नयाँ संविधान र ब्रुटस प्रवृत्ति - डा. विपिन अधिकारी

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काठमाडौ, २०६६ पुस १३ - संविधानसभाको समयसीमा साँघुरिदै जाँदा तोकिएको अवधिमा मुलुकले प्रजातान्त्रिक संविधानप्राप्त गर्न सक्नेछ या छैन भन्ने विषयलाई लिएर यतिबेला विभिन्न शंका/उपशंका गरिँदैछ । संविधानसभाको कार्यप्रगति, यसको स्तर, त्यहाँ भएको राजनीतिक मूल्य र मान्यताका बहसहरू तथा विभिन्न दलहरूको संविधान निर्माणप्रतिको निष्ठा हेर्दा धेरैलाई विरक्ति लाग्न थालेको छ । एउटा प्रश्न बारम्बार उपस्थित हुन्छ - 'किन संविधान नबन्नेतर्फ सबैको ध्यान मोडिदैछ ?'

यो एउटा यक्ष प्रश्न हो । पश्चिमी संस्कृतिमा अंग्रेजी साहित्यकार सेक्सपियरको प्रसिद्ध नाटक जुलियस सिजरमा एउटा हृदयविदारक प्रसंग बारम्बार कोट्याइने गरिन्छ । सम्राट सिजरका भरपर्दा मित्र मार्कस जुनियस बु्रटस् उनको साम्राज्य तथा समृद्धिमा जहिले पनि गहिरो अर्थ राख्दथे । सिजरको जीवनकालभरि बु्रटस्को क्षमता, निष्ठा तथा उत्साहप्रति सिजरलाई कहिल्यै शंका भएन । एकरात सिजरलाई केही व्यक्तिहरूले षड्यन्त्रपर्ण तरिकाले भालाले घोचीघोची मार्न खोज्छन् । एउटा योद्धाका रूपमा सिजरले हत्याराहरूको उक्त झुन्डलाई एक्लैले प्रतिरोध गरिरहेका हुन्छन् । त्यस्तो प्रकारको आक्रमणको कुनै सम्भावना कहिल्यै नसोचेका सिजरलाई हत्याराहरूको अनुहार निहाल्ने रहर जाग्दछ । जब प्रतिरोधको क्रममा ती अनुहारहरू उनी हेर्न लाग्दछन् । सिजरको मुटु उनको मुखसम्म आइपुग्छ र उनी फत्रक्क गल्दछन् । आफ्नो प्रतिरक्षा गर्ने उनको चाहना समाप्त भएर जान्छ ।

पत्यार गर्न गाह्रो थियो- त्यस हत्याराहरूको समूहमा उनका सबैभन्दा विश्वासिला साथी बु्रटस्लाई देख्दा संसारप्रति सम्राट सिजरमा कुनै आशक्ति बाँकी रहँदैन । उनको मुखबाट केवल तीनटुक्रा शब्दमात्र निस्कन्छः 'इभेन यु, ब्रुटस ?' जब ब्रुटसस्जस्ता साम्राज्य निर्माण गर्न सहयोग गर्ने सहयात्री नै सिजरको हत्या गर्न तयार भई आउँछन् र सिजरको विशाल साम्राज्यको धोकापूर्ण पतनका लागि उभिन्छन् भने त्यो लडाइँ लडेर कुन मूल्य र मान्यतालाई बचाउने भन्ने दर्दनाक आशय हुन्छ, ती तीन टुक्रा शब्दको । सेक्स्ापियरद्वारा रचित उक्त नाटक क्राइस्ट जन्मनुभन्दा ४४ वर्षअघिको सम्राट जुलियस सिजरको हत्याको कथा हो । तर यसको नैतिक पाठ आज पनि उत्तिकै महत्त्व राख्दछ ।

अहिले संविधान बनाउनका लागि पाँच महिना बाँकी छ । धेरै ब्रुटसस्हरू लागि परेका छन् संविधान नबनोस् भनेर । प्रजातन्त्रप्रतिको आस्था समाप्त हुन लाग्यो भन्ने पिर कसैलाई छैन । पाँच महिनाको अवधिमा यो विश्वमा कतिपय संविधानहरू बनेर जारी भइसकेको इतिहासले देखाउँछ । नेपालमा किन सम्भव छैन ? यदि साँच्चिकै संविधान बनाउन सकिने स्थिति छैन भने किन छैन ? त्यसको जिम्मेवारी लिन अगाडि बढ्नुपर्‍यो । भइरहेको एउटा प्रजातान्त्रिक तथा भविष्यमुखी संविधानलाई फालेर मुलुकमा यति भद्दा मजाक गर्ने छुट कसैलाई प्राप्त हुनुहुँदैन । साँच्चिकै यो देशको स्थिति नयाँ संविधान बनाउन सकिने खालको छैन भने जिम्मेवार पक्षले अगाडि आएर भन्नुपर्‍यो- संविधानसभाको आयोजना कसका लागि गरिएको थियोे भनेर ? यसको चुनाव गराउनु र यति ठूलो आकारको संविधानसभालाई आजसम्म सकिनसकि थेग्नुको अर्थ के थियो ? त्यो स्पष्ट गर्न सक्नुपर्दछ । यदि प्रजातन्त्रप्रतिको अटुट आस्था तथा विश्वासका कारण संविधानसभाको रचना गरिएको थिएन भने यसको प्रष्ट जवाफ जनतासमक्ष आउनुपर्छ । किन यति भ्रामक आशयहरू राजनीतिज्ञ, सभासदहरू तथा नागरिक समाजको मुखबाट निस्किरहेका छन् । आज यस्ता प्रश्नहरू ती व्यक्ति तथा क्षेत्रहरूबाट उठाइनु के एउटा विडम्बना मात्र मानेर बिर्सिदिने ?

वास्तवमा मुलुकभरि मूलप्रवाहका पत्रपत्रिकादेखि रेडियो, टेलिभिजनलगायत सबै क्षेत्रबाट संविधान बन्न नसकेमा यो राजनीतिक संक्रमणकाललाई कसरी अगाडि बढाउने भन्ने चिन्ता व्यक्त गर्न थालिएको छ । कतिपय राजनीतिज्ञ तथा कानुनविद्हरू अन्तरिम संविधानको छिद्रान्वेषण गर्दै यसबाट राष्ट्रपति शासन हुन सक्ने तथा यसको आधारमा अगाडि बढ्न सकिने विश्लेषण अगाडि सार्न पछाडि परेका छैनन् भने कतिपय व्यक्तिहरू वर्तमान संविधानको संशोधन गर्दै संविधान बनाउनका लागि थप समयावधिको व्यवस्था गर्नुपर्ने कुरालाई अगाडि राख्दै हिँडेका छन् । यी दुवै कुतर्क हुन् ।

प्रथमतः अहिले पनि नेपालले आम नेपालीलाई स्वीकार्य संविधान बनाउन सक्ने समय टरेको छैन । मुलुकमा आज पनि भविष्यका लागि कुनै ऊर्जा बाँकी छ भने त्यो ऊर्जा यो पाँच महिनाको अवधिमा बाँकी रहेको संविधान निर्माणसम्बन्धी कार्यलाई सम्पन्न गर्न प्रयोग गर्नुपर्दछ । संविधान निर्माणका लागि व्यवस्था गरिएको दुई वर्षको अवधि स्थिर अवधि हो । यसलाई बढाउने वा घटाउनेतर्फ संविधानले स्पष्ट दृष्टिकोण नदिएको सम्बन्धमा कसैको दुईमत हुनसक्दैन । त्यस्तै दुई वर्षभित्र संविधान बनेन भने त्यस्तो दुर्भाग्यपूर्ण स्थितिका लागि के गर्ने भन्ने सम्बन्धमा वर्तमान संविधानले कुनै पनि प्रकारको वैकल्पिक व्यवस्था -कन्टिन्जेन्सी प्लान) को प्रावधान उल्लेख गरेको छैन । त्यसैगरी संकटकाल जाल बुनेर थप्ने विषय होइन । यसको अर्थ प्रष्ट छ- संविधानको भावनाअनुसार संविधान बन्नुपर्दछ ।

नेपालको प्रजातान्त्रिक विकासका लागि संविधानसभा जरुरी थिएन । कानुनको शासन तथा समन्यायलाई प्राणवायु बनाउन सक्ने जुनसुकै संवैधानिक पद्धतिले पनि अन्ततः प्रजातान्त्रिक अवधारणा तथा संस्थाहरूलाई आफ्नो जीवनपद्धति बनाउन सक्छ । प्रजातन्त्रको इतिहास यही हो । संविधानसभाको प्रक्रिया खतरामुक्त छैन तथा यसको प्रयोगका धेरै भूराजनीतिक सीमाहरू छन् भन्ने नेपालीहरूको आज पनि कमी छैन । यही विश्वासकै कारण विश्वेश्वरप्रसाद कोइरालाजस्ता शीर्षस्थ राजनेताले न्यूनतम प्रजातान्त्रिक मान्यता छ भने राजाले नै जारी गरेको संविधान पनि स्वीकार गर्दै त्यसको निष्ठापूर्वक पालनाको पक्षलाई जोड दिँदै निर्वाचनमा भाग लिएको आजको नेपालको राजनीतिको शीर्षस्थ नेताहरूलाई थाहा भएकै कुरा हो । तर आफ्नो राजनीतिक औकात तथा यो मुलुकको क्षमता तथा सामथ्र्य दुवै प्रति असंवेदनशील हुँदै जुन प्रयोगमा यो मुलुकलाई धकेलिएको छ । अब त्यसबाट देशलाई कसैगरी पनि उकासेर प्रजातान्त्रिक प्रक्रियालाई अगाडि बढाउनुको अर्को विकल्प छैन । एउटा गल्तीको आधारमा अर्को गल्ती गर्ने छुट कसैलाई पनि प्राप्त हुनुहुँदैन ।

संविधान निर्माण सम्बन्धमा एउटा भरपर्दो बाटो देशका लागि आज पनि उपलब्ध छ । त्यो बाटो भनेको अहिलेकै संविधानसभा तथा यसले सुरु गरेको प्रक्रियाबमोजिम आगामी पाँच महिनामा एउटा संक्षिप्त संरचना भएको छोटो तथा छरितो संविधान बनाउन सकिन्छ । संविधान निर्माणसम्बन्धी विभिन्न प्रयोगमा एउटा प्रयोग यस किसिमको संविधान बनाउने प्रयोग पनि हो । जब कुनै मुलुकमा वर्तमान राजनीतिक नेतृत्व वर्गले समाधान गर्न नसक्ने गरी नीतिगत प्रश्नहरू उपस्थित हुन जान्छन् तथा विभिन्न दलहरूबीच आम सहमति हरेक विषयमा देखा पर्दैन, त्यस अवस्थामा सहमतिका बुँदाहरूका आधारमा संक्षिप्त संरचना भएको सबैलाई स्वीकार्य संविधान निर्माण गरी अगाडि बढ्न सकिन्छ । जब मुलुकमा पुनः निर्वाचन हुन्छ तथा नयाँ संविधानका आधारमा नयाँ नेतृत्व वर्ग व्यवस्थापिकामा देखा पर्दछ । बाँकी रहेका नीतिगत प्रश्नहरूलाई पुनः छलफल गरी दुई तिहाई बहुमतले पारित गरी समाधान दिँदै जान सकिन्छ । संविधान बन्दै नबन्नुभन्दा एउटा भविष्यमुखी संविधान बनाएर मात्र विश्राम लिनु रणनीतिक हिसाबले व्यावहारिक देखिन्छ । प्रजातान्त्रिक संस्थाहरूप्रतिको आस्था जोगाइ राख्न भए पनि यो प्रक्रियामा जानै पर्दछ ।

यो नयाँ कुराचाहिँ होइन । उदाहरणका रूपमा डेनमार्कबाट स्वतन्त्रता दाबी गर्दै संविधान बनाउने राजनीति थेग्न नसकेपछि आइसल्यान्डले सन् १९४४ मा संक्षिप्त संरचना भएको संविधान निर्माण गरी संक्रमणकाललाई अन्त्य गरेको थियो । त्यसैगरी ७५ वर्षसम्म प|mान्सको संरक्षणमा रहेको ट्युनिसियाले सन् १९५६ मा स्वतन्त्रता प्राप्त गर्दा आइसल्यान्डकै जस्तो परिस्थिति खप्नुपर्‍यो । यसबाट पार पाउन उनीहरूले तीन वर्षसम्म संविधानसभामा छलफल गरे । टुंगोमा पुग्न नसकेपछि संक्षिप्त संरचना भएको संविधानमा सहमति गरेर राजनीतिक प्रक्रियालाई अगाडि बढाए । इन्डोनेसियामा पनि सन् १९४५ ताका त्यही नै भयो । आमसहमति बन्न नसक्दा एउटा अस्थायी संविधान निर्माण गरेर सभासदहरू बिदा भए । आजसम्म त्यही अस्थायी संविधान नै स्थायी सरह लागू भई बसेको छ । रोमानियाको कथा पनि त्यस्तै छ । सन् १९८९ मा तानाशाही व्यवस्थाबाट मुक्ति पाएको रोमानियाले सन् १९९१ मै एउटा संक्षिप्त संविधान बनाइ राजनीतिक अस्थिरतालाई अन्त्य गर्न सक्यो । पोहोर कोसोभोमा पनि त्यसै गरियो । आन्तरिक जातीय द्वन्द्वलाई व्यवस्थापन गर्ने क्रममा यसले पनि मुख मिलेका कुराहरूलाई आधार बनाई एउटा संक्षिप्त संविधान जारी गरी मुलुकलाई अगाडि बढाउन मदत गर्‍यो ।

यी सबै उदाहरणहरूले नेपालले चाह्यो भने एउटा संक्षिप्त संरचना भएको संविधान निर्माण गरी यो संविधानसभाको प्रक्रियालाई सार्थक निष्कर्षमा पुर्‍याउन सक्छ । मूल कुरा के हो भने प्रजातान्त्रिक निष्ठा र विश्वास कमजोर धरातलमा उभ्याउनु हुँदैन । यसले आफूलाई पनि र सम्पूर्ण मुलुकलाई डुबाउने छ ।

Right to self-determination

Discussion on this topic has suffered due to extremism among proponents and opponents.

Diverse jurisdictions can be looked into for additional models, for example, from the Saami Parliaments of Scandinavia to the Maori seats in the New Zealand Parliament to the Canadian experience in territorial governance for further discussion. Models help, but only when the ground situations are not overlooked. But issues like federalisation of the country based on ethnicity and grounding of rights jurisprudence on the concept of “premium rights” (agradhikar) going beyond the claims of affirmative action or reverse discrimination defy any such move.

BIPIN ADHIKARI

http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2009/12/16/Oped/Right-to-self-determination/3119/

THE KATHMANDU POST, DECEMBER 17, 2009 - The quality of discussion as to the right to self-determination has always suffered in Nepal because of the awfully motivated efforts by activists either to contain it, or to misinterpret it in a way that no country can ever afford to apply it.

Although a sub-committee constituted to advise the Constituent Assembly Committee on Restructuring of State and Distribution of State Powers on this issue has already submitted its report, it does not in any significant sense address the magnitude of the issue, and its complexity and implication in a constitutional framework which is to be based on democracy and constitutionalism. It offers little in the way of concrete suggestions or strategies for realising the claim for indigenous self-determination in Nepal.

In international law, the application of the right to self-determination in the context of decolonisation or associated independence movements is much clear. The United Nations itself was created “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace. In this context, both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) hold on their right “to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.

This right has been applied in the context of people under colonial domination and foreign occupation. But even international law, the UN Charter or other covenants do not explain what independence means, or provide any enforcement mechanism to implement this right when violated.

Since the early 1990s, however, the right to self-determination has gone beyond that. It is everywhere, and with different undercurrents. It is no longer an issue of colonial domination or foreign occupation only. It is being applied also in the context of subgroups within the people of a country. These sub-groups may or may not include indigenous groups depending on the situation of a particular country. But where there are indigenous groups, the right to indigenous self-determination is being recognised to freely determine their political status, and pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

In many countries, increasing political overtones of this right has also helped undermine the valid claims in it. It has thus led to an increase in the number of conflicts within states, where subgroups seek greater self-determination and even full secession. This is precisely the reason many constitutions forbid the right to self-determination through secession, and many others do not recognise this right in express words, although it does significantly contribute to the jurisprudence of fundamental rights in any country.

In order to avoid this trend, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by the General Assembly in 2007, the latest document on the theme, holds two principles together: That indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and international human rights law; and that “nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States”.

In addition, the 2007 Declaration responds to all misconceptions by stating thereon that “in the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, human rights and fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected”. They could be subjected only to such limitations “as are determined by law and in accordance with international human rights obligations”. “Any such limitations shall be non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic society.”

The 2007 Declaration makes it very explicit that the provisions set forth there should be interpreted in accordance with “the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, good governance and good faith”.

These fundamental principles leave little confusion to those who want to “operationalise” this principle in Nepal. In several countries, one can see patterns which are emerging pointing out to effective strategies that will allow communities to realise their goals in the framework of democracy, human rights and territorial integrity. It has been evidenced in both common law and civil law systems.

Many of the finished work of the CA thematic committees have already logically approached the issue of the right to self-determination through several specific content areas including provisions on basic collective and inclusionary rights, political representation, and recognition of identity variables in the letter and spirit of their preliminary drafts. So far, notwithstanding several drawbacks of the Constituent Assembly, it is difficult to find any report that betrays the cause of the indigenous people of the country.

Diverse jurisdictions can be looked into for additional models, for example, from the Saami Parliaments of Scandinavia to the Maori seats in the New Zealand Parliament to the Canadian experience in territorial governance for further discussion. Models help, but only when the ground situations are not overlooked. But issues like federalisation of the country based on ethnicity and grounding of rights jurisprudence on the concept of “premium rights” (agradhikar) going beyond the claims of affirmative action or reverse discrimination defy any such move.

Something’s not right: A list of rights without inbuilt judicial sanctions is not worth its name

A Supreme Court which lacks independence, which has to be accountable to a legislative committee, and which is always under the threat and duress of a legislative majority cannot protect any fundamental rights whatsoever.

http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2009/11/18/Oped/Somethings-not-right/2158/

BIPIN ADHIKARI
lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com

The recently released exhaustive list of fundamental rights and directive principles of state policy proposed under the new constitution of Nepal is not going to impress the country’s lawyers and many other critical thinkers here. The list is not without its built-in problems, but even assuming that the problems will be sorted out at a later stage, there are other crucial issues still unattended to. One such problem is that the list is without judicial sanction.

The issue of sanction is so important. A right without remedy is no right at all. In a way, even the Panchayat constitution, criticised on so many grounds, guaranteed a list of basic fundamental rights. Some rights were guaranteed only to Nepali citizens, and some were guaranteed to both citizens and non-citizens. The right to proceed for the enforcement of these rights was guaranteed by Article 16, and the Supreme Court was empowered with extra-ordinary jurisdiction to deal with any eventuality of their violation subject to the provisions of the constitution.

Like the constitution of 1959, the Panchayat constitution also provided for a Supreme Court, a court of record with the power to impose punishment for contempt of court. The king was to appoint its chief justice after consulting, if he so desired, the members of the state council and other judges after consultation with the chief justice. Apart from ordinary jurisdiction, it also had extraordinary jurisdiction to issue directives, orders or writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights, or in cases where no other remedy is provided, for the enforcement of rights conferred by any other law for the time being in force.

The decision of the Supreme Court was to be final. The Judicial Committee which could ask the king to order a revision of a case was basically the king’s committee. In any case, the principle of law declared by the Supreme Court in cases within its jurisdiction was binding on all courts. A Judicial Service Commission was also created to organise judicial service. But the functional aspect of the Supreme Court was not promising.

The constraints on the Supreme Court which according to the constitution exercised judicial powers of an absolute monarch were many. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court had performed its due role in cases of sensitive and serious political nature involving the monarchy, foreign relations and politics. It had also in many instances exercised its extraordinary power of judicial review assertively and effectively on the grounds of violation of natural justice and refusal of right to legal representation, non-conformity with the procedure prescribed by law, dismissal under a wrong way, non-disclosure of grounds and so forth.

There were some decisions which equally put questions on the status of the Supreme Court. It was not able to maintain consistency in its decisions in several cases, notwithstanding publicly expressed commitments and emphasis of justices in favour of judicial control for preserving the rule of law. The area of dissatisfaction for many against the passive stand taken by the Supreme Court is related to restrictions on fundamental rights imposed by Article 17 (2) and 11 (2A).

The court had, no doubt, failed in some instances to support the cause of the constitution by withdrawing itself from going into the property of the Act simply because the preamble of the enactment had shielded it with the “firewall” of “public good”, hence the judicial activism.

When the constitution of 1990 was promulgated 28 years later, all these problematic issues were reconsidered, and some outstanding arrangements were made to make sure that the Supreme Court, which got continuity in its form, changed significantly in terms of its substance. Not only was its power as the guardian of the constitution acknowledged, but efforts were also made to make sure that it was independent and able to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens.

In fact, as a Duke Professor Donald L. Horowitz has emphasised in a 2006 article, as of 2005 more than three quarters of the world’s states had some form of judicial review for constitutionality enshrined in their constitutions. It is a very popular constitutional institution. Even some undemocratic countries take it as a feature that constitutions should inculcate (even if in substance they imply quite a different angle). Although constitutional experts may be divided on whether the power of judicial review shall lie in the Supreme Court or a constitutional court separate from this conventional institution, it has become more and more difficult for constitution makers to avoid judicial review.

The introduction of a Supreme Court for the United Kingdom provides greater clarity in our constitutional arrangements by further separating the judiciary from the legislature.

The concept paper and preliminary draft submitted by the Constituent Assembly (CA) Committee on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles, no matter how good they are, cannot be properly studied without referring to the reports of the Committee on Judicial System.

The later report recommends infamous provisions in the new constitution which belittles the parameters of the Supreme Court as the guardian of the Constitution, and robs the power of judicial review from the Supreme Court in significant sense. It can neither interpret the constitution in important sense, nor it can judge upon the constitutionality of any law where it matters most. The report also makes sure that the Supreme Court and its judges are under parliamentary control in all matters relating to their appointment, dismissal and the job of judicial decision making.

A Supreme Court which lacks independence, which has to be accountable to a legislative committee, and which is always under the threat and duress of a legislative majority cannot protect any fundamental rights whatsoever. If this is so, the question is how the concept paper and preliminary draft submitted by the CA Committee on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles can safeguard the fundamental rights of the Nepali people. A list of rights without inbuilt judicial sanctions is not worth its name.

My law, your law

Nepal could study the Turkish model amind demands to communalise personal laws

The importance of secular laws and institutions cannot be over-emphasized in a progressive society. They are important because they are essential for the protection and promotion of human rights of all the people. But many democratic countries have conceded to the pressure and created exceptions in their legal systems to remain politically correct. The most recent example is Britain, which has officially adopted Islamic law, with sharia courts given powers to rule on Muslim civil cases.

Bipin Adhikari
lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com

A Muslim social activist in Lahan was asking this critique why the Muslims in the Constituent Assembly had not been able to garner enough support to make sure that the Muslims of Nepal, as many other Muslims of the world, were guaranteed the right to be governed by their own personal laws as far as their communities were concerned.

The forum that this author was participating in was on the theme of local self-government in the scheme of state restructuring, which was not something that attracted his attention at that moment. The question was very simple, but the answer remains difficult for many reasons.

Nepal has been practicing a uniform civil code from the very beginning. The National Civil Code (known to Nepalis as the New Muluki Ain) prescribes uniform rules for all Nepali communities and cultures. The code covers most of the laws governing rights relating to property and personal matters like marriage, divorce, maintenance, adoption and inheritance. The code allows communities and cultures to act according to their traditions in these matters, but the standard rules apply to everybody in the country, and the law courts in Nepal administer them uniformly except when exceptions are permitted by the code itself. As such, the code has been applied to Muslims as well since a very long time.

It was early this year when the Nepal Muslim Sangh, a federation of Nepali Muslim communities, made a request to the government to accept its six-point demand. These demands were intended to protect the interest of Muslims as a minority community in the country. The federation wanted the country’s Maoist government at that time to acknowledge that Nepali Muslims had a separate identity, and that this warranted the creation of a separate Islamic Affairs Commission, an Islamic School (Madrassah) Board, a Hajj Committee (for annual pilgrimages to Mecca) and the introduction of Islamic personal law based on the sharia for Muslim communities.

The Muslims, who number just over 800,000 or about 3.5 percent out of a population of 26 million, constitute Nepal’s second largest religious minority after Buddhists. On March 15, the government even signed an agreement with their representatives which, however, declined to accept their demand for recognition of sharia-based personal law in the new constitution.

Many Nepali Muslims in recent years are in touch with Muslims in other countries through their civil society organizations. A significant portion of Indian Muslims were able to receive citizenship certificates before the Constituent Assembly elections in 2007. Those who are familiar with the legal arrangements in India question why Nepal’s legal system cannot afford the same treatment to Nepali Muslims what the Indian legal system has afforded to Indian Muslims. They are aware that in India, family law is still determined by the religion of the parties concerned, despite many advances made by the legal system in other sectors.

While Muslims and Christians in India have their own personal laws, Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists come under the Hindu law enacted by parliament. India accepted communalizing family law as an extraordinary measure of protection to minorities for healing the wounds of the partition caused by communal polarization. The question is whether India should be followed as the best example in this case.

One must also not forget that the constitution of India directs the state to work towards a uniform civil code for the country (assuming that these arrangements are temporary interventions). This demand essentially means unifying all these personal laws to have one set of secular code that will apply to all citizens of India irrespective of the community they belong to. Though the exact contours of such a uniform code have not been spelt out, it should presumably incorporate the most modern and progressive aspects of all existing personal laws while discarding those which are discriminatory and violative of the basic rights of Indian citizens.

The Indian Supreme Court, which has established a very sublime image for itself as the guardian of fundamental rights of Indian citizens, has repeatedly regretted the fact that the state has not implemented this provision even after all these years. It has indeed been bold enough to instruct the government that it must move forward towards a secular regime.

The importance of secular laws and institutions cannot be over-emphasized in a progressive society. They are important because they are essential for the protection and promotion of human rights of all the people. But many democratic countries have conceded to the pressure and created exceptions in their legal systems to remain politically correct. The most recent example is Britain, which has officially adopted Islamic law, with sharia courts given powers to rule on Muslim civil cases.

The British government has sanctioned the powers for sharia judges to rule on cases ranging from divorce and financial disputes to those involving domestic violence. Rulings issued by a network of five sharia courts are enforceable with the full power of the judicial system, through the county courts or High Court. These courts are hearing cases where Muslims involved agree to be bound by traditional sharia law; and under the 1996 Arbitration Act, the court’s decisions can then be enforced by the county courts or the High Court. Previously, the rulings of sharia courts in Britain could not be enforced, and depended on voluntary compliance among Muslims.

So a sort of parallel legal system has already come into the picture there. Critics fear that Britain’s Islamic hardliners will now try to make sharia law the dominant legal system in Muslim neighborhoods, and warn that women often receive less favorable treatment at the hands of the traditional Islamic courts.

It is good that this country already has a system of uniform civil law. One possible alternative for Nepali Muslims would be to review the provisions of this national civil code and ask the government to revise and streamline the provisions which are objectionable from a secular point of view. Sharia law has certain religious values for Muslims, but then secular laws would have that value for every community.

It is interesting to note that Turkey, a predominantly Muslim state, has a secular constitution which provides for freedom of religion and many other human rights. It has very carefully worked out a civil code that very keenly secures the rights of all communities. The government, however, imposes some restrictions on all religious expression in its offices and state-run institutions, including universities, usually for the stated reason of preserving the state’s secular character.

The secularity, bearing the meaning of protection of beliefs, plays an important role to protect the state in Turkey. The region has a long and rich Islamic tradition stretching back to the dawn of the Seljuk period and the Ottoman Empire. Yet it still believes that secular institutions can serve all. This model could definitely be studied.

Loose ends

Bipin Adhikari (Source: http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2009/10/22/Oped/Loose-ends/1243/index.html)

KATHMANDU, OCT 22 - In the context of devolution of power from the centre to the provinces, one of the key issues that the Constituent Assembly (CA) has to respond to is how the obligations that Nepal has made under the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972 are going to be achieved in the new set-up.

Under this convention, Nepal has undertaken to identify and delineate the different “cultural heritage” and “natural heritage” situated on its territory. As a member state, it is the duty of Nepal to ensure the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural heritage on its territory. Each member state under the convention has to endeavour to adopt a general policy which aims to give the cultural and natural heritage a function in the life of the community and to integrate the protection of that heritage into comprehensive planning programmes.

In addition, the quest for the function and values of cultural expressions and practices and of monuments and sites, led by UNESCO, has paved the way for various new approaches to understanding, protecting and respecting cultural heritage of each country. These approaches, which involve the recognition of communities and groups as those who identify, enact, recreate and transmit the intangible or living heritage, found their culminating point in the adoption of the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage.

This convention which Nepal has shown willingness to ratify states that the “Intangible Cultural Heritage” is manifested — inter alia — in the following domains: ?oral traditions and expressions including languages as a vehicle of the intangible cultural heritage; performing arts (such as traditional music, dance and theatre); social practices, rituals and festive events; knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe and traditional craftsmanship.

Under the present constitution, which provides for an interim arrangement until a new constitution is adopted by the CA, the words and phrases employed to help preserve national heritage do not adequately reflect the authoritative expressions of the 1972 convention, the 2003 instrument, other conventions and many soft norms established in recent years. Although certain norms established in the rights perspective, as far as religion, culture, language and script and the arts, there is enough room for improvement taking the overall issue of the preservation and management of national heritage in the broader UNESCO perspective.

Nepal is renowned for its natural and cultural heritages. As far as the current legal regime is concerned, the power of preservation of national heritage has been provided for by the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act 1956, the Local Self-Governance Act 1999, various forestry and national park related laws, the Religious Endowments (Guthi) Corporation Act and so on. The Ministry of Culture and State Restructuring is the overall responsible body at the central level for safeguarding and promoting the cultural heritage, both intangible and tangible. The Department of Archaeology under the ministry has the responsibility for the preservation of the tangible cultural heritage. It has historically played a crucial role in its area of business.

The legal system also provides for specific institutions like the Cultural Corporation, the Nepal Copyright Office and similar institutions dealing with related components of national heritage. In 2007, the government also established new institutions in the form of the Nepal Academy for Language and Literature, the Academy of Fine Arts and the Academy of Music and Performing Arts with three separate statutes.

Mention may also be made of trusts like the Lumbini Development Trust and the Pashupati Area Development Trust, which operate under their defined jurisdiction. Similarly, there are councils like the Greater Janakpur Development Council, development committees for religious areas, i.e., Deoghat area, Manakamana area, Halesi area, Bouddhanath area, Budhanilkantha area, Pathibhara area and others which cater to the requirements of preservation and management of the national heritage.

Now while the CA is drafting a new constitution for Nepal is the time to deliberate on how the existing legal regime — crafted along the principles of a unitary system of government — should be restructured into a central-provincial framework. Such a discussion must look into relevant pragmatic technical and jurisdictional aspects of institution and site management, including funding considerations and human resource concerns for public cultural institutions in the new system.

What responsibilities are to be retained by the national government at the central level and what powers are to be devolved to the provincial units at the sub-national level are the main questions here. The devolution is not only to the provinces, but also to the regional, local and village levels. Similarly, a constitutional framework of devolution must respond to various managerial, financial and legislative issues as far as the devolved power and responsibilities are concerned. Unless the constitution makers discuss what the strengths or weaknesses of the present system are, it will be difficult for them to decide how the new arrangements must be made in the given perspective.

There could be several suggestions towards new, effective and sustainable arrangements. It might also be necessary to arrange for a national body to enforce national standards in the matter of preservation of national heritages and their multifarious uses. For example, the constitution makers may consider establishing something like a Nepal Heritage Council as a body of heritage experts to work as the Nepal Government’s independent expert advisory body on heritage matters. The council can play a key role in assessment, advice and policy formulation and support for major heritage programmes. Such a council could be far more effective than the existing multiple agency approach being applied hitherto.

To this day, the reports of the CA have not touched on the issue of national heritage as an exclusive issue. The Committee on the Determination of Bases for Cultural and Social Solidarity, which has already submitted its report, should have dealt with this issue at length. Failing this, one can only hope that the Committee on Restructuring of the State and Allocation of State Powers and the Committee on the Allocation of Natural Resources, Financial Powers and Revenues, which are the two remaining thematic committees on this issue, must take time and reflect on the new framework.

(lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com)

रिपोर्ट: नयाँ संविधान बनाउने र जोगाउने चुनौती - डा. विपिन अधिकारी

(Photo: Kiran Nepal) प्रजातान्त्रिक दिल्ली होस् वा जनवादी चीन त्यहाँका सरकारहरूले गर्ने राजनीतिक निर्णयहरू सक्षमतापूर्वक लागू गर्ने राज्यशक्तिको आधार भनेको तिनका सुरक्षा संयन्त्र नै हुन्। हाम्रा पनि संवेदनशील विषय तथा क्षेत्रहरू कुन हुन् भन्ने कुरा प्रस्ट भइसकेको छ। त्यसैले हाम्रो नयाँ संविधान लागू भइसकेपछि आउन सक्ने व्यवधानहरूको सामना गर्ने योजना र तयारी पनि अहिलेदेखि नै गरिनुपर्छ।

http://www.himalkhabar.com/news.php?id=2778 (वर्ष १९, अङ्क १३पूर्णाङ्क २५०, १-१५ कात्तिक २०६६
18 Oct-1 Nov 2009)


भनिन्छ; सम्राट जुलियस सिजरको हत्यापछि रोम शहर शोकको सागरमा डुबेको थियो। सारा नगरवासी रोएका थिए। तर पनि शहरका कतिपय क्षेत्रमा त्यो रोदन र शोकको प्रभाव थिएन। शहरका यौनकर्मीका पसलहरू खुलै थिए। र, त्यहाँ आउने-जानेहरूको पनि कमी थिएन। त्यहाँ नाचगान, भोग र लिप्साको क्रम अनवरत चलिनैरहेको थियो।

केही मान्छेलाई देशको पतन वा उत्थान कहिल्यै पनि व्यक्तिगत चासोको विषय बन्ने गर्दैन। निजी सुख-सुविधा र भोगविलास, परिवार तथा आफन्तको स्वार्थबाट अलग्गिएर देश र समाजको भविष्यमाथि घोरिन तिनलाई फुर्सद नै हुँदैन।

आज नेपालको हविगत लगभग जुलियस सिजर मारिएका बेलाको रोम साम्राज्यको जस्तै लाग्छ। संविधानसभाले नयाँ संविधान बनाउने काम शुरु गरेको १६ महिना पुगिसकेको छ। जतिजति दिन बित्दैछन् त्यति-त्यति आम मानिसलाई नयाँ संविधान बन्दैन कि भन्ने लाग्दै गएको छ। यसो त संविधान बनाउनका लागि संविधानसभाले लाखौँ सुझ्ाव पाएको छ।

संविधानसभाका ६ वटा विषयगत समितिले व्यापक अध्ययन, मनन तथा विश्लेषणका आधारमा नयाँ संविधानको लागि प्रारम्भिक मस्यौदा पनि प्रस्तुत गरिसकेका छन्। बाँकी रहेका समितिहरू पनि जोडतोडले आफ्नो काम फत्ते गर्न लागेकै देखिन्छन्। अवधारणापत्र तथा प्रारम्भिक मस्यौदा अध्ययन समितिले विषयगत समितिहरूद्वारा प्रस्तुत प्रतिवेदनहरूको अध्ययन तथा संशोधन (मोडेरेसन) गर्ने कार्य शुरु गरिसकेको छ। अबका सात महिना कस्सिएर लाग्ने हो भने संविधान जारी गर्न असम्भव लाग्दैन। तर यही बेला, संविधान बनाउने भन्दा यो मौकालाई अन्य उद्देश्यका लागि प्रयोग गर्नेहरूको डाँको बलियो हुँदै गएको छ।

आजको नेपाल एउटा ठूलो विपत्तिमा फँसिसकेका सङ्केतहरू देखिँदादेखिँदै र राज्यप्रणाली निरन्तर पतनोन्मुख हुँदाहुँदै पनि यो देश आत्मसमर्पण नै गर्ने अवस्थामा भने अझ्ै पुगेको छैन। सामरिक महत्वका ठूला ठूला हिमशिखरहरू, यसको स्वच्छ पानीको निरन्तर स्रोत, करोडौं हेक्टर जमिन सिंचाई गर्न सक्ने जल उत्पादनको क्षमता, जलविद्युत् विकासका लागि प्राकृतिक पूर्वाधारहरू, हावापानी तथा भविष्यमा वित्तीयलगायत विभिन्न क्षेत्रहरूमा दह्रो रूपमा फड्को मार्न सक्ने क्षमता अहिले पनि नेपालमा विद्यमान छ। र, यही क्षमता नै मुलुकको दुष्चक्रको कारण पनि बन्ने गरेको छ। सबैलाई यसको भौगोलिक अवस्थितिले लोभ्याएको छ। सँगसँगै गौरवशाली नेपाली जनता तथा आफ्नो मुलुकको स्वाधीनता तथा आत्मसम्मानप्रति चनाखो उनीहरूको दृष्टिकोणले आन्तरिक रूपमा कमजोर मुलुकहरूलाई त्रस्त पनि पारिराखेकै छ। त्यही त्रासको मानसिकताका कारण यहाँ विभिन्न अपरेशनहरू गरिँदैछन्। त्यस्तै अपरेशनको प्रभाव परेको छ संविधानसभामा पनि।

अबको दुई महिनापछि, २०६६ साल मङ्सिर ३० गते नेपालको सातौँ संविधानको पहिलो मस्यौदा आउनुपर्नेमा दुईमत छैन। पुसको पहिलो हप्ताभित्र त्यो मस्यौदा संविधानसभाको पूर्ण बैठकमा पेश हुन नसके १४ जेठ २०६७ मा नयाँ संविधान जारी हुन सम्भव हुने छैन। तर आज जुन रूपमा काम हुँदैछ, त्यसबाट दुईथरीका प्रश्न उठेका छन्। पहिलो; के यो संविधानसभाले बनाएको संविधान पूर्णतः प्रजातान्त्रिक मूल्य र मान्यतामा आधारित होला? यो प्रश्नको जवाफ हालसम्म भएका काम कारबाहीका आधारमा खोज्नुपर्ने हुन्छ। मुखले कसले के बोलेको छ भन्ने कुरा भन्दा पनि संविधानको प्रारम्भिक मस्यौदा बनाउनेतर्फ भएको प्रगति तथा त्यसमा उल्लिखित प्रावधानहरू यस प्रश्नको जवाफका लागि अहम् पक्षहरू हुनेछन्। दोस्रो प्रश्न हो- के त्यसरी बनाइएको संविधान आम नेपालीलाई स्वीकार्य होला? सम्पूर्ण राष्ट्रलाई स्वीकार्य हुनको लागि प्रस्तावित संविधानले नेपालीहरूको राष्ट्रवाद, प्रजातन्त्र प्राप्तिका लक्ष्यहरू तथा जातीय स्वाभिमान समेतको रक्षा गरेकै हुनुपर्नेछ। अब यो प्रश्नमा देश धेरै अल्मलिएला जस्तो लाग्दैन।

आजका मितिसम्म, प्रस्तावित नेपालको शासकीय स्वरुप कस्तो हुने र राज्यको पुनर्संरचना कसरी गर्ने भन्ने विषयमा संविधानसभाबाट कुनै प्रस्ताव पारित हुनसकेको छैन। यसको अभावमै व्यवस्थापिकीय अङ्गको स्व्ारुप निर्धारण समिति ले प्रस्तावित संसद्को प्रारुप तयार पारेको छ। संविधानसभाको न्यायप्रणालीसम्बन्धी समितिका बहुमत सदस्यहरूले स्वतन्त्र तथा व्यावसायिक न्यायपालिकाप्रति स्पष्टतः अविश्वास प्रकट गरिसकेका छन्। उनीहरूले न्यायाधीशको नियुक्ति र कारबाहीको अधिकार केन्द्रीय व्यवस्थापिकाअन्तर्गत गठन हुने समितिलाई दिने प्रस्ताव पारित गरेका छन्। त्यस अनुसार सर्वोच्च अदालतलाई संविधानका मूलभूत पक्षहरूमा व्याख्याको अधिकार रहने छैन। राष्ट्राध्यक्ष, कार्यकारिणी प्रमुख वा व्यवस्थापिकाद्वारा निर्वाचित पद र अधिकारसँग सम्बन्धित प्रश्नको छिनोफानो पनि अदालतले गर्न पाउने छैन। राजनीतिक विषयसँग प्रत्यक्ष सरोकार राख्ने विषय र संविधानसँग कानून बाझ्िएको विषयमा पनि व्याख्याको अधिकार व्यवस्थापिकासँगै हुनेछ। यसले अदालतको काम संविधानवादको रक्षा नभएर आलीधुर तथा सम्पत्ति जस्ता विषयसँग मात्र सीमित हुने सम्भावना प्रस्ट देखाएको छ।

संविधानसभाको न्याय प्रणालीसम्बन्धी समितिका बहुमत सदस्यले पारित गरेको मस्यौदा नै भावी संविधानको अङ्ग बन्ने हो भने त्यस उप्रान्त सर्वोच्च अदालतको न्यायाधीश भएरै न्याय सम्पादनको लामो अनुभव बटुल्नु प्रधानन्यायाधीश हुनको लागि जरुरी हुने छैन। न्यायाधीशको काम कारबाहीका सम्बन्धमा संसदीय समिति आफैंले गठन गरेको विशेष अदालतमा मुद्दा दायर हुने र उक्त अदालतले गरेको फैसला नै अन्तिम हुने प्रस्ताव समेत हेर्दा नयाँ संविधान मुलुकको मूल कानूनका रूपमा पनि रहन सक्ने देखिँदैन। नयाँ संविधानको संरक्षक सर्वोच्च अदालत नहुने भएपछि देशमा कानूनी शासनको भविष्य के होला- सोच्न सकिन्छ।

त्यस्तै निर्वाचित सरकारमाथि पनि विश्वास रहने अवस्था देखिँदैन। व्यवस्थापिकालाई कार्यकारिणी क्षेत्रमा प्रवेश गराउने प्रावधानहरू पनि अगाडि सारिएका छन्। संवैधानिक निकायको संरचना निर्धारण समिति ले समानता तथा विभेदविरुद्धको समान संरक्षणसम्बन्धी विषयहरूमा ६ वटा बेग्लाबेग्लै आयोगहरू प्रस्ताव गरेर सबैलाई चकित पारिदिएको छ। सबै कुरा स्वतन्त्र आयोगहरूले नै गर्ने भए करोडौं खर्च गरेर चुनावबाट आएको सरकारले चाहिँ के गर्ने नि भन्ने बारे धेरै प्रश्नहरू उपस्थित भएका छन्। उदाहरणको लागि, मधेशी आयोग जरुरी हुन्छ भने हिमाली आयोग किन जरुरी हुँदैन? दलितको लागि बेग्लै आयोग चाहिने भए सीमान्तकृतका लागि त्यस्तै आयोग किन नचाहिने? अनि, के असमानता तथा विभेद खप्नु परेका सबै समुदाय वा क्षेत्रका समस्यालाई एउटै बलियो आयोगले हेर्न सक्दैन? विशेषता प्राप्त आयोग स्थापनामा पनि भागबण्डाको राजनीति आश्चर्यजनक छ!

संविधानसभाको सांस्कृतिक र सामाजिक ऐक्यबद्धताको आधार निर्धारण समिति ले नेपाली भाषा केन्द्रीयस्तरको सरकारी कामकाजको भाषाका रूपमा स्थापित हुन संविधानसभा वा संसद्को दुईतिहाई बहुमतले पारित हुनुपर्ने तर हिन्दीभाषालाई केन्द्रीय सरकारी कामकाजको भाषाका रूपमा स्थापित गर्न भाषा आयोगको सिफारिसमा संसद्को सामान्य बहुमतबाटै सम्भव हुने क्रान्तिकारी व्यवस्था सार्वजनिक गरेको छ। स्थानीय भाषाहरूलाई अवसर दिने प्रयोजनबाट सिर्जित यो प्रावधानले विदेशी भाषालाई पनि स्थापित गरेरै छोड्ने छाँट देखिन्छ। यदि नयाँ संविधानमा यो समितिको सिफारिस बमोजिम नै भाषा नीति कायम गरियो भने नेपालका कम्तीमा आठ-दश वटा भाषा नजान्ने व्यक्तिले केन्द्रीयस्तरको कर्मचारी भएर काम गर्न सक्ने छैनन्। अल्पसङ्ख्यक तथा सीमान्तकृत समुदायको हकअधिकार संरक्षण समिति ले यो मुलुकलाई उत्पीडकको रूपमा परिभाषित हुनसक्ने गरी इतिहासमा गरेको पीडाको लागि राज्यले क्षतिपूर्ति दिनुपर्ने व्यवस्था प्रस्ताव गरेको छ। त्यसैगरी जातिगत आधारमा राज्यको पुनर्संरचना गरी राज्यलाई मूल जातिहरूबीच बाँडफाँड गर्नेतर्फ देशलाई अगाडि बढाउँदै गर्दा भइरहेका विवादहरूको समाधानभन्दा पनि मुलुक नयाँ विवादहरूतर्फ अग्रसर हुँदै गएको प्रस्ट देख्न सकिन्छ।

राष्ट्रिय हितको संरक्षण समिति ले नेपालको राष्ट्रिय हितको पहिचान गर्दा न त मुलुकले वर्षौंदेखि शोषण खपिरहनु परेको राष्ट्रिय इन्धन आपूर्ति नीतिको बारेमा केही उल्लेख गर्न सकेको छ, न खाद्य आपूर्तिसम्बन्धी व्यवस्थाका बारेमा नै केही बोलेको छ। नेपाल भूकम्पजन्य धरातलमा रहेको मुलुक हो। भुइँचालो गई लाखौंको ज्यान धरापमा परेको अवस्थामा जीउज्यानको सुरक्षा कसरी गरिनेछ? कसैलाई चासो भएको देखिएन।

संविधानसभामा प्रकट भएका यस्ता सबै विषय र व्याख्याहरूबाट के प्रस्ट हुँदै गएको छ भने नेपालमा सरकार बनाउने कुनै पनि दलले वा संयुक्त सरकारले नेपालको राजनीतिक सार्वभौमसत्ताको निरपेक्ष प्रयोग अरू धेरै दिनसम्म गर्न पाउने छैनन्। धेरै वर्ष भइसक्यो मुलुकविरुद्धका धम्कीहरूलाई नेपालको सरकारले कूटनीतिक प्रक्रियाद्वारा मुकाविला गर्ने क्षमता गुमाएको। आफ्नो अस्तित्व जोगाउनका लागि आर्थिक शक्ति बढाउने तथा सोको प्रयोगबाट अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सहयोग प्राप्त गर्ने वातावरण क्रमशः निखि्रँदै गएको छ। देश विरुद्ध सञ्चालित आतङ्कवादी गतिविधिलगायतका राष्ट्रिय सङ्कटहरू आइपर्दा त्यसको सामना गर्ने योजना तथा नागरिक प्रतिरक्षाको कार्यक्रम पनि यो मुलुकसँग बाँकी रहेको देखिँदैन।

यस्तो सङ्कटापन्न अवस्थामा मुलुकको अस्तित्व जोगाउने शक्ति भनेका देशका संवेदनशील संरचनाहरू (क्रिटिकल इन्फ्रास्ट्रक्चर) हुने गर्छन्। तर दुर्भाग्यवश त्यसमा पनि आजको नेपालको कुनै पकड छैन। संविधानसभा वा व्यवस्थापिकाको कार्यसूचीमा यस्ता कुराहरू पर्ने गरेको पाइदैंन। देशमा पैसाको र लगानीकर्ताहरूको कमी छैन। तर पनि कुनै नियोजित षड्यन्त्रअन्तर्गत मुलुकमा नयाँ विद्युत् उत्पादन कार्य लगभग शून्य अवस्थामा छ। इन्धन, दूरसञ्चार जस्ता आधारभूत वस्तु र सेवाहरूको सञ्चालन र नियन्त्रण विदेशीलाई जिम्मा लगाइसकेको सरकारले राष्ट्रिय सङ्कटहरू आइपर्दा स्थितिलाई कसरी सम्हाल्न सक्ला? खाद्यान्नको स्टक पटक्कै नभएको देश हो नेपाल। चाहिएको बेलामा दुईचार अर्ब डलर अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय ब्याङ्क वा वित्तीय कम्पनीहरूबाट खुरुक्क झ्िक्न सक्ने भरड्राफ्ट सुविधाको व्यवस्था आजसम्म कुनै सरकारले गर्न सकेको छैन। आफ्नो अस्तित्व समेत बोध गराउन अक्षम सरकारलाई अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय साहुहरूले कसरी पत्याउनु?

यसरी कोट्याउँदै जाँदा कहालीलाग्दो भुमरीमा परेको छ मुलुक। यसको गृह वा सुरक्षा स्वार्थको अध्ययन तथा अनुसन्धान गर्ने कुनै कारगर गुप्तचर सेवा सञ्चालनमा नरहेको धेरै वर्ष भइसक्यो। मन्त्रिपरिषद्का गोप्य निर्णयहरू मन्त्रालय पुग्नुभन्दा पहिले दूतावास पुग्दा आश्चर्य मान्न छोडिएको छ। आफ्नो कागजातको सुरक्षा गर्न नसक्ने मुलुकले अन्य देशले यसविरुद्ध सञ्चालन गरेका कामकारबाहीका सम्बन्धमा कसरी जासूसी गर्न सक्ला? गोप्यता भन्ने कुरा सरकारी संयन्त्रमा बाँकी नै नरहेको देखिन्छ। यहाँका संसूचनाहरू वर्गीकृत रूपमा विदेशी जासूसी संस्थाहरूले सङ्कलन गरी प्रयोग गरिरहेको पाइन्छ। लाग्छ; काउन्टर इन्टेलिजेन्सी सेवाद्वारा राष्ट्रिय हित संरक्षण गर्ने कुनै सोचसम्म छैन हामीसँग। यस्तो अवस्थामा कसरी कुनै सरकारले यो मुलुकको आर्थिक, सैनिक तथा राजनीतिक शक्तिलाई नेपाली जनताको सार्वभौम हितका लागि प्रयोग गर्न सक्ला? यो देशको विपत्ति कसले खप्ने तथा यसमा आइपर्दा को जाइलाग्ने भन्ने कुनै अवधारणा क्रियाशील देखिँदैन। के गणतन्त्र स्थापना गर्नुको अर्थ यस देशका राष्ट्रिय स्वार्थ नै छैनन् भन्ने हो र?

माथिको पृष्ठभूमिले एउटा प्रजातान्त्रिक, समावेशी र न्यायपूर्ण संविधान जारी गर्ने बाटोमा देखिएका चुनौतीहरूलाई एक/एक गरेर समाधान गर्दै नयाँ संविधान जारी गराउनुपर्ने नेपालको वर्तमान नेतृत्ववर्गको बाध्यतालाई छर्लङ्ग पार्छ। बाटो विकट त छ नै- तर त्यो विकटताभन्दा पनि ठूलो जोखिम भनेको यत्रो प्रजातान्त्रिक प्रयोग गरेर ल्याउने भनेको संविधान बनेकै दिनदेखि जलाउन लागियो भने त्यसको परिणति के होला? जस्तोसुकै राम्रो संविधान आए पनि यसका विरुद्ध जाइलाग्ने अवयवहरू अहिले नै प्रस्ट देखिइसकेका छन्। यस्तो अवस्थामा केही वर्ष अघिदेखि नै धरापमा परिसकेको नेतृत्व वर्गले दिएको निकासले त्यस्ता विवादहरूकोसमाधान कति सम्भव होला?

यो सङ्कटको घडीमा नेपाली सेनाले आफ्नो भूमिकालाई कुन रूपमा बुझनेछ, नेपालको प्रजातान्त्रिक भविष्य त्यसैमा निहित हुनेछ। सबै संयन्त्रहरूको ढाड भाँचिसकिए तापनि करिब एक लाख जवानको क्षमता भएको एउटा बलियो राष्ट्रिय सेना मुलुकमा विद्यमान नै छ। यदि संविधान आउन सकेन अथवा आएर पनि त्यसले प्रजातान्त्रिक मूल्य र मान्यतालगायत राष्ट्रिय स्वार्थहरूलाई कायम राख्न सकेन भने कुनै पनि सरकारले यो देश धान्न सक्ने छैन। दुवै अवस्थामा फाइदा लिएरै छोड्ने विदेशी दृष्टिकोणका कारण भविष्य आकलन गर्न गाह्रो छैन। मुलुकको एकता र अखण्डताको सवालमा कुनै पनि देशको सेना तटस्थ बसिराख्न सम्भव हुँदैन। नागरिक संयन्त्र काम नलाग्ने भएपछि सैनिक संयन्त्र अगाडि आउँछ नै। त्यसैले पनि हुनसक्छ कतिपय पक्षहरूले यो सेनाको राष्ट्रवादी चरित्रलाई पनि कुनै न कुनै हिसाबले कमजोर पार्नुपर्छ भन्ने आशयका विभिन्न प्रस्तावहरू गर्दै हिँडेका छन्। यहाँ फस्ने सम्भावना दह्रो भएर आएको छ- सरकार तथा सेना दुवैको।

राज्य संस्थापनको क्रममा प्रजातान्त्रिक भारत नटुक्रिरहन सकेन। त्यसपछि पनि त्यसले लगातार रूपमा आन्तरिक विखण्डन तथा विद्रोहका प्रयासहरू भोग्नु परिरहेको छ। संसारमा अत्यधिक हिंस्रक आन्दोलनहरू खप्ने देशहरूमा भारतको नाम सबैभन्दा अगाडि आउँछ। चाहे नागाल्याण्ड आदि उत्तरपूर्वी भूभागहरू होउन् या कश्मिर र पञ्जाव क्षेत्रमा भएका र भइरहेका― हिंसात्मक द्वन्द्वहरू भारतले खपिनैरहेको छ। चीनबाट आफ्नो भनी दाबी गरिएको अरुणाचल प्रदेश अहिले पनि अस्थिर नै छ। राष्ट्रिय एकताका यस्ता चुनौतीहरू भारतका लागि नयाँ होइनन्। तर भारतका हरेक सरकार राष्ट्रियता तथा सार्वभौमसत्तालाई मोलतोल नगरिकन प्रजातान्त्रिक प्रक्रियाबाट ती समस्याहरूको हल गर्दै आएका छन्। विद्रोही र सरकारहरूसँगको वार्तालाई टेवा दिने शक्ति न त भारतको राजनीतिक एकता थियो, न त यसको आर्थिक क्षमता। यसको एउटै आधार थियो राष्ट्रप्रति समर्पित भारतको सेना तथा समग्र सुरक्षा संयन्त्र। भारतमा राष्ट्रिय अखण्डता र राष्ट्रवादको ग्यारेन्टी बनेको छ त्यहाँको सेना।

त्यसैगरी जनवादी चीनले पनि चाहे आन्तरिक रूपमा होस् वा बाह्य रूपमा आफ्नो सरहदभित्र विभिन्न किसिमका सङ्कटहरू खपेको छ। राजधानी बेइजिङ्ग आफैं नै सुरक्षाको हिसाबले असाध्यै संवेदनशील क्षेत्र मानिन्छ। यसलाई स्थिर राख्न चीनले आफ्नो सारा क्षमता लगाउँदै आएको छ। तैपनि त्यहाँ सुरक्षा दुर्घटनाहरू भइरहेकै हुन्छन्। सन् १९५० देखि तिब्बत द्वन्द्वकै अवस्थामा छ। पश्चिमको सिन्जियाङ प्रान्तमा तीन महिना अगाडि भएको भीषण जातीय आन्दोलन चीनले खपिरहेको आन्तरिक स्थितिको एउटा ताजा उदाहरण हो। विदेशीबाट सल्काइएको भनेर चीनले आरोप लगाएको यस आन्दोलनमा दुई सयभन्दा बढी व्यक्तिहरूको ज्यान गयो। तर पनि आन्तरिक सुरक्षाको सवालमा चीन असाध्यै दह्रो मुलुक हो। चीनको करिब ३० लाखको जनमुक्ति सेना कुनै पनि विद्रोहलाई दबाउने क्षमता राख्दछ। आन्तरिक अस्थिरतासँग जुध्न बनाइएको ६ लाख ६० हजार जवानसहितको सैनिक प्रहरीले निरन्तर रूपमा प्रहरी प्रशासनलाई पछाडिबाट ब्याकअप सहयोग पुर्‍याइरहेको हुन्छ। आजसम्म चीन एउटा अभिभाज्य तथा सार्वभौमसत्ता सम्पन्न रहनुको प्रमुख कारण उसको सेना तथा सुरक्षा संयन्त्र नै हो।

चीनमा हाल पनि अधिनायकवादी व्यवस्था छ। तर सोचेर, बुझ्ेर र विस्तारै प्रजातान्त्रिक संस्थाहरूलाई संस्थागत गराउनुपर्छ भन्ने मान्यता चिनियाँ नेताहरूले राख्दै आएका छन्। चीनको शासक वर्ग हाम्रा नेताहरूले झ्ैं संसद्मा अनुत्तरदायी र प्रजातन्त्रविरोधी कुरा राख्दैनन््। प्रजातान्त्रिक प्रक्रियालाई सोचेर, बुझ्ेर स्थापित गर्दै लैजानुपर्छ भन्ने उनीहरूको नीति रहेको देखिन्छ। यस बमोजिम नै उनीहरू आर्थिक क्षेत्रमा विधिको शासन लागू गर्दै अगाडि बढ्दैछन्। खर्बौं डलरको लगानी भित्र्याउँदै आफ्नो मुलुकलाई बलियो आर्थिक गति दिन सक्षम भएको छ चीन। प्रजातन्त्रलाई हतियार बनाएर अन्य मुलुकहरूले हामीलाई सिध्याउने हुन् कि भन्ने डरमा त्रस्त छन् चिनियाँहरू। हामी चिप्लियौँ भने उठ्न सक्ने छैनौँ भन्ने धारणाका कारण चीन जतिसुकै बेला पनि आफूलाई प्रतिरक्षा गर्न सक्ने तागत लिएर उभिएको छ।

प्रजातान्त्रिक दिल्ली होस् वा जनवादी चीन त्यहाँका सरकारहरूले गर्ने राजनीतिक निर्णयहरू सक्षमतापूर्वक लागू गर्ने राज्यशक्तिको आधार भनेको तिनका सुरक्षा संयन्त्र नै हुन्। हाम्रा पनि संवेदनशील विषय तथा क्षेत्रहरू कुन हुन् भन्ने कुरा प्रस्ट भइसकेको छ। त्यसैले संविधानसभाबाट आउने संविधान प्रजातान्त्रिक तथा समावेशी हुनुका साथै बृहत् राष्ट्रिय स्वार्थहरूलाई संरक्षण गर्ने उद्देश्यबाटै प्रेरित हुनुपर्छ। हाम्रो नयाँ संविधान लागू भइसकेपछि आउन सक्ने व्यवधानहरूको सामना गर्ने योजना र तयारी पनि अहिलेदेखि नै गरिनुपर्छ। नयाँ संविधानको सफल कार्यान्वयन र बचाउका निम्ति आवश्यक शक्ति र उपायहरूको बन्दोवस्त त्यही संविधानमै पनि गरिएको हुनुपर्छ। अहिलेदेखि नै तयारी गर्नुको अर्को विकल्प छैन।

Moderators’ plight - Bipin Adhikari

One can easily map the plight of the members of the moderating committee at the Constituent Assembly. Doing something in moderation means not doing it excessively. It is not perhaps out of place here to mention that in ancient Greece, the temple of Apollo at Delphi bore the inscription Meden Agan (nothing in excess) for posterity to remember. For this to materialise again, this country needs the sincere and nationalist support of the senior leaders to the moderation committee.

[Source: The Kathmandu Post, October 08, 2009]
http://www.ekantipur.com/tkp/news/news-detail.php?news_id=843

It has already been more than five months since the Constituent Assembly (CA) created a committee to study the concept papers and preliminary drafts produced by the different thematic committees. This committee is supposed to moderate these documents according to the given terms of reference and present a report to the full house for final adoption.

Once its recommendations are discussed in the full house, and adopted according to the CA rules, they lead to the Constitutional Committee for comprehensive drafting purposes. Although the role of the committee is very important, it has not been able to make much progress in its job for various reasons.

The purpose of the drafting phase in the constitution making business in Nepal is to establish an integrated constitutional proposal. This proposal — in the form of the first comprehensive draft of the new constitution — is to be done by the CA Constitutional Committee, which is one of the 11 thematic committees working in the house.

The Constitutional Committee can prepare the first integrated draft only after it is able to move from the strong but unstructured common constitutional will of the earlier phase. The drafting phase leads all the exercises done in the earlier phase to the formation of a common will around a precise integrated constitutional proposal.

The job of the draftsmen in the Constitutional Committee, however, is not easy. As the concept paper and preliminary drafts produced by six of the thematic committees have shown, there is lack of consistency in their approach to the new constitution. There is too much influence of the political party of the committee chairman on the committee concept papers and preliminary draft in some cases.

For example, the Committee on the Determination of Legislative Organ has produced its report based on the parameters of the parliamentary system because the committee leadership belongs to the Nepali Congress. In the same vein, the Committee on the Judicial System produced its report proposing a judiciary almost committed to the government becase its chairperson belongs to the UCPN (Maoist), which does not believe in the independence of the judiciary and its power of judicial review of issues of unconstitutionality. The values that both these parties have built are almost irreconcilable on fundamental grounds.

There are clear-cut ideological divisions between the UCPN (Maoist) members, who form the largest group in the house, and the others. There are dissenting notes signed by Tarai-based parties as well. On several issues, the CPN (UML) has marked differences with Nepali Congress priorities, although both these parties have a liberal orientation. There is little that has been done to sort out these differences in camera.

Issues like the nature of the electoral system or the number of provinces that the country is going to have should have been settled between the major parliamentary parties without much controversy. The situation has been further aggravated by issues of emotional value. The issue of whether to continue with the age-old flag of Nepal or to design a new one has been made controversial because the parties have done little homework.

Above all, three crucial issues — the form of government, nature of provincial arrangements and devolution, and the rest of the issues of state restructuring — do not show any trace of judicious resolution. The demand for ethnic demarcation of provinces, the question of “premium rights” (the so-called agradhikar), and the efforts to colour developmental issues in the periphery of ILO instrument 169 as overtly political issues will further complicate the prospect of any workable moderation. The forces which have almost lost the claim of “one Madhes one province” at the political level have re-energized themselves with the demand of Hindi as a new programme for the balkanization of the Tarai.

As the thematic committees in the unicameral CA started working on their part of the constitution making business without any “objective resolution” — or the basic principles which must be honoured in every case — the concept papers and preliminary drafts of their portion of the constitution are being produced independently of common governing (underlying) principles.

According to Radheshyam Adhikari, a senior member of the committee to study concept papers and preliminary drafts produced by different thematic committees (one can roughly describe it as a moderation committee), this group is working on the reports of four out of six committee reports so far produced and discussed in the house. These reports are being examined to see whether they have covered all the constitutional subjects under their terms of reference, and whether there are any jurisdictional overlaps or theoretical discrepancies in them.

It is the responsibility of this committee to see all the reports in their entirety and suggest necessary moderations to the full house, where applicable. If accomplished in its proper spirit, this moderating committee will definitely help the full house to consider all the propositions that they make to develop an integrated approach, adopt them with necessary treatment, and forward them to the Constitutional Committee for drafting an integrated constitutional proposal.

As the process of moderation at this level involves eliminating or lessening extremes, it will not be possible to do it without the serious commitment of senior leaders of major political parties. Ensuring consistency and accuracy also demands expert inputs at all levels within the committee. These inputs may help the committee members to get new ideas and alternative approaches for their consideration.

At the end, the problem is that moderation is never a militant approach. It is a process to make sure that assessments are valid, fair and consistent. It is a type of quality assurance to make sure thematic committee members’ formulations are consistent across the valid constitutional standards and universal principles. But nobody can reconcile what is inherently irreconcilable.

One can easily map the plight of the members of the moderating committee. Doing something in moderation means not doing it excessively. It is not perhaps out of place here to mention that in ancient Greece, the temple of Apollo at Delphi bore the inscription Meden Agan (nothing in excess) for posterity to remember. For this to materialise again, this country needs the sincere and nationalist support of the senior leaders to the moderation committee.

(lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com)

Just a minute

"Everybody knows that the Maoists after spoiling many important months of parliament need a facelift to reach a compromise that does not create any political value except for their cadres sweating on the campaign for civilian supremacy."

The Kathmandu Post
http://www.kantipuronline.com/news/news-detail.php?news_id=300727

By Bipin Adhikari
lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com

Sep 24, 2009 - While Nepal’s Constituent Assembly (CA) has only eight months left to finish its alleged historical mission of drafting a new constitution, certain forces seem to be trying desperately to make a case for a seventh amendment to the Interim Constitution. An enabling political environment is being created to table the seventh constitution amendment bill in parliament as soon as the Dashain-Tihar festive weeks end. The political exercises towards this end painfully remind critiques of what poet Bhupi Sherchan (1937-1990) so skilfully described in his poem “We” a few decades ago:

We are the Ekalabya in the tale of the Mahabharata
In every generation [or amendment?] a Dronacharya comes to us
And we gladly, at his signal,
Cut off our thumb and offer it to him as a preceptor’s fee,
Destroying our own existence we hand it over to him
And we are ecstatic about our devotion to our teacher
About the strength of our own souls.

This time around as well, the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) is going to create a popular cause for such a move. It is basically the demand of this party that the constitution be amended once again. They have been insisting that the president, who had no power to ask the government to pursue the objective of dismissing the then chief of army staff Rookmangud Katawal according to the prescribed statutory procedures, and not to act on the decision made going beyond the standard traditions, was acting ultra vires. They interpreted it as an operation of the president with the assistance of the army, which led to the (enforced) resignation of their Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal.

With the alleged seventh amendment, the Maoists want to make sure that the president, a constitutional head, does not abuse his power once again. Everybody knows that the Maoists after spoiling many important months of parliament need a facelift to reach a compromise that does not create any political value except for their cadres sweating on the campaign for civilian supremacy. But their move has meaning for somebody else.

It is not a new phenomenon. It has been happening ever since April 2006, when King Gyanendra was forced to reinstate parliament and end his direct rule due to strikes and street protests in Kathmandu. The idea then was to restore the constitutional machinery that had become inoperative because the Maoists did not allow the government of the day to conduct elections to parliament whose term had already ended. On the contrary, as soon as the dead parliament was reinstated, it started acting against the very constitution which it wanted to restore.

The nine-point declaration unanimously passed by it aimed to keep the king out of the process while meeting many of the Maoist rebels’ conditions for taking part in the upcoming elections. Tabled by Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, the resolution left the king with only a ceremonial role by ending his title of commander-in-chief of the army, declaring the king’s income and assets taxable, removing his power to select an heir and changing the name of the government from “His Majesty’s Government” to “Nepal Government.” The reinstated parliament also dissolved the king’s advisory council. The resolution also declared parliament the supreme legislator and nullified any current laws that contradicted these points. The political developments have gone far beyond the May 2006 parameters for the restoration of democracy under a road map which is not clear to anybody.

The trend continues even now, although an elected CA is already in place under the Interim Constitution, the source of most of the instabilities of this country. It has been subjected to six amendments since it came into existence. Each amendment was sought on certain legitimate grounds; but in the final act, it ended up severely circumscribing the legitimate powers of the CA to take decisions on all issues made controversial at the hands of the seven-party alliance and the CPN (Maoist).

Whether it is about the declaration of the abolition of the monarchy or the decision to kick off the CA process without adopting an objective resolution, the Interim Constitution was played out with deliberate efforts. Similarly, the concept of federalism was imposed on the country pre-empting the power of the CA to take an appropriate decision in this regard. The constitution was also ruthlessly amended to allow every willing Indian living in Nepal or abroad to acquire Nepali citizenship.

The people of this country still do not know who are the 5.2 million people who have been given citizenship by committing fraud against the CA. It all went on as all covert operations in Nepal have shown — changing the demographic structure of the country overnight without giving any opportunity to the CA to decide if there were any legitimate claims for such a move at all. There is no reason to believe that the impending constitutional amendment is going to be any different.

Despite all these manoeuvrings, the present composition of the CA cannot be changed; and certain proposals for the new constitution cannot be passed by a two-thirds majority of the house, no matter how covert the operations are. In a way, recent political controversies regarding Vice President Parmanand Jha’s refusal to comply with the court’s directive to retake the oath of office in Nepali has sufficiently educated the people of this country as to what their motherland has really become in the hands of forces who have neither loyalty to this country nor commitment to constitutional democracy or the rule of law. This education has come as a blessing in disguise.

Everybody wants peace in Nepal. It comes only when Nepalis are left to decide their destiny themselves. They understand what gives them the pride of a nation. The CA should be allowed to take decisions on all important matters inside the house itself. Any policy decisions by way of a new constitutional amendment evading CA procedures is not a proper course of action.

Such excessive interventions and enforced compulsions for the political parties in Nepal will only result in further erosion in their capacity to organize their people. The decreasing faith of the common people in their leaders is not good for anybody. Moreover, Nepalis are no longer interested in paying any gurudakshina (a preceptor’s fee) anymore. The alternative is another conflict and chaotic Nepal.

Judge for yourself

In fact, the CA Committee on Judicial System has not spent its energy on how justice can be made accessible to all the deprived and downtrodden people of this country, which is the major issue of the day. It has rather focused on how judicial power can be belittled, and the doctrine of the separation of powers to protect the liberty of the common people be kept at the mercy of the majority party in the legislature.

Bipin Adhikari
lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com

Source: The Kathmandu Post, September 10, 2009)
http://www.ekantipur.com/news/news-detail.php?news_id=300076

While the Constituent Assembly (CA) is losing its sense of direction, the Committee on Judicial System (CJS) has now proposed a strange concept paper and preliminary draft on the form and nature of the judiciary under the new constitution.

Submitted for discussion in the full house, this proposal is yet another example of how vulnerable Nepal has become as a country adhering to the principles of the rule of law and independence of the judiciary in the hands of illiberal constitution makers.

Although the committee proposal has not been unanimously decided, and the full house of the CA can still reshape it, the fact that some political forces at the committee level can go to this extent is ever disturbing. Led by a Maoist member, Prabhu Shah, the Committee on Judicial System enables the appointment of the chief justice who is not a sitting Supreme Court (SC) justice. Even knowing that this provision could have lethal use in the prevailing political culture, some Madhesi parties have joined the Maoists to allow them to form a majority. This provision has been introduced undoubtedly to break with the past, resize the concept of the independence of the judiciary, and create a judiciary committed to the government.

The provision of direct appointment of the chief justice from outside the Supreme Court is not problematic per se, but it must be seen among other changes to be put in place. The proposal also provides for a committee within the legislature to appoint judges and take action against them when they breach justice.

Details are not provided, but it is this committee which will have the power to interpret the constitution, where necessary, thereby stripping the Supreme Court of its role as the guardian of the constitution. Once passed, it will no longer be the Supreme Court which will have the final word on what the constitution says, or does not say, on a particular constitutional issue, and leave the responsibility to the legislature.

But that does not seem to be enough, though. Reforms being contemplated by the Committee on Judicial System make explicit that the legislature will have complete jurisdiction to decide issues involving the position and powers of the head of state, the chief executive of the country, and officials to be elected by the legislature (like the speaker, deputy speaker, committee chairs and so on).

All political issues, even if they involve legal constitutional questions, and issues of laws contradicting the constitution, will be taken care of by the legislature itself in the future. Besides, a special court could be created by the legislature, whenever there is a vacancy, to take action against judges (should they breach the trust of the legislature), and give the final verdict, with no scope for an independent judicial review.

These changes are coming against a background of Maoist allegations that the judiciary and the Nepal Army, two stable state apparatus in Nepal still not shattered by belligerent winds, must be overcome to establish a genuine “people’s democracy” in the country. An independent judiciary, which does not want to be guided by the government, and the national army, which is said to be firm on certain national security issues, do not help the transition towards an authoritarian regime.

In fact, the committee has not spent its energy on how justice can be made accessible to all the deprived and downtrodden people of this country, which is the major issue of the day. It has rather focused on how judicial power can be belittled, and the doctrine of the separation of powers to protect the liberty of the common people be kept at the mercy of the majority party in the legislature.

The template for this change is without doubt not democratic. Even in China, wherefrom these constitutional arrangements are said to have been imitated, things have been changing. In the past 30 years, owing to the tragic experience of the Cultural Revolution and the urge for economic development, China attached great importance to the independence of the judiciary and reform of its legal system. It is trying to catch up with other technically advanced nations in the world and has begun to actively co-exist in the global economic system.

Every modern Chinese believes that a credible judiciary and legal system can provide a solid base for developing a market economy. Economic construction replaced class struggle as the basic task of the Chinese Communist Party. Its growing legal system has quickly become a new means relied on both by this party for its governance and by Chinese citizens as a safeguard for their increasing individual rights.

Under economic reform and an open-door policy, an increase in individual autonomy and contacts with the outside world has further raised the expectations of the people for more protection of their basic rights. As a result, legal reform has become an urgent task to resolve the rising conflicts and expectations in society. To meet these expectations of the citizenry, China has even started ushering in periodic plans to modernize the judiciary, comply with international standards and rationalize the legal system.

Much of the study of their legal reform efforts concerns the struggle to adapt international norms to local conditions. As a huge country with a fast growing economy and fears of internal instability and external security threats, Chinese policymakers are careful not to jump on everywhere without stabilizing changes. Although not without limitations, the direction is certainly positive.

Even now, the structure of China’s government, especially the judiciary, is very peculiar. It is one of the five organs of the National People’s Congress. There is no special status given to it by the constitution. The other four organs are the president of China, the State Council, the Central Military Commission and the Supreme People’s “Procuratorate”. The Communist Party of China still prevails everywhere. In this environment, the judiciary is yet to emerge as a fully independent institution — based on the doctrine of separation of powers.

Yet, China is certainly trying to emerge from the rubbish of the past. It is so strange that the Maoists of Nepal are still attracted to people’s courts which existed in China from 1949-78 as component parts of the corresponding government.

राजनीतिक घेरामा न्यायालय - बालकृष्ण बस्नेत

'जसले शासन चलाउँछ, कानुन बनाउँछ । उसैलाई संविधान व्याख्या गर्न दिनु स्वेच्छाचारिताको पराकाष्ठा हो,' युवा संविधानविद् बिपिन अधिकारी न्यायिक समितिले पारित गरेका प्रावधानले मुलुकमा ठूलो दुर्घटना निम्त्याउनसक्ने औंल्याउँछन् । बाहिरबाट प्रधानन्यायाधीश नियुक्त गर्ने प्रावधान पनि एकलौटी शासन सञ्चालनको हतियार बन्ने उनको तर्क छ ।

Kantipur Daily, August 29, 2009 (13 Bhadau 2066)

काठमाडौं, लोकतान्त्रिक पद्धतिमा जसले कानुन बनाउँछ उसैलाई व्याख्याको अधिकार कहीँ छ ? संविधानसभा न्यायिक समितिले शुक्रबार पारित गरेको प्रस्ताव जस्ताको तस्तै नयाँ संविधानमा लेखियो भने त्यो नेपालमा हुनेछ । 'दुर्भाग्यबस त्यसो भयो भने' कानुनमै कपाल फुलाएका मोतीकाजी स्थापितका शब्दमा 'नयाँ संविधान मात्र बन्दैन, साथमा नयाँ खालको निरंकुशतासमेत आउनेछ ।'

एकीकृत माओवादीको अगुवाइमा संविधानसभा अन्तर्गतको न्यायिक समितिले न्यायालयको क्षेत्राधिकार एकपछि अर्को कटौती गरेको छ । 'यथास्थितिवाद हटाउन र न्यायालयका समस्यालाई जरैबाट उखेल्न' नयाँ मोडलको न्यायपालिकाको खाका माओवादीले कोरेको छ । त्यसमा मधेसी जनअधिकार फोरमलगायत मधेसवादी दलले साथ दिएका छन् । कांग्रेस, एमाले सहित दल भने समितिमा अल्पमतमा परे ।

न्यायाधीशको नियुक्ति र कारबाहीको अधिकार केन्द्रीय व्यवस्थापिकाअन्तर्गत गठन हुने समितिलाई दिने प्रस्ताव पारित भएको हो । त्यतिमात्र होइन, संविधान व्याख्याको अधिकारसमेत सोही समितिलाई दिएपछि माओवादी प्रस्ताव शंकाको घेरामा
परेको छ । अहिले नियुक्ति र कारबाही अधिकार न्यायपरिषद् र संविधानको सम्पूर्ण व्याख्याको अधिकार सर्वोच्च अदालतलाई छ । एकात्मक र शक्तिशाली व्यवस्थापिकाको अडान राख्दै आएको माओवादीले त्यही निकायलाई न्यायालयको अधिकार दिनुपर्ने तर्क गरेपछि विवाद चुलिएको हो ।

'लिखित संविधान भएका, झन् संघीय प्रणाली अवलम्बन भएका कुनै देशमा पनि संविधान व्याख्याको अधिकार संसदलाई हुँदैन,' वरिष्ठ अधिवक्ता स्थापितले कान्तिपुरसँग भने । धेरै संघ/राज्यहरू भएपछि अधिकार बाँडफाँडलगायत ठूला विवादमा स्वतन्त्र निकायको खाँचो हुन्छ । त्यस्ता विवाद स्वतन्त्र र सक्षम न्यायालयबाटै समाधान गर्नुपर्ने विश्वव्यापी मान्यता र अनुभव छन् ।

तर न्यायिक समितिले राष्ट्राध्यक्ष, कार्यकारी प्रमुख वा व्यवस्थापिकाद्वारा निर्वाचित पद र अधिकारसँग सम्बन्धित प्रश्न, राजनीतिक विषयसँग प्रत्यक्ष सरोकार राख्ने विषय र संविधानसँग कानुन बाझिएका विषयमा व्याख्याको अधिकार व्यवस्थापिकालाई हुने निर्णय गरेको छ । यसअघि बिहीबार न्यायाधीशको नियुक्ति, कारबाहीको अधिकार सोही समितिलाई हुने र प्रधानन्यायाधीश पदमा न्याय सेवा बाहिरबाट समेत नियुक्त गर्नसक्ने व्यवस्था पारित भएका थिए ।

'जसले शासन चलाउँछ, कानुन बनाउँछ । उसैलाई संविधान व्याख्या गर्न दिनु स्वेच्छाचारिताको पराकाष्ठा हो,' युवा संविधानविद् बिपिन अधिकारी न्यायिक समितिले पारित गरेका प्रावधानले मुलुकमा ठूलो दुर्घटना निम्त्याउनसक्ने औंल्याउँछन् । बाहिरबाट प्रधानन्यायाधीश नियुक्त गर्ने प्रावधान पनि एकलौटी शासन सञ्चालनको हतियार बन्ने उनको तर्क छ ।

न्यायपालिकासम्बन्धी माओवादी अवधारणा विवादास्पद र विरोधाभासपूर्ण छन् । एकातिर उसले न्यायसम्बन्धी सम्पूर्ण अधिकार अदालतमा निहित हुने प्रस्तावमा सहमति जनाएको छ । त्यसैलाई खण्डन हुने गरी नियुक्ति, कारबाही र व्याख्यामा नयाँ व्यवस्था छ । न्यायालयलाई सत्ताको प्रत्यक्ष नियन्त्रणमा राखी माओवादीले जनवादी शासन व्यवस्था स्थापित गर्न खोजेको भनी यस्ता प्रस्तावको विरोध भएको हो ।

न्यायालयसम्बन्धी आफ्नो अवधारणाको गलत बुझाइरहेको माओवादी तर्क छ । 'व्यवस्थापिकालाई अधिकार थप्नु जनप्रतिनिधिलाई बलियो बनाउनु हो । सत्ता कब्जा होइन' माओवादी सभासद एकराज भण्डारीले कान्तिपुरसँग भने ।

यथास्थितिवाद, संसदीय गलत परम्परा र शक्ति सन्तुलनको दुरुपयोगमा रमाइरहेकाहरूले मात्र आफ्नो प्रस्ताव विरोध गरेको माओवादी तर्क छ ।

'पुराना खराब संरचनालाई हटाई नयाँ व्यवस्थामा जाँदा स्वाभाविक विरोध हुन्छ । तर परिवर्तनका लागि हिजोका संरचनामा फेरबदल अनिवार्य छ,' उनले भने । माओवादीको अगुवाइमा पारित प्रस्तावमा केन्द्रमा संघीय व्यवस्थापिका न्यायसमिति, राज्यमा राज्य व्यवस्थापिका न्यायसमिति र जिल्लामा प्रतिनिधिसभा न्यायसमितिलाई प्रधानन्यायाधीश सहित सबै तहका न्यायाधीशको नियुक्ति, कारबाही र न्याय प्रशासनसम्बन्धी अन्य कुराहरूको सिफारिस अधिकार दिइएको छ । त्यसका लागि सम्बन्धित व्यवस्थापिका उपाध्यक्षको अध्यक्षतामा एक कानुनमन्त्री र बाँकी सबै संसद सदस्य हुनेगरी ११ सदस्यीय समिति गठन हुने उल्लेख छ ।

न्यायाधीशको कारबाहीका लागि संसदीय समिति आफैंले गठन गरेको विशेष अदालतमा मुद्दा दायर हुने र उक्त अदालतले गरेको फैसला नै अन्तिम हुने 'जबर्जस्त' व्यवस्था पनि प्रस्तावमा छ ।

व्यवस्थापिका, कार्यपालिका र न्यायपालिका एक अर्कामा सन्तुलित हुने शक्ति पृथकीकरण सिद्धान्तको व्यापक दुरुपयोग गरिएको, न्यायालयमा चरम भ्रष्टाचार हुँदा अहिलेको संरचनाले काम नगरेको अधिवक्ता भण्डारीको ठम्याइ छ ।

'शक्ति पृथकीकरणको व्यावहारिक कार्यान्वयन अहिले पनि कहाँ भएको छ ? सबै दलले राजनीतिक हस्तक्षेप गरेकै छन् । अदालत झन् गैरजिम्मेवार र अनुत्तरदायी छ,' उनले भने ।

Restructuring Nepal's Judiciary - Few changes needed to add constituent unit dimension to court system - Bipin Adhikari

http://www.forumfed.org/en/products/magazine/Nepal2009/Nepal-judiciary.php

One of the major issues before the Constituent Assembly of Nepal is deciding on the mechanics of devolving judicial power to the far-flung villages in the new state structure.

The Constituent Assembly (CA), a body of 601 members formed in the election held on 10 April 2008, is tasked with writing a new constitution for Nepal within two years under the authority of the interim constitution.

The history of the modern independent judiciary in Nepal dates back to 1950, when a revolution overthrew the hereditary and despotic prime ministerial system, a system in which the post of prime minister was passed from one member to another member in the same family. It was replaced by an interim constitutional regime meant to be a modern constitutional democracy. Different forms of judiciary have been in place during the last 58 years within the framework of Nepal’s unitary state. Thus, one of the key subjects of national debate in modern Nepal is restructuring the judiciary – in particular, devolving judicial power to the autonomous constituent units, according to the aspiration of the people of Nepal.

How Nepal's judiciary works today

Nepal’s judiciary operates within the framework of its parliamentary democracy. All powers relating to justice in the country are exercised by courts and other judicial institutions in accordance with the constitution, the laws and the recognized principles of justice. Judicial procedures are adversarial, largely based on common-law principles and lawyers play a key role in the process of judicial decision making.

Nepal has a National Code which deals with traditionally important:

• civil laws
• penal laws, and
• court procedures

Many of the modern areas of criminal and civil laws are not covered by the National Code as such. They were dealt with by special statutes enacted by the legislature after 1962 on different dates.

The judicial branch is led by the Supreme Court, the highest court in the judicial hierarchy of the land. In this capacity, the constitution confers upon the Supreme Court not only original and appellate jurisdiction, but also extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction. This includes the authority of the Supreme Court to hear petitions challenging the constitutionality of any law, and declare such law or any part of it void in order to ensure that justice is done. It can also, when convinced, respond to public-interest litigation involving constitutional issues regarding the rights of the marginalized.

As the guardian of the constitution, the Supreme Court has all the requisite powers and status that such responsibilities call for. All other courts in the country -- that is Appellate Courts (of which there are currently 16), and District Courts (of which there is one for each of the 75 administrative districts in Nepal) -- are subordinate courts and are administered by the Supreme Court.

Based on constitutional prescriptions, the Administration of Justice Act of 1991 has empowered the Supreme Court to inspect and supervise its inferior courts, and give them directives, which are obliged to implement them. The Supreme Court is a court of record -- its decisions are accepted to be of evolutionary value and are not to be challenged when produced before any court. They are binding on all and the Court has the power to mete out punishment to anyone it holds in contempt of court.

Moving towards a devolved system

In addition to Nepal’s three-tier unitary judiciary, there are several tribunals and specific types of courts established by parliamentary statutes. They are meant to hear special types of applications, claims and controversies.

There is one Administrative Court, two public-debts courts, four revenue tribunals, one Town Development Committee Court, one Military Court, one Labour Court and one Constituent Assembly Court.

The Constituent Assembly Court has been functioning since early this year. It deals exclusively with complaints regarding CA elections.

Except for the CA Court, all these special courts and tribunals are created and regulated under the terms of their enabling parliamentary statute. These statutes define the number, size and location of courts, as well as their territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction. Where there are complicated questions of law, or issues of fundamental rights and constitutional interpretation, cases decided by these courts or tribunals may be referred to the appellate courts, or the Supreme Court, according to the terms of the enabling law.

The structure of Nepal’s court system is one of the simplest in the region. It is constitutionally defined in substance, and statutorily elaborated in detail.

The unified and unitary judiciary makes it easy to administer and to ensure necessary quality control. All judges are appointed on the recommendation of the Judicial Council led by the Chief Justice who, in turn, is appointed and supervised by a high-profile constitutional body. A flourishing law profession, a legally qualified judicial bureaucracy and an independent judiciary complement each other. This does not mean that the present three-tier structure and the workings of the judiciary are not in need of reform. But, to effect change, it may not be necessary to start from a blank slate and create everything anew.

There are many issues that could be reopened to ensure devolution of judicial power to the newly formed constituent units. It is important that the political issues are settled first -- including the degree of internal autonomy of these constituent units and their law-making powers. Establishing the number of constituent units and their territorial limits is also a substantial part of the job.

Options for change

However, there are feasible options. A four-tier judiciary is one option, with a National Supreme Court at the top, almost as it exists today, including a National Court of Appeal in each devolved territory, acting under national laws. The court of appeal would have appellate jurisdiction over the lower courts and tribunals. No doubt, in such a changed context, the National Supreme Court should be looked at more as a constitutional court.

Apart from carrying out its normal duties as guardian of the fundamental rights of Nepalese citizens, it would deal with inter-constituent unit as well as national-constituent unit issues. Similarly, the National Courts of Appeal, replacing the existing Appellate Courts, may well have to serve as the top courts in each constituent unit, assuming some additional constitutional jurisdiction, and in effect become the local arm of the National Supreme Court.

Again, if the current 75 administrative districts are divided into some workable constituent unit set-up of eight or 10 constituent units, with a national government at the top, it will be necessary to provide for a locally recruited and operated court of the constituent unit in each constituent unit. There would also be a locally recruited and operated district court in each district within the constituent unit.

As such, the existing district courts could continue working as the court of first instance for cases coming under laws and institutions of constituent units. Each constituent unit court in its area would not only enjoy the status of appellate court over all district courts, but also serve as trial court for all cases falling under the laws and institutions under the national jurisdiction. As such a court of the constituent unit, locally recruited and operated, would function not only for the constituent unit; but also as the court of first instance for the centre.

It is at the constituent unit level that access to justice in Nepal must be ensured first. At this level, there is a need for an approachable judiciary. It must be simple enough to be accessed without the mediation of lawyers and must function in a participatory and transparent manner. Such an achievement would definitely require redefining the number, size and location of district courts, as well as their territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction.

For example, each district court (as suggested above) could have three or four separate one-member benches, according to the subject specificity, such as a family bench (dealing with marriage, divorce, domestic violence and women's rights), civil bench, criminal bench and small business bench. Simplifying existing trial-court procedures should encourage greater respect for the law, making the judiciary more accessible to the public and self-represented litigants. Such restructuring at the district-court and constituent unit court level could provide greater uniformity in rules and procedures — simplifying the tasks of lawyers, clerical personnel and judges, and cutting the costs of litigation.

There have been principles established and lessons learned in the restructuring of many other smaller democracies, especially in budgeting, planning and personnel administration, integration and standardization of the judiciary's information-management systems, judicial compensation and access to justice. These may be applicable in a wide variety of court-reform contexts, whether to justify a court’s existence or its closure, or to accommodate political sensitivities. The CA must also be mindful of serious flaws in the current judicial system, that it is not accessible to most people in the countryside. Even worse, it is increasingly acquiring an elitist character. The problems start right there.

Bipin Adhikari is a constitutional expert based in Kathmandu.

CA panel votes to pick judges from parliament - Provision draws mixed reactions

http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=211737

KATHMANDU, Aug 27 - Legal experts have shown mixed reactions to the vote at the Constitutional Committee to Determine the Judicial System.

Nepal Bar Association Chairman Bishwo Kant Mainali said the provision would pose multiple risks to the judiciary. “First, the system will politicise the judiciary, and second, a chief justice from outside the apex court will not be able to lead the judiciary because judges and administrative staff there would not accept such a leader.” He also said the system would invite political intervention in the judiciary and corrode its values.

“This is a regressive development. The concern is the system may be abused,” said Bipin Adhikari, a constitutional expert.

Maoist lawmaker Ek Raj Bhandari ruled out the possibility of the election system politicising the judiciary. “This system will keep the judiciary out of politics and political influence because iy makes the chief justice accountable to the people,” he said.

Same old thing - Bipin Adhikari

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, for example, has recently put forward changes on a range of subjects including expenses of the members of parliament, freedom of information and modernisation of the House of Commons procedures. His plans to introduce legislation that could see a shift from self-regulation of the House of Commons — and subsequently the House of Lords — to independent, statutory regulation has been a subject of rigorous debate in the United Kingdom. A new Parliamentary Standards Authority is supposed to be given the power to regulate legislators’ allowances and the Commons would be asked to agree on a code of conduct for legislators in order to increase accountability.
Source: http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=211661(The Kathmandu Post, August 27, 2009)

The Constituent Assembly (CA) Committee on the Determination of the Form of Legislative Organ (CDFLO) has finally presented its concept paper and preliminary constitutional draft in the CA for further discussion. It, however, deals only a bare minimum with the form of legislature that a majority of its members want. Why the CDFLO had a very small breathing space is very clear. It was supposed to build on the report of the Committee on the Determination of the Form of Government as to whether this country was picking up a new governmental system or continuing with the parliamentary form with necessary reform.

In the same vein, the report of the Committee on State Restructuring and Allocation of State Powers was necessary for it to plan the form of legislature in Kathmandu and the provinces as well as the ambit of their powers and relationship. The CDFLO concept paper and preliminary constitutional draft have been produced without basic policy support from the two important thematic committees, which had more say on the form of the legislature than the CDFLO itself in some important sense.

Nepal has a long experience of practicing elected legislatures in some form. There have been good days and bad days; but it would not have been out of context to discuss a variety of proposals and changes keeping in view the country’s past experience. Alterations to the composition, powers, procedure and structure of the legislature, elected or notional, have continued since 1950-51. The Constitution of 1990 had tried much to push ahead sustainable efforts to ensure a functioning legislature. That process has now been discredited already. But it is very clear that the committee has not been able to show a better regime for the prospective legislature to regain the country’s trust.

As one goes through the CDFLO report, one finds few new features in the scheme except for the change in the number of members of the House of Representatives and the National Assembly, the system of mixed representation, which is without rightful prescriptions, and provisions for provincial legislatures. The system of proportional representation as it applies to the House of Representatives at the centre really surprises many.

The committee proposals do not state how the legislatures that they have proposed for the centre and the provinces are more representative and responsive in their legislative and policy making activities. They do not explain how they are going to be more efficient and effective, or more accountable and accessible than their predecessor under the 1990 constitution. It is not clear in what ways they are more legitimate and linked to the people than before. In a great many cases, institutional changes influence legislative behaviour and leads to tangible outcomes in legislative settings. The presence of new institutions leads to new patterns of legislative behaviour, and institutions matter in predictable ways. But those providing prescriptions must know in advance what the problem areas are.

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, for example, has recently put forward changes on a range of subjects including expenses of the members of parliament, freedom of information and modernisation of the House of Commons procedures. His plans to introduce legislation that could see a shift from self-regulation of the House of Commons — and subsequently the House of Lords — to independent, statutory regulation has been a subject of rigorous debate in the United Kingdom. A new Parliamentary Standards Authority is supposed to be given the power to regulate legislators’ allowances and the Commons would be asked to agree on a code of conduct for legislators in order to increase accountability.

Additionally, they are also thinking of coming forward with new proposals for dealing effectively with inappropriate behaviour, including potentially the options of effective exclusion and recall for gross financial misconduct identified by the new independent regulator and the House itself. These proposals have come forward in addition to those already with cross-party agreement, such as the requirement for all spending to be receipted and incomes from second jobs to be fully accounted for.

Prime Minister Brown also intends to set out proposals for public debate on five major issues in the coming months: Reform of the House of Lords to an elected House, introduction of a written constitution, devolution of power away from Westminster, reform of the electoral system and increased public participation through electoral registration and greater engagement of young people, including a potential lowering of the voting age. There is also a proposal to progressively reduce the time taken to release official documents from 30 to 20 years and to broaden the terms of application of the Freedom of Information Act to include a wider range of organisations.

Some British experts have argued the case for parliament’s deliberations to be spread more evenly over the year. They consider that members of parliament are not on holiday for the period of the recess. Committee-level activities in parliament continue even then. But with a more sensible organisation of parliamentary oversight, many critiques believe that parliament might avoid the sense that the entire government is on holiday. A combination of these changes could be considered in Nepal as well, which would enable the new legislature to do its work more efficiently, and to be seen to do so.

A clear code of conduct for all legislators and stringent action against those violating it has certainly become essential in Nepal. A legislator should lose his membership and be expelled from the house if he conducts himself in a manner that results in gross violation of basic democratic norms and/or misuse of office. The constitution needs clear guidelines to ensure strict time limits for assembly sessions and speeches of its members. The new constitution should also expressly prohibit any development towards a constituency development fund for the members. It should also restrict the tendency of the members to exercise executive powers on whatever pretext. Even the oversight functions of the committees in the legislature should understand this limitation.

Not only is a clear delineation between executive and legislative functions necessary, the constitution should also expressly state that members of the legislature will not have any role regarding local governments and administrative institutions. These provisions are necessary to make sure that legislators focus on what they have been elected for instead of intruding into the sphere of activities meant for the government of the day. It is apparent that the CDFLO concept paper and preliminary draft have ignored many aspects of the reforms that should have been discussed and carefully proposed for further discussion. As they exist today, they do not propose anything other than business as usual. This is, no doubt, another point of worry.

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