, but also extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction. This includes the authority of the Supreme Court to hear petitions challenging the constitutionality of any law, and declare such law or any part of it void in order to ensure that justice is done. It can also, when convinced, respond to public-interest litigation involving constitutional issues regarding the rights of the marginalized.

As the guardian of the constitution, the Supreme Court has all the requisite powers and status that such responsibilities call for. All other courts in the country -- that is Appellate Courts (of which there are currently 16), and District Courts (of which there is one for each of the 75 administrative districts in Nepal) -- are subordinate courts and are administered by the Supreme Court.

Based on constitutional prescriptions, the Administration of Justice Act of 1991 has empowered the Supreme Court to inspect and supervise its inferior courts, and give them directives, which are obliged to implement them. The Supreme Court is a court of record -- its decisions are accepted to be of evolutionary value and are not to be challenged when produced before any court. They are binding on all and the Court has the power to mete out punishment to anyone it holds in contempt of court.

Moving towards a devolved system

In addition to Nepal’s three-tier unitary judiciary, there are several tribunals and specific types of courts established by parliamentary statutes. They are meant to hear special types of applications, claims and controversies.

There is one Administrative Court, two public-debts courts, four revenue tribunals, one Town Development Committee Court, one Military Court, one Labour Court and one Constituent Assembly Court.

The Constituent Assembly Court has been functioning since early this year. It deals exclusively with complaints regarding CA elections.

Except for the CA Court, all these special courts and tribunals are created and regulated under the terms of their enabling parliamentary statute. These statutes define the number, size and location of courts, as well as their territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction. Where there are complicated questions of law, or issues of fundamental rights and constitutional interpretation, cases decided by these courts or tribunals may be referred to the appellate courts, or the Supreme Court, according to the terms of the enabling law.

The structure of Nepal’s court system is one of the simplest in the region. It is constitutionally defined in substance, and statutorily elaborated in detail.

The unified and unitary judiciary makes it easy to administer and to ensure necessary quality control. All judges are appointed on the recommendation of the Judicial Council led by the Chief Justice who, in turn, is appointed and supervised by a high-profile constitutional body. A flourishing law profession, a legally qualified judicial bureaucracy and an independent judiciary complement each other. This does not mean that the present three-tier structure and the workings of the judiciary are not in need of reform. But, to effect change, it may not be necessary to start from a blank slate and create everything anew.

There are many issues that could be reopened to ensure devolution of judicial power to the newly formed constituent units. It is important that the political issues are settled first -- including the degree of internal autonomy of these constituent units and their law-making powers. Establishing the number of constituent units and their territorial limits is also a substantial part of the job.

Options for change

However, there are feasible options. A four-tier judiciary is one option, with a National Supreme Court at the top, almost as it exists today, including a National Court of Appeal in each devolved territory, acting under national laws. The court of appeal would have appellate jurisdiction over the lower courts and tribunals. No doubt, in such a changed context, the National Supreme Court should be looked at more as a constitutional court.

Apart from carrying out its normal duties as guardian of the fundamental rights of Nepalese citizens, it would deal with inter-constituent unit as well as national-constituent unit issues. Similarly, the National Courts of Appeal, replacing the existing Appellate Courts, may well have to serve as the top courts in each constituent unit, assuming some additional constitutional jurisdiction, and in effect become the local arm of the National Supreme Court.

Again, if the current 75 administrative districts are divided into some workable constituent unit set-up of eight or 10 constituent units, with a national government at the top, it will be necessary to provide for a locally recruited and operated court of the constituent unit in each constituent unit. There would also be a locally recruited and operated district court in each district within the constituent unit.

As such, the existing district courts could continue working as the court of first instance for cases coming under laws and institutions of constituent units. Each constituent unit court in its area would not only enjoy the status of appellate court over all district courts, but also serve as trial court for all cases falling under the laws and institutions under the national jurisdiction. As such a court of the constituent unit, locally recruited and operated, would function not only for the constituent unit; but also as the court of first instance for the centre.

It is at the constituent unit level that access to justice in Nepal must be ensured first. At this level, there is a need for an approachable judiciary. It must be simple enough to be accessed without the mediation of lawyers and must function in a participatory and transparent manner. Such an achievement would definitely require redefining the number, size and location of district courts, as well as their territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction.

For example, each district court (as suggested above) could have three or four separate one-member benches, according to the subject specificity, such as a family bench (dealing with marriage, divorce, domestic violence and women's rights), civil bench, criminal bench and small business bench. Simplifying existing trial-court procedures should encourage greater respect for the law, making the judiciary more accessible to the public and self-represented litigants. Such restructuring at the district-court and constituent unit court level could provide greater uniformity in rules and procedures — simplifying the tasks of lawyers, clerical personnel and judges, and cutting the costs of litigation.

There have been principles established and lessons learned in the restructuring of many other smaller democracies, especially in budgeting, planning and personnel administration, integration and standardization of the judiciary's information-management systems, judicial compensation and access to justice. These may be applicable in a wide variety of court-reform contexts, whether to justify a court’s existence or its closure, or to accommodate political sensitivities. The CA must also be mindful of serious flaws in the current judicial system, that it is not accessible to most people in the countryside. Even worse, it is increasingly acquiring an elitist character. The problems start right there.

Bipin Adhikari is a constitutional expert based in Kathmandu.