'जसले शासन चलाउँछ, कानुन बनाउँछ । उसैलाई संविधान व्याख्या गर्न दिनु स्वेच्छाचारिताको पराकाष्ठा हो,' युवा संविधानविद् बिपिन अधिकारी न्यायिक समितिले पारित गरेका प्रावधानले मुलुकमा ठूलो दुर्घटना निम्त्याउनसक्ने औंल्याउँछन् । बाहिरबाट प्रधानन्यायाधीश नियुक्त गर्ने प्रावधान पनि एकलौटी शासन सञ्चालनको हतियार बन्ने उनको तर्क छ ।
Kantipur Daily, August 29, 2009 (13 Bhadau 2066)
काठमाडौं, लोकतान्त्रिक पद्धतिमा जसले कानुन बनाउँछ उसैलाई व्याख्याको अधिकार कहीँ छ ? संविधानसभा न्यायिक समितिले शुक्रबार पारित गरेको प्रस्ताव जस्ताको तस्तै नयाँ संविधानमा लेखियो भने त्यो नेपालमा हुनेछ । 'दुर्भाग्यबस त्यसो भयो भने' कानुनमै कपाल फुलाएका मोतीकाजी स्थापितका शब्दमा 'नयाँ संविधान मात्र बन्दैन, साथमा नयाँ खालको निरंकुशतासमेत आउनेछ ।'
एकीकृत माओवादीको अगुवाइमा संविधानसभा अन्तर्गतको न्यायिक समितिले न्यायालयको क्षेत्राधिकार एकपछि अर्को कटौती गरेको छ । 'यथास्थितिवाद हटाउन र न्यायालयका समस्यालाई जरैबाट उखेल्न' नयाँ मोडलको न्यायपालिकाको खाका माओवादीले कोरेको छ । त्यसमा मधेसी जनअधिकार फोरमलगायत मधेसवादी दलले साथ दिएका छन् । कांग्रेस, एमाले सहित दल भने समितिमा अल्पमतमा परे ।
न्यायाधीशको नियुक्ति र कारबाहीको अधिकार केन्द्रीय व्यवस्थापिकाअन्तर्गत गठन हुने समितिलाई दिने प्रस्ताव पारित भएको हो । त्यतिमात्र होइन, संविधान व्याख्याको अधिकारसमेत सोही समितिलाई दिएपछि माओवादी प्रस्ताव शंकाको घेरामा
परेको छ । अहिले नियुक्ति र कारबाही अधिकार न्यायपरिषद् र संविधानको सम्पूर्ण व्याख्याको अधिकार सर्वोच्च अदालतलाई छ । एकात्मक र शक्तिशाली व्यवस्थापिकाको अडान राख्दै आएको माओवादीले त्यही निकायलाई न्यायालयको अधिकार दिनुपर्ने तर्क गरेपछि विवाद चुलिएको हो ।
'लिखित संविधान भएका, झन् संघीय प्रणाली अवलम्बन भएका कुनै देशमा पनि संविधान व्याख्याको अधिकार संसदलाई हुँदैन,' वरिष्ठ अधिवक्ता स्थापितले कान्तिपुरसँग भने । धेरै संघ/राज्यहरू भएपछि अधिकार बाँडफाँडलगायत ठूला विवादमा स्वतन्त्र निकायको खाँचो हुन्छ । त्यस्ता विवाद स्वतन्त्र र सक्षम न्यायालयबाटै समाधान गर्नुपर्ने विश्वव्यापी मान्यता र अनुभव छन् ।
तर न्यायिक समितिले राष्ट्राध्यक्ष, कार्यकारी प्रमुख वा व्यवस्थापिकाद्वारा निर्वाचित पद र अधिकारसँग सम्बन्धित प्रश्न, राजनीतिक विषयसँग प्रत्यक्ष सरोकार राख्ने विषय र संविधानसँग कानुन बाझिएका विषयमा व्याख्याको अधिकार व्यवस्थापिकालाई हुने निर्णय गरेको छ । यसअघि बिहीबार न्यायाधीशको नियुक्ति, कारबाहीको अधिकार सोही समितिलाई हुने र प्रधानन्यायाधीश पदमा न्याय सेवा बाहिरबाट समेत नियुक्त गर्नसक्ने व्यवस्था पारित भएका थिए ।
'जसले शासन चलाउँछ, कानुन बनाउँछ । उसैलाई संविधान व्याख्या गर्न दिनु स्वेच्छाचारिताको पराकाष्ठा हो,' युवा संविधानविद् बिपिन अधिकारी न्यायिक समितिले पारित गरेका प्रावधानले मुलुकमा ठूलो दुर्घटना निम्त्याउनसक्ने औंल्याउँछन् । बाहिरबाट प्रधानन्यायाधीश नियुक्त गर्ने प्रावधान पनि एकलौटी शासन सञ्चालनको हतियार बन्ने उनको तर्क छ ।
न्यायपालिकासम्बन्धी माओवादी अवधारणा विवादास्पद र विरोधाभासपूर्ण छन् । एकातिर उसले न्यायसम्बन्धी सम्पूर्ण अधिकार अदालतमा निहित हुने प्रस्तावमा सहमति जनाएको छ । त्यसैलाई खण्डन हुने गरी नियुक्ति, कारबाही र व्याख्यामा नयाँ व्यवस्था छ । न्यायालयलाई सत्ताको प्रत्यक्ष नियन्त्रणमा राखी माओवादीले जनवादी शासन व्यवस्था स्थापित गर्न खोजेको भनी यस्ता प्रस्तावको विरोध भएको हो ।
न्यायालयसम्बन्धी आफ्नो अवधारणाको गलत बुझाइरहेको माओवादी तर्क छ । 'व्यवस्थापिकालाई अधिकार थप्नु जनप्रतिनिधिलाई बलियो बनाउनु हो । सत्ता कब्जा होइन' माओवादी सभासद एकराज भण्डारीले कान्तिपुरसँग भने ।
यथास्थितिवाद, संसदीय गलत परम्परा र शक्ति सन्तुलनको दुरुपयोगमा रमाइरहेकाहरूले मात्र आफ्नो प्रस्ताव विरोध गरेको माओवादी तर्क छ ।
'पुराना खराब संरचनालाई हटाई नयाँ व्यवस्थामा जाँदा स्वाभाविक विरोध हुन्छ । तर परिवर्तनका लागि हिजोका संरचनामा फेरबदल अनिवार्य छ,' उनले भने । माओवादीको अगुवाइमा पारित प्रस्तावमा केन्द्रमा संघीय व्यवस्थापिका न्यायसमिति, राज्यमा राज्य व्यवस्थापिका न्यायसमिति र जिल्लामा प्रतिनिधिसभा न्यायसमितिलाई प्रधानन्यायाधीश सहित सबै तहका न्यायाधीशको नियुक्ति, कारबाही र न्याय प्रशासनसम्बन्धी अन्य कुराहरूको सिफारिस अधिकार दिइएको छ । त्यसका लागि सम्बन्धित व्यवस्थापिका उपाध्यक्षको अध्यक्षतामा एक कानुनमन्त्री र बाँकी सबै संसद सदस्य हुनेगरी ११ सदस्यीय समिति गठन हुने उल्लेख छ ।
न्यायाधीशको कारबाहीका लागि संसदीय समिति आफैंले गठन गरेको विशेष अदालतमा मुद्दा दायर हुने र उक्त अदालतले गरेको फैसला नै अन्तिम हुने 'जबर्जस्त' व्यवस्था पनि प्रस्तावमा छ ।
व्यवस्थापिका, कार्यपालिका र न्यायपालिका एक अर्कामा सन्तुलित हुने शक्ति पृथकीकरण सिद्धान्तको व्यापक दुरुपयोग गरिएको, न्यायालयमा चरम भ्रष्टाचार हुँदा अहिलेको संरचनाले काम नगरेको अधिवक्ता भण्डारीको ठम्याइ छ ।
'शक्ति पृथकीकरणको व्यावहारिक कार्यान्वयन अहिले पनि कहाँ भएको छ ? सबै दलले राजनीतिक हस्तक्षेप गरेकै छन् । अदालत झन् गैरजिम्मेवार र अनुत्तरदायी छ,' उनले भने ।
Saturday, August 29, 2009
Friday, August 28, 2009
Restructuring Nepal's Judiciary - Few changes needed to add constituent unit dimension to court system - Bipin Adhikari
http://www.forumfed.org/en/products/magazine/Nepal2009/Nepal-judiciary.php
One of the major issues before the Constituent Assembly of Nepal is deciding on the mechanics of devolving judicial power to the far-flung villages in the new state structure.
The Constituent Assembly (CA), a body of 601 members formed in the election held on 10 April 2008, is tasked with writing a new constitution for Nepal within two years under the authority of the interim constitution.
The history of the modern independent judiciary in Nepal dates back to 1950, when a revolution overthrew the hereditary and despotic prime ministerial system, a system in which the post of prime minister was passed from one member to another member in the same family. It was replaced by an interim constitutional regime meant to be a modern constitutional democracy. Different forms of judiciary have been in place during the last 58 years within the framework of Nepal’s unitary state. Thus, one of the key subjects of national debate in modern Nepal is restructuring the judiciary – in particular, devolving judicial power to the autonomous constituent units, according to the aspiration of the people of Nepal.
How Nepal's judiciary works today
Nepal’s judiciary operates within the framework of its parliamentary democracy. All powers relating to justice in the country are exercised by courts and other judicial institutions in accordance with the constitution, the laws and the recognized principles of justice. Judicial procedures are adversarial, largely based on common-law principles and lawyers play a key role in the process of judicial decision making.
Nepal has a National Code which deals with traditionally important:
• civil laws
• penal laws, and
• court procedures
Many of the modern areas of criminal and civil laws are not covered by the National Code as such. They were dealt with by special statutes enacted by the legislature after 1962 on different dates.
The judicial branch is led by the Supreme Court, the highest court in the judicial hierarchy of the land. In this capacity, the constitution confers upon the Supreme Court not only original and appellate jurisdiction, but also extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction. This includes the authority of the Supreme Court to hear petitions challenging the constitutionality of any law, and declare such law or any part of it void in order to ensure that justice is done. It can also, when convinced, respond to public-interest litigation involving constitutional issues regarding the rights of the marginalized.
As the guardian of the constitution, the Supreme Court has all the requisite powers and status that such responsibilities call for. All other courts in the country -- that is Appellate Courts (of which there are currently 16), and District Courts (of which there is one for each of the 75 administrative districts in Nepal) -- are subordinate courts and are administered by the Supreme Court.
Based on constitutional prescriptions, the Administration of Justice Act of 1991 has empowered the Supreme Court to inspect and supervise its inferior courts, and give them directives, which are obliged to implement them. The Supreme Court is a court of record -- its decisions are accepted to be of evolutionary value and are not to be challenged when produced before any court. They are binding on all and the Court has the power to mete out punishment to anyone it holds in contempt of court.
Moving towards a devolved system
In addition to Nepal’s three-tier unitary judiciary, there are several tribunals and specific types of courts established by parliamentary statutes. They are meant to hear special types of applications, claims and controversies.
There is one Administrative Court, two public-debts courts, four revenue tribunals, one Town Development Committee Court, one Military Court, one Labour Court and one Constituent Assembly Court.
The Constituent Assembly Court has been functioning since early this year. It deals exclusively with complaints regarding CA elections.
Except for the CA Court, all these special courts and tribunals are created and regulated under the terms of their enabling parliamentary statute. These statutes define the number, size and location of courts, as well as their territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction. Where there are complicated questions of law, or issues of fundamental rights and constitutional interpretation, cases decided by these courts or tribunals may be referred to the appellate courts, or the Supreme Court, according to the terms of the enabling law.
The structure of Nepal’s court system is one of the simplest in the region. It is constitutionally defined in substance, and statutorily elaborated in detail.
The unified and unitary judiciary makes it easy to administer and to ensure necessary quality control. All judges are appointed on the recommendation of the Judicial Council led by the Chief Justice who, in turn, is appointed and supervised by a high-profile constitutional body. A flourishing law profession, a legally qualified judicial bureaucracy and an independent judiciary complement each other. This does not mean that the present three-tier structure and the workings of the judiciary are not in need of reform. But, to effect change, it may not be necessary to start from a blank slate and create everything anew.
There are many issues that could be reopened to ensure devolution of judicial power to the newly formed constituent units. It is important that the political issues are settled first -- including the degree of internal autonomy of these constituent units and their law-making powers. Establishing the number of constituent units and their territorial limits is also a substantial part of the job.
Options for change
However, there are feasible options. A four-tier judiciary is one option, with a National Supreme Court at the top, almost as it exists today, including a National Court of Appeal in each devolved territory, acting under national laws. The court of appeal would have appellate jurisdiction over the lower courts and tribunals. No doubt, in such a changed context, the National Supreme Court should be looked at more as a constitutional court.
Apart from carrying out its normal duties as guardian of the fundamental rights of Nepalese citizens, it would deal with inter-constituent unit as well as national-constituent unit issues. Similarly, the National Courts of Appeal, replacing the existing Appellate Courts, may well have to serve as the top courts in each constituent unit, assuming some additional constitutional jurisdiction, and in effect become the local arm of the National Supreme Court.
Again, if the current 75 administrative districts are divided into some workable constituent unit set-up of eight or 10 constituent units, with a national government at the top, it will be necessary to provide for a locally recruited and operated court of the constituent unit in each constituent unit. There would also be a locally recruited and operated district court in each district within the constituent unit.
As such, the existing district courts could continue working as the court of first instance for cases coming under laws and institutions of constituent units. Each constituent unit court in its area would not only enjoy the status of appellate court over all district courts, but also serve as trial court for all cases falling under the laws and institutions under the national jurisdiction. As such a court of the constituent unit, locally recruited and operated, would function not only for the constituent unit; but also as the court of first instance for the centre.
It is at the constituent unit level that access to justice in Nepal must be ensured first. At this level, there is a need for an approachable judiciary. It must be simple enough to be accessed without the mediation of lawyers and must function in a participatory and transparent manner. Such an achievement would definitely require redefining the number, size and location of district courts, as well as their territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction.
For example, each district court (as suggested above) could have three or four separate one-member benches, according to the subject specificity, such as a family bench (dealing with marriage, divorce, domestic violence and women's rights), civil bench, criminal bench and small business bench. Simplifying existing trial-court procedures should encourage greater respect for the law, making the judiciary more accessible to the public and self-represented litigants. Such restructuring at the district-court and constituent unit court level could provide greater uniformity in rules and procedures — simplifying the tasks of lawyers, clerical personnel and judges, and cutting the costs of litigation.
There have been principles established and lessons learned in the restructuring of many other smaller democracies, especially in budgeting, planning and personnel administration, integration and standardization of the judiciary's information-management systems, judicial compensation and access to justice. These may be applicable in a wide variety of court-reform contexts, whether to justify a court’s existence or its closure, or to accommodate political sensitivities. The CA must also be mindful of serious flaws in the current judicial system, that it is not accessible to most people in the countryside. Even worse, it is increasingly acquiring an elitist character. The problems start right there.
Bipin Adhikari is a constitutional expert based in Kathmandu.
One of the major issues before the Constituent Assembly of Nepal is deciding on the mechanics of devolving judicial power to the far-flung villages in the new state structure.
The Constituent Assembly (CA), a body of 601 members formed in the election held on 10 April 2008, is tasked with writing a new constitution for Nepal within two years under the authority of the interim constitution.
The history of the modern independent judiciary in Nepal dates back to 1950, when a revolution overthrew the hereditary and despotic prime ministerial system, a system in which the post of prime minister was passed from one member to another member in the same family. It was replaced by an interim constitutional regime meant to be a modern constitutional democracy. Different forms of judiciary have been in place during the last 58 years within the framework of Nepal’s unitary state. Thus, one of the key subjects of national debate in modern Nepal is restructuring the judiciary – in particular, devolving judicial power to the autonomous constituent units, according to the aspiration of the people of Nepal.
How Nepal's judiciary works today
Nepal’s judiciary operates within the framework of its parliamentary democracy. All powers relating to justice in the country are exercised by courts and other judicial institutions in accordance with the constitution, the laws and the recognized principles of justice. Judicial procedures are adversarial, largely based on common-law principles and lawyers play a key role in the process of judicial decision making.
Nepal has a National Code which deals with traditionally important:
• civil laws
• penal laws, and
• court procedures
Many of the modern areas of criminal and civil laws are not covered by the National Code as such. They were dealt with by special statutes enacted by the legislature after 1962 on different dates.
The judicial branch is led by the Supreme Court, the highest court in the judicial hierarchy of the land. In this capacity, the constitution confers upon the Supreme Court not only original and appellate jurisdiction, but also extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction. This includes the authority of the Supreme Court to hear petitions challenging the constitutionality of any law, and declare such law or any part of it void in order to ensure that justice is done. It can also, when convinced, respond to public-interest litigation involving constitutional issues regarding the rights of the marginalized.
As the guardian of the constitution, the Supreme Court has all the requisite powers and status that such responsibilities call for. All other courts in the country -- that is Appellate Courts (of which there are currently 16), and District Courts (of which there is one for each of the 75 administrative districts in Nepal) -- are subordinate courts and are administered by the Supreme Court.
Based on constitutional prescriptions, the Administration of Justice Act of 1991 has empowered the Supreme Court to inspect and supervise its inferior courts, and give them directives, which are obliged to implement them. The Supreme Court is a court of record -- its decisions are accepted to be of evolutionary value and are not to be challenged when produced before any court. They are binding on all and the Court has the power to mete out punishment to anyone it holds in contempt of court.
Moving towards a devolved system
In addition to Nepal’s three-tier unitary judiciary, there are several tribunals and specific types of courts established by parliamentary statutes. They are meant to hear special types of applications, claims and controversies.
There is one Administrative Court, two public-debts courts, four revenue tribunals, one Town Development Committee Court, one Military Court, one Labour Court and one Constituent Assembly Court.
The Constituent Assembly Court has been functioning since early this year. It deals exclusively with complaints regarding CA elections.
Except for the CA Court, all these special courts and tribunals are created and regulated under the terms of their enabling parliamentary statute. These statutes define the number, size and location of courts, as well as their territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction. Where there are complicated questions of law, or issues of fundamental rights and constitutional interpretation, cases decided by these courts or tribunals may be referred to the appellate courts, or the Supreme Court, according to the terms of the enabling law.
The structure of Nepal’s court system is one of the simplest in the region. It is constitutionally defined in substance, and statutorily elaborated in detail.
The unified and unitary judiciary makes it easy to administer and to ensure necessary quality control. All judges are appointed on the recommendation of the Judicial Council led by the Chief Justice who, in turn, is appointed and supervised by a high-profile constitutional body. A flourishing law profession, a legally qualified judicial bureaucracy and an independent judiciary complement each other. This does not mean that the present three-tier structure and the workings of the judiciary are not in need of reform. But, to effect change, it may not be necessary to start from a blank slate and create everything anew.
There are many issues that could be reopened to ensure devolution of judicial power to the newly formed constituent units. It is important that the political issues are settled first -- including the degree of internal autonomy of these constituent units and their law-making powers. Establishing the number of constituent units and their territorial limits is also a substantial part of the job.
Options for change
However, there are feasible options. A four-tier judiciary is one option, with a National Supreme Court at the top, almost as it exists today, including a National Court of Appeal in each devolved territory, acting under national laws. The court of appeal would have appellate jurisdiction over the lower courts and tribunals. No doubt, in such a changed context, the National Supreme Court should be looked at more as a constitutional court.
Apart from carrying out its normal duties as guardian of the fundamental rights of Nepalese citizens, it would deal with inter-constituent unit as well as national-constituent unit issues. Similarly, the National Courts of Appeal, replacing the existing Appellate Courts, may well have to serve as the top courts in each constituent unit, assuming some additional constitutional jurisdiction, and in effect become the local arm of the National Supreme Court.
Again, if the current 75 administrative districts are divided into some workable constituent unit set-up of eight or 10 constituent units, with a national government at the top, it will be necessary to provide for a locally recruited and operated court of the constituent unit in each constituent unit. There would also be a locally recruited and operated district court in each district within the constituent unit.
As such, the existing district courts could continue working as the court of first instance for cases coming under laws and institutions of constituent units. Each constituent unit court in its area would not only enjoy the status of appellate court over all district courts, but also serve as trial court for all cases falling under the laws and institutions under the national jurisdiction. As such a court of the constituent unit, locally recruited and operated, would function not only for the constituent unit; but also as the court of first instance for the centre.
It is at the constituent unit level that access to justice in Nepal must be ensured first. At this level, there is a need for an approachable judiciary. It must be simple enough to be accessed without the mediation of lawyers and must function in a participatory and transparent manner. Such an achievement would definitely require redefining the number, size and location of district courts, as well as their territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction.
For example, each district court (as suggested above) could have three or four separate one-member benches, according to the subject specificity, such as a family bench (dealing with marriage, divorce, domestic violence and women's rights), civil bench, criminal bench and small business bench. Simplifying existing trial-court procedures should encourage greater respect for the law, making the judiciary more accessible to the public and self-represented litigants. Such restructuring at the district-court and constituent unit court level could provide greater uniformity in rules and procedures — simplifying the tasks of lawyers, clerical personnel and judges, and cutting the costs of litigation.
There have been principles established and lessons learned in the restructuring of many other smaller democracies, especially in budgeting, planning and personnel administration, integration and standardization of the judiciary's information-management systems, judicial compensation and access to justice. These may be applicable in a wide variety of court-reform contexts, whether to justify a court’s existence or its closure, or to accommodate political sensitivities. The CA must also be mindful of serious flaws in the current judicial system, that it is not accessible to most people in the countryside. Even worse, it is increasingly acquiring an elitist character. The problems start right there.
Bipin Adhikari is a constitutional expert based in Kathmandu.
CA panel votes to pick judges from parliament - Provision draws mixed reactions
http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=211737
KATHMANDU, Aug 27 - Legal experts have shown mixed reactions to the vote at the Constitutional Committee to Determine the Judicial System.
Nepal Bar Association Chairman Bishwo Kant Mainali said the provision would pose multiple risks to the judiciary. “First, the system will politicise the judiciary, and second, a chief justice from outside the apex court will not be able to lead the judiciary because judges and administrative staff there would not accept such a leader.” He also said the system would invite political intervention in the judiciary and corrode its values.
“This is a regressive development. The concern is the system may be abused,” said Bipin Adhikari, a constitutional expert.
Maoist lawmaker Ek Raj Bhandari ruled out the possibility of the election system politicising the judiciary. “This system will keep the judiciary out of politics and political influence because iy makes the chief justice accountable to the people,” he said.
KATHMANDU, Aug 27 - Legal experts have shown mixed reactions to the vote at the Constitutional Committee to Determine the Judicial System.
Nepal Bar Association Chairman Bishwo Kant Mainali said the provision would pose multiple risks to the judiciary. “First, the system will politicise the judiciary, and second, a chief justice from outside the apex court will not be able to lead the judiciary because judges and administrative staff there would not accept such a leader.” He also said the system would invite political intervention in the judiciary and corrode its values.
“This is a regressive development. The concern is the system may be abused,” said Bipin Adhikari, a constitutional expert.
Maoist lawmaker Ek Raj Bhandari ruled out the possibility of the election system politicising the judiciary. “This system will keep the judiciary out of politics and political influence because iy makes the chief justice accountable to the people,” he said.
Thursday, August 27, 2009
Same old thing - Bipin Adhikari
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, for example, has recently put forward changes on a range of subjects including expenses of the members of parliament, freedom of information and modernisation of the House of Commons procedures. His plans to introduce legislation that could see a shift from self-regulation of the House of Commons — and subsequently the House of Lords — to independent, statutory regulation has been a subject of rigorous debate in the United Kingdom. A new Parliamentary Standards Authority is supposed to be given the power to regulate legislators’ allowances and the Commons would be asked to agree on a code of conduct for legislators in order to increase accountability.
Source: http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=211661(The Kathmandu Post, August 27, 2009)
The Constituent Assembly (CA) Committee on the Determination of the Form of Legislative Organ (CDFLO) has finally presented its concept paper and preliminary constitutional draft in the CA for further discussion. It, however, deals only a bare minimum with the form of legislature that a majority of its members want. Why the CDFLO had a very small breathing space is very clear. It was supposed to build on the report of the Committee on the Determination of the Form of Government as to whether this country was picking up a new governmental system or continuing with the parliamentary form with necessary reform.
In the same vein, the report of the Committee on State Restructuring and Allocation of State Powers was necessary for it to plan the form of legislature in Kathmandu and the provinces as well as the ambit of their powers and relationship. The CDFLO concept paper and preliminary constitutional draft have been produced without basic policy support from the two important thematic committees, which had more say on the form of the legislature than the CDFLO itself in some important sense.
Nepal has a long experience of practicing elected legislatures in some form. There have been good days and bad days; but it would not have been out of context to discuss a variety of proposals and changes keeping in view the country’s past experience. Alterations to the composition, powers, procedure and structure of the legislature, elected or notional, have continued since 1950-51. The Constitution of 1990 had tried much to push ahead sustainable efforts to ensure a functioning legislature. That process has now been discredited already. But it is very clear that the committee has not been able to show a better regime for the prospective legislature to regain the country’s trust.
As one goes through the CDFLO report, one finds few new features in the scheme except for the change in the number of members of the House of Representatives and the National Assembly, the system of mixed representation, which is without rightful prescriptions, and provisions for provincial legislatures. The system of proportional representation as it applies to the House of Representatives at the centre really surprises many.
The committee proposals do not state how the legislatures that they have proposed for the centre and the provinces are more representative and responsive in their legislative and policy making activities. They do not explain how they are going to be more efficient and effective, or more accountable and accessible than their predecessor under the 1990 constitution. It is not clear in what ways they are more legitimate and linked to the people than before. In a great many cases, institutional changes influence legislative behaviour and leads to tangible outcomes in legislative settings. The presence of new institutions leads to new patterns of legislative behaviour, and institutions matter in predictable ways. But those providing prescriptions must know in advance what the problem areas are.
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, for example, has recently put forward changes on a range of subjects including expenses of the members of parliament, freedom of information and modernisation of the House of Commons procedures. His plans to introduce legislation that could see a shift from self-regulation of the House of Commons — and subsequently the House of Lords — to independent, statutory regulation has been a subject of rigorous debate in the United Kingdom. A new Parliamentary Standards Authority is supposed to be given the power to regulate legislators’ allowances and the Commons would be asked to agree on a code of conduct for legislators in order to increase accountability.
Additionally, they are also thinking of coming forward with new proposals for dealing effectively with inappropriate behaviour, including potentially the options of effective exclusion and recall for gross financial misconduct identified by the new independent regulator and the House itself. These proposals have come forward in addition to those already with cross-party agreement, such as the requirement for all spending to be receipted and incomes from second jobs to be fully accounted for.
Prime Minister Brown also intends to set out proposals for public debate on five major issues in the coming months: Reform of the House of Lords to an elected House, introduction of a written constitution, devolution of power away from Westminster, reform of the electoral system and increased public participation through electoral registration and greater engagement of young people, including a potential lowering of the voting age. There is also a proposal to progressively reduce the time taken to release official documents from 30 to 20 years and to broaden the terms of application of the Freedom of Information Act to include a wider range of organisations.
Some British experts have argued the case for parliament’s deliberations to be spread more evenly over the year. They consider that members of parliament are not on holiday for the period of the recess. Committee-level activities in parliament continue even then. But with a more sensible organisation of parliamentary oversight, many critiques believe that parliament might avoid the sense that the entire government is on holiday. A combination of these changes could be considered in Nepal as well, which would enable the new legislature to do its work more efficiently, and to be seen to do so.
A clear code of conduct for all legislators and stringent action against those violating it has certainly become essential in Nepal. A legislator should lose his membership and be expelled from the house if he conducts himself in a manner that results in gross violation of basic democratic norms and/or misuse of office. The constitution needs clear guidelines to ensure strict time limits for assembly sessions and speeches of its members. The new constitution should also expressly prohibit any development towards a constituency development fund for the members. It should also restrict the tendency of the members to exercise executive powers on whatever pretext. Even the oversight functions of the committees in the legislature should understand this limitation.
Not only is a clear delineation between executive and legislative functions necessary, the constitution should also expressly state that members of the legislature will not have any role regarding local governments and administrative institutions. These provisions are necessary to make sure that legislators focus on what they have been elected for instead of intruding into the sphere of activities meant for the government of the day. It is apparent that the CDFLO concept paper and preliminary draft have ignored many aspects of the reforms that should have been discussed and carefully proposed for further discussion. As they exist today, they do not propose anything other than business as usual. This is, no doubt, another point of worry.
lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com
Wednesday, August 12, 2009
Gouvernement népalais
"While discussing France as a model, one also needs to consider the fortune of a legislature in the new (non-parliamentary) set up. Some additional questions are: Can a president who wields power in the area of “high” politics give the feeling of an emotionally united head of state? Is it possible for a directly elected head of state to remain non-partisan in a country with so many socio-political and ethnic cleavages? These questions come up unhesitatingly in a country whose parliamentary template has already grown discernible patterns over the last six decades" - BIPIN ADHIKARI
http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=209306
The Kathmandu Post, August 13, 2009
While a debate on the best form of government for Nepal is going on, senior political scientist Prof. Lok Raj Baral has proposed that the French system of government could be discussed as a suitable model. A recent paper prepared by Baral — and discussed at a combined forum of the Society for Constitutional and Parliamentary Exercises (SCOPE) and the Constituent Assembly (CA) Committee on the Determination of the Form of Government — explores what Nepal needs after democratic experiments through all these years in the parliamentary form of government.
Discussing some key characteristics of the French system as developed under the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, Baral suggests that the model has potential to address Nepal’s recurring problem of instability and that it also seems to be compatible with Nepal’s other on-the-ground situations. Also described as being midway between the American presidential government and the British cabinet system, the most distinctive feature of the French model is the division of executive power between the president and the government headed by the prime minister. In this system, the president is directly elected by the people, but the prime minister comes from the majority party in parliament. The issue here is whether the model proposed by Baral could be a viable model
As one can see, the French model insists on the parliamentary character of the system, but does not make secret its determination to check abuse of parliamentary democracy, generally keeping the president out of parliament’s clutches, which had cursed republican France with dictatorship and/or chronic governmental instability for many decades before the promulgation of the present constitution. For example, under the Constitution of the Fourth Republic (1946-1948) governments had lasted an average of six months only.
Many analysts and leaders including General Charles de Gaulle, who ruled France from 1959 to 1969, agreed that their governments before the promulgation of the present constitution were overthrown with distressing regularity mostly because they were accountable to a fickle parliament. Under the present arrangement, political parties holding sway in parliament, who by their very nature represent particular interests rather than the general interest of the country, cannot destabilise the president — the number one executive — who is said to be responsible for making decisions in the area of “high” politics, such as foreign affairs, defence, statecraft and crisis decision-making.
The role of the prime minister, who is accountable to parliament, is not that crucial because he is responsible for making decisions in the area of “low” politics only, such as domestic policy, the budget and routine decision-making. His power is carefully hedged with a number of constitutional provisions intended to protect governmental stability and thereby to ensure the capacity of the government to act when action — especially unpopular action — is called for. Arguably, any instability (in France) at this stage cannot affect the overall issue of governmental firmness and efficiency.
This arrangement brought together a compelling presidential position with manifold executive powers and a parliamentary executive (prime minister) responsible before the elected house. The president’s task was primarily to end any deadlock and act decisively to avoid the stagnation prevalent under the Constitution of the Fourth Republic. The prime minister, similarly, was to direct the work of the government, providing a strong leadership to the legislative branch and help overcome partisan squabbles.
The scheme also had the potential to produce some unintended relationships, usually described as “cohabitation” in government. It occurs when the president is from a different party than the majority party in parliament. It comes about because such a system forces the president to name a prime minister acceptable to the majority within parliament. Such cohabitation is supposed to prevent the stagnation of split majorities that can frequently occur in presidential systems.
There are important implications of this model in the typical Nepalese context. Even in France, from charismatic General Charles de Gaulle to the current President Nicolas Sarkozy, who was elected two years ago on a very divisive political platform, neither the patterns of power relationships that are being described nor the political impact of the sort have been consistent. This was true during the tenure of all the eight presidents who ruled France with their prime ministers approved by the house.
During the last 50 years, France experimented with different types of governments, although theoretically the constitutional form was the same. There is hardly any disagreement on the analysis that there was a shift from, say, segmented government from 1959 to 1962 to monocratic presidential government from 1962 to 1976. The first situation demonstrates sectoral division of labour within the executive in which responsibility for one set of matters is incumbent upon one person and responsibility for another set of matters is incumbent upon another person. The second situation is all about the exercise of personal leadership by a single individual.
This is not all. A further shift to shared government from 1976 to 1981 was also noted. Then a shift back to monocratic presidential government from 1981 to 1984, to a return to segmented government from 1986 and then a further shift to monocratic prime ministerial government from 1986 to 1988 was also noted. It goes on. These shifts are remarkable by any standard but bizarre and heretical in Nepal’s political scenario. There are administrative implications of this strange constitutional “hybrid” or “duarchy”. Besides, this model has different implications for the first executive (the president) in his relations with parliament.
This major issue apart, the cohabitation experience in 1986 during the tenure of President Francois Mitterrand (1981-95), for example, and similar other experiences have led many to argue that a majority opposed to the president is somehow contrary to the spirit of the Fifth Republic. Mitterrand worked with seven prime ministers with a variety of experiences. The two further “cohabitations” of 1993 and 1995 and 1997-2002 also suggested that the primacy of the president, or what some French political analysts describe as “republican monarchy”, could no longer be taken on the normal institutional practice.
In 1964, Francois Mitterrand launched a famous denunciation against General de Gaulle called the permanent coup d’état. After 42 years, during the electoral campaign in 2006, Nicolas Sarkozy, at that time the interior minister, was quoted for his commitment against the unitary executive, and his intention to expand the powers of the French president, were he to occupy that office. There are many positions. But the possibility of cohabitation in the future is said to be remote.
While discussing France as a model, one also needs to consider the fortune of a legislature in the new (non-parliamentary) set up. Some additional questions are: Can a president who wields power in the area of “high” politics give the feeling of an emotionally united head of state? Is it possible for a directly elected head of state to remain non-partisan in a country with so many socio-political and ethnic cleavages? These questions come up unhesitatingly in a country whose parliamentary template has already grown discernible patterns over the last six decades.
Apparently, this critique has not focussed on the strengths of Prof. Baral’s propositions. This must be done both within and without the CA at a more serious level. In that case, one must also consider how a decision about the choice of the form of government can be made in a country where constitutions come and go, not in the exercise of legitimate process but enforced hiatus and geopolitical machinations. This aspect of Nepal’s democratic experiment is definitely not a secret anymore.
lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com
Wednesday, August 5, 2009
Maoist U-turn on prez provision - PHANINDRA DAHAL
“The big U-turn in Maoist policy in a one-and-half-month period shows they still don’t have a stable opinion on the form of government to be adopted in future,” said constitutional expert Bipin Adhikari. He also said “such shifts in party position” would create complexity in negotiations for reaching consensus on the new constitution.
http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=207883
KATHMANDU, Aug 4 - The UCPN (Maoist), which had earlier proposed the provision of presidential election from Parliament, presented a proposal advocating direct election of an executive president by the people at the Constituent Assembly Committee to Determine the Forms of the Governance System on Tuesday.
This is a reversal of the stance stated in their Constituent Assembly election manifesto. The fresh proposal presented at the committee’s meeting on Tuesday maintains that the president can be relieved of the position if the party s/he represents recalls him/her through the House.
Earlier, in their written proposal submitted to the committee on June 23, the Maoists had proposed election of the executive president through a simple majority of the central legislature. The 25-point proposal was submitted to the committee after days of debate at the party’s politburo meeting.
Maoist lawmaker Giriraj Mani Pokharel told the Post that the decision to go for direct presidential elections was taken because the party’s Central Committee (CC) meeting nullified the politburo’s decision. At the central committee, leaders expressed dissatisfaction with the party leadership for going for the Westminster model for presidential elections. Pokharel said the party’s position was final for now, but may change when there is high-level understanding among political parties during the constitution drafting process.
At Tuesday’s meeting, lawmakers from Nepali Congress and UML called the Maoist reversal of stance “an unstable opinion.” UML lawmaker Krishna Prasad Sapkota said reversal in the Maoist position would create complexities in decision making.
“The big U-turn in Maoist policy in a one-and-half-month period shows they still don’t have a stable opinion on the form of government to be adopted in future,” said constitutional expert Bipin Adhikari. He also said “such shifts in party position” would create complexity in negotiations for reaching consensus on the new constitution.
The Maoists have proposed that there will be no provision of prime minister and opposition party in the upcoming statute. The party’s election manifesto had earlier come up with the provision of prime minister to “assist” the president. NC and UML, however, continue to stick to their positions that there should be “a ceremonial president and an executive prime minister” for the stability of the government in future.
Posted on: 2009-08-04 22:27:11 (Server Time)
http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=207883
KATHMANDU, Aug 4 - The UCPN (Maoist), which had earlier proposed the provision of presidential election from Parliament, presented a proposal advocating direct election of an executive president by the people at the Constituent Assembly Committee to Determine the Forms of the Governance System on Tuesday.
This is a reversal of the stance stated in their Constituent Assembly election manifesto. The fresh proposal presented at the committee’s meeting on Tuesday maintains that the president can be relieved of the position if the party s/he represents recalls him/her through the House.
Earlier, in their written proposal submitted to the committee on June 23, the Maoists had proposed election of the executive president through a simple majority of the central legislature. The 25-point proposal was submitted to the committee after days of debate at the party’s politburo meeting.
Maoist lawmaker Giriraj Mani Pokharel told the Post that the decision to go for direct presidential elections was taken because the party’s Central Committee (CC) meeting nullified the politburo’s decision. At the central committee, leaders expressed dissatisfaction with the party leadership for going for the Westminster model for presidential elections. Pokharel said the party’s position was final for now, but may change when there is high-level understanding among political parties during the constitution drafting process.
At Tuesday’s meeting, lawmakers from Nepali Congress and UML called the Maoist reversal of stance “an unstable opinion.” UML lawmaker Krishna Prasad Sapkota said reversal in the Maoist position would create complexities in decision making.
“The big U-turn in Maoist policy in a one-and-half-month period shows they still don’t have a stable opinion on the form of government to be adopted in future,” said constitutional expert Bipin Adhikari. He also said “such shifts in party position” would create complexity in negotiations for reaching consensus on the new constitution.
The Maoists have proposed that there will be no provision of prime minister and opposition party in the upcoming statute. The party’s election manifesto had earlier come up with the provision of prime minister to “assist” the president. NC and UML, however, continue to stick to their positions that there should be “a ceremonial president and an executive prime minister” for the stability of the government in future.
Posted on: 2009-08-04 22:27:11 (Server Time)
Saturday, August 1, 2009
रिपोर्ट - संघीयता रोग कि उपचार?
राजनीतिक दलहरूमा प्रजातान्त्रिक मान्यताहरूको अभाव तथा आमरुपमा कानूनी शासनप्रतिको वितृष्णा भएको मुलुकमा संघीयताका मूल्य र मान्यताहरू संस्थागत हुन गाह्रो पर्ने दृष्टान्त पाकिस्तानले पेश गरेको छ। अतिवादी नेतृत्व तथा परम्पराले अरुलाई त दुःख दिन्छ नै; आफूलाई पनि जनस्तरमा स्थापित गर्न सक्दैन। पाकिस्तानमा संघीयता यसै कारणले गर्दा बलियो हुनसकेको छैन।
डा. विपिन अधिकारी
http://www.himalkhabar.com/hkp/news.php?id=2634
31 July - 16 August, Himal Khabarpatrika, 2009
नेपालमा संघीयताको चर्चा गर्दा छिमेकमा रहेको मुलुक पाकिस्तानको प्रसङ्ग निकै कम कोट्याइने गरेको छ। अझ् कतिपयले त पाकिस्तान पनि संघीय मुलुक हो र भन्ने प्रतिप्रश्न समेत गर्ने गरेको पाइन्छ। तर, इस्लामिक गणतन्त्र पाकिस्तान आफ्नो जन्मदेखि नै एउटा संघीय मुलुक रहँदै आएको छ। यसको संघीय पहिचान 'झ्ेलमा पर्नुका पछाडि उसका आफ्नै अनेक कारणहरू रहेका छन्। आजको पाकिस्तानमा बलुचिस्तान, उत्तर-पश्चिम सीमान्त प्रदेश (एनडब्लुएफपी), पञ्जाब तथा सिन्धलगायत चार ठूल्ठूला प्रदेशहरू छन्। संघीय राजधानी र अरू दुईवटा क्षेत्र संघ अर्थात् केन्द्रको शासनअन्तर्गत रहेका छन्। चारवटा प्रदेशमा सयभन्दा बढी जिल्लाहरू छन्। ती जिल्लालाई स-साना तहसिलमा बाँडिएको छ। त्यसभन्दा पनि मुन्तिर पाँचहजारभन्दा बढी स्थानीय सरकारहरू छन्। यसलाई राज्य अथवा सरकारको उपस्थिति जनताको घरदैलोमा सुनिश्चित गर्ने प्रयास मान्न सकिन्छ।
तर, के संघीयता भनेको मुलुकको प्रादेशिक संरचना मात्र हो त? कहाँ चुकेको छ पाकिस्तान जनताको सशक्तीकरणको लडाइँमा? के प्रजातान्त्रिक संस्कार कमजोर भएको मुलुकमा संघीयताको प्रयोग खतरामुक्त हुनसक्छ? यी र यस्ता प्रश्नको जवाफ खोज्नुअघि पाकिस्तानको पृष्ठभूमि हेरौं।
पाकिस्तानको जन्म
पाकिस्तान दक्षिण एशियाको दोस्रो ठूलो मुलुक हो। यो नेपालभन्दा लगभग पाँचगुणा ठूलो र भारतभन्दा पाँचगुणा सानो छ। यसको जनसङ्ख्या करिब १८ करोड छ। यहाँका ९६ प्रतिशत जनता इस्लाम धर्मावलम्बी छन्। इस्लाम मान्नेहरूमध्ये पनि बहुसङ्ख्यक सुन्नी समुदायका छन्। हिन्दू, इसाई, शिख तथा बौद्ध धर्मावलम्बीहरू पनि स-सानो सङ्ख्यामा यहाँ बसोबास गर्दछन्। पाकिस्तानीहरू मृदुभाषी, सुसंस्कृत तथा उदार मानिन्छन्।
प्राचीन सिन्धु उपत्यकाको सभ्यता भएको क्षेत्रमा हाल पाकिस्तान अवस्थित छ। विभिन्न कालखण्डहरूमा यस क्षेत्रमा वैदिक, पर्सियन, टर्को-मङ्गोलियन, इन्डो-ग्रीक तथा इस्लामिक संस्कृतिहरू स्थापित भए। सन् १६५८ देखि १९४७ सम्म यो क्षेत्र ब्रिटिश साम्राज्यको एउटा भागको रूपमा रह्यो। स्वतन्त्रता आन्दोलनको बेला भारतीय राष्ट्रिय कङ्ग्रेस र अलइण्डिया मुस्लिम लिगका बीचमा फाटो उत्पन्न भएपछि मुस्लिमहरूले स्वतन्त्र पाकिस्तानको माग गर्न थाले। सन् १९४७ मा भारत स्वतन्त्र हुँदा तत्कालीन ब्रिटिश भारतका मुस्लिम बहुल क्षेत्रहरू (जस्तो सिन्ध प्रान्त, उत्तर-पश्चिमी क्षेत्रहरू, पश्चिम पञ्जाब, बलुचिस्तान तथा पूर्वी बङ्गाल) मिलाएर पाकिस्तान नामको नयाँ मुलुक स्थापना भयो। पाकिस्तानको स्वतन्त्र राजनीतिक इतिहास यहीँबाट शुरु हुन्छ।
६२ वर्षअघि अलग देशको रूपमा जन्मँदा असाध्यै गरिब रहेको पाकिस्तानले स्वतन्त्रता प्राप्तिपछिको चार दशकसम्म उच्च दरमा आर्थिक विकास गर्यो। यस अवधिमा यसले कृषि, निर्माण, यातायात, ऊर्जा तथा टेक्सटाइल जस्ता क्षेत्रमा आफ्नो छुट्टै पहिचान कायम गर्यो। सन् १९९० पछि पाकिस्तानले आर्थिक सङ्कट झ्ेल्नु परे पनि उत्पादन क्षेत्र र सेवा उद्योगतर्फ राम्रो फड्को मारिरहेको अवस्था छ। वैदेशिक मुद्रा सञ्चितिमा पनि प्रशस्त सुधार आएको छ। यति हुँदाहुँदै पनि पाकिस्तानको राष्ट्रिय ऋण असाध्यै उच्च (१०० अर्ब डलरको हाराहारीमा) छ। युद्ध, अशान्ति तथा अन्य कारणले बढेको सामरिक तथा सुरक्षा खर्च यसको एउटा प्रमुख कारण हो। २८ प्रतिशत पाकिस्तानी अझ्ै गरिबीको रेखामुनि छन्। अर्थ-व्यवस्थामा कृषिको भूमिका २० प्रतिशतमा झ्रेको छ भने उत्पादनमूलक क्षेत्रको भूमिका ५३ प्रतिशत पुगेको छ। दूरसञ्चार, जग्गा-जमिन तथा इन्धनको क्षेत्रमा पाकिस्तानमा ठूलो वैदेशिक पूँजी भित्रिएको छ। यी सबै सूचकले पाकिस्तानको सुदूर भविष्य उज्यालो देखाउँछन्।
विविधतापूर्ण समाज
पाकिस्तान एउटा बहुजातीय मुलुक हो। यहाँ भाषागत विविधता पनि प्रशस्त छ। पञ्जाबी, सिन्धी, बलुच र पश्तुन प्रमुखमध्ये पर्छन् भने यी भाषा-क्षेत्रभित्र रहेका अन्य भाषिकाहरू समेत जोड्दा त्यहाँ ६० भन्दा बढी भाषाहरू अस्तित्वमा छन्।
कडागत हिसाबले पञ्जाबी भाषी ४४.१५ प्रतिशत, पश्तुन १५.४२ प्रतिशत, सिन्धी १४.१ प्रतिशत, सेराइकी भाषी १०.५३ प्रतिशत र बलुची बोल्नेको सङ्ख्या ३.५ प्रतिशत रहेको छ। तर, मातृभाषाका रूपमा ७.५७ प्रतिशतले मात्र बोल्ने उर्दूलाई राष्ट्रिय भाषा बनाइएको छ। सबै भाषाभाषी तथा समुदायको सम्पर्क भाषा भएकोले उर्दूलाई यो हैसियत प्राप्त भएको हो। यहाँ अङ्ग्रेजीलाई पनि औपचारिक भाषाको मान्यता प्राप्त छ। त्यसैगरी पञ्जाबी, पश्तुन, सिन्धी र बलुचीलाई प्रादेशिक भाषाको रूपमा स्वीकार गरिएको छ। अन्य भाषाका सम्बन्धमा त्यस्तो कुनै व्यवस्था छैन।
पाकिस्तानमा भाषिक तथा जातीय विविधताको व्यवस्थापन शुरुदेखि नै जटिल विषयको रूपमा रहेको छ। सन् १९७१ मा भाषा तथा संस्कृतिको आधारमा पूर्वी पाकिस्तान बङ्गलादेशको रूपमा छुट्टिन पुग्यो। सन् १९४७-४८, सन् १९५८-६३ तथा सन् १९७३ देखि १९७७ का बीचमा बलुचहरूको विखण्डनको प्रयास दबाउन सरकारले धेरै मेहनत गर्नुपर्यो। बलुचिस्तानका मुख्य बासिन्दा बलोच र पश्तुन हुन्। यीमध्ये केही सिराइकी र सिन्धीहरू पनि छन्। सन् २००२ देखि बलुचहरूले फेरि पाकिस्तानबाट अलग हुने आन्दोलन शुरु गरेका छन्। त्यस्तै सन् १९४७-४८ को पश्तुनहरूको आन्दोलन तथा त्यसपछि सन् १९७० को मूल भूमिबाट छुट्टिने तिनको विद्रोह पनि कम पीडादायी थिएन। सन् १९८० को दशकमा सिन्धीहरूले क्षेत्रीयताको आधारमा अर्को आन्दोलन शुरु गरे। उनीहरू आफूलाई त्यस क्षेत्रका मूल बासिन्दा मान्दछन्। त्यसैगरी सन् १९९० को दशकमा महाजीरहरूले जातीय आधारमा आफूलाई स्थापित गराउन चलाएको आन्दोलन पनि कष्टप्रद नै रह्यो। महाजीरहरू भारत-पाकिस्तान विभाजनपछि भारत छोडेर पाकिस्तानको सिन्ध प्रान्तमा गई बसेका इस्लामिक धर्मावलम्बीहरू हुन्। यसरी आज पनि पाकिस्तानले राष्ट्रिय एकताका लागि विभिन्न प्रकारले जुधिरहनु परेको छ।
संवैधानिक प्रयोग
अलग मुलुकका रूपमा उदय भएपछि पाकिस्तान नयाँ संविधान लेखनतर्फ उन्मुख भयो। यसतर्फको पहिलो कदम जुलाई १९४७ मा ६९ सदस्य भएको संविधानसभाको निर्माण गरियो। पछि यसलाई एकजना महिला समेत थप गरी ७९ पुर्याइयो। यसको अध्यक्षमा सर्वसम्मतिबाट निर्वाचित भएका थिए- मुहम्मद अलि जिन्हा। सन् १९४९ को मार्चमा पाकिस्तानका प्रथम प्रधानमन्त्री लियाकत अली खानले प्रस्ताव गरेको अब्जेक्टिभ रिजोलुसन् वा लक्ष्य सम्बन्धी सङ्कल्पले पाकिस्तानलाई प्रजातान्त्रिक तथा संघीय गणतन्त्रका रूपमा प्रस्तुत गरेको थियो। सो प्रस्तावले मुलुकलाई इस्लामिक बनाउनेतर्फ पनि पहल गर्यो। २४ जना सदस्यहरू भएको एउटा आधारभूत सिद्धान्त समिति पनि बनाइएको थियो। संविधानसभाले काम गर्दागर्दै १६ अक्टोबर १९५१ मा प्रधानमन्त्री लियाकतको सन्दिग्ध अवस्थामा हत्या हुनगयो। त्यसपछि रत्वाजा नजिमुद्दिन प्रधानमन्त्री भए। संविधानको अन्तिम मस्यौदा १९५४ मा पारित गर्ने चरणमा पुगेपछि गभर्नर जेनरल गुलाम मुहम्मदले संविधानसभा विघटन गरिदिए। अदालतलाई पनि विवादहरूमा संलग्न गराइयो। संविधानसभाका अध्यक्षले मुद्दा जिते। १९५५ मा पुनः दोस्रो संविधानसभाको निर्माण गरियो। नयाँ संविधानसभामा ८० जना सदस्य थिए, आधा पश्चिम पाकिस्तानका आधा पूर्वी पाकिस्तानका। दुवै पक्षको कुरा नमिली संवैधानिक प्रक्रिया अगाडि बढ्न सक्दैनथ्यो।
अन्ततः पाकिस्तानको संविधानसभाले १९५६ मा नयाँ संविधान विधिवत् पारित गर्यो। त्यसै वर्षको मार्चमा लागू गरिएको नयाँ संविधानमा बेलायती वा भारतीय शैलीको संसदीय ढाँचा अपनाइएको थियो। यस्तै; पाकिस्तानलाई पूर्वी पाकिस्तान र पश्चिमी पाकिस्तान गरी दुई संघीय इकाइका रूपमा स्वीकार गरेको थियो। दुवै इकाइलाई समानताको आधारमा व्यवहार गर्ने प्रण गरिएको थियो। संघीय संसद्लाई बेलायती संसद् जत्तिकै अधिकारसम्पन्न तुल्याइएको थियो। आपतकालमा केन्द्रीय सरकारलाई एकतर्फी निर्णय गर्नसक्ने र प्रादेशिक स्वायत्तता प्रभावित गर्नसक्ने अधिकार प्रदान गरिएको थियो। नयाँ संविधान लागू भएपछि बेलायतीहरूले बनाएको सन् १९३५ को संविधान स्वतः खारेज हुनपुग्यो।
सन् १९५६ मा बाजागाजासहित लागू गरिएको नयाँ संविधान ३२ महिनापछि नै राष्ट्रपति सिकन्दर मिर्जाको कु को सिकार भयो। त्यो संविधानअनुसार एउटा आम चुनाव पनि हुन पाएन। राष्ट्रपति मिर्जाले संविधान नै बदर गरी सैनिक कानून लगाए। उनले जनरल आयुव खानलाई प्रमुख सैनिक प्रशासकमा नियुक्त गरे। आयुवले तीन हप्तामै मुलुकमा आफ्नो पूर्ण पकड कायम गरे र अवैधानिक काम गर्ने वैधानिक राष्ट्रपतिलाई अपदस्त गरी आफूलाई राष्ट्रपति घोषणा गरे। यहीँबाट शुरु हुन्छ पाकिस्तानमा सैनिकीकरणको अध्याय। आयुवले चार वर्षसम्म विना संविधान नै शासन चलाए। आफू सर्वेसर्वा प्रमाणित भइसकेपछि उनले सन् १९६२ मा एकजना पूर्व प्रधान न्यायाधीशको नेतृत्वमा बनाइएको नयाँ संविधान जारी गराए। यो संविधानले बहुल नेतृत्व विकास गर्न सक्ने संसदीय परिपाटी समाप्त पार्दै पाकिस्तानमा राष्ट्रपतीय शासनको श्रीगणेश गर्यो।
संविधानसभाले बनाएको संविधानमा जस्तै यो संविधानको संघीय संरचनामा पनि पूर्वी पाकिस्तान तथा पश्चिमी पाकिस्तानबीच समानताका आधारमा व्यवहार गर्ने राजनीतिक प्रतिबद्धता व्यक्त गरिएको थियो। यी दुवै इकाइ आफ्नो अलग प्रादेशिक सरकार बनाउन सक्षम थिए। केन्द्रमा १५६ जनाको एक सदनात्मक व्यवस्थापिकाको व्यवस्था गरिएको थियो।
आफ्नै निर्देशनमा बनेको भए पनि आयुवलाई धेरै दिनसम्म यो संविधान उपयोगी हुनसकेन। त्यसैले मार्च १९६९ मा उनले यो संविधान पनि खारेज गरे। त्यसपछि सत्ताको बागडोर सम्हाल्न अघिसरे- तत्कालीन सेनापति जनरल आघा मोहम्मद याह्या खान। याह्या खान भने तत्काल नयाँ संविधान बनाउनेतर्फ लागेनन्। यसको साटो उनले एउटा कानूनी संरचनासम्बन्धी आदेश १९७० जारी गरे। यसमा पनि संघीय संरचनाहरू कायमै राखिएका थिए। यही आदेशको आधारमा सन् १९७० मा पाकिस्तानमा संघीय संसद्का लागि पहिलो पटक आमचुनाव भयो।
यो आमचुनावमा दुइटा दल अरूभन्दा अगाडि देखिए- पूर्वी पाकिस्तानमा आधार भएको शेख मुजिव रहमानको अवामी लिग तथा पश्चिम पाकिस्तानमा आधारित जुल्पि्ककर अली भुट्टोको पाकिस्तान पिपल्स पार्टी (पीपीपी)। अवामी लिगले पूर्वी पाकिस्तानलाई प्राप्त १६२ स्थानमध्ये १६० स्थानमा विजय हासिल गर्यो। तर, पश्चिम पाकिस्तानमा यसले एउटा स्थान पनि जित्न सकेन। त्यस्तै पीपीपीले पश्चिम पाकिस्तानका लागि छुट्याइएको १४४ स्थानमध्ये ८८ स्थान मात्र जित्न सक्यो। यसले पूर्वी पाकिस्तानमा एउटा पनि उम्मेदवार दिन सकेन। बलोचिस्तान तथा उत्तर-पश्चिमी क्षेत्रमा अन्य राजनीतिक शक्ति पनि देखा परे। क्षेत्रीयताप्रतिको नारा यति बलवान भयो कि कुनै पनि पार्टीले मुलुकलाई एकताको सूत्रमा बाँध्न सक्ने स्थिति रहेन।
राष्ट्रलाई कसैगरी पनि जोगाउनुपर्छ भन्ने भावनासहितको पाकिस्तानी सेना पनि आफ्नो भूमिकाको सही अनुमान गर्न सक्ने स्थितिमा थिएन। अर्को शब्दमा भन्दा निर्वाचनको परिणामले नराम्रो राजनीतिक वास्तविकता सबैका सामु छर्लङ्ग राखिदियो। स्वतन्त्र भएको २३ वर्षपछि भएको आम निर्वाचन अखण्ड पाकिस्तानका लागि प्रजातन्त्र तथा स्थायित्व दिन सक्ने थिएन। दुवै ठूला पार्टीहरू जातजाति, भाषा, क्षेत्रको आधारमा अगाडि बढिरहँदा त्यहाँ राष्ट्र निर्माणका लागि सकारात्मक दृष्टिकोण तथा रचनात्मक प्रयास हुन सकेन। मुजिव संयुक्त पाकिस्तानमा आफ्नो र पूर्वी पाकिस्तानका जनताको भविष्य देख्दैनथे। अर्कोतर्फ भुट्टो जसरी भए पनि नेतृत्वमा बस्न चाहन्थे- त्यो नेतृत्व सम्पूर्ण पाकिस्तानको नभएर केवल पश्चिमी पाकिस्तानको मात्र किन नहो'स्! पुनः पाकिस्तानी सेना स्वाभिमानी हुँदै जानुको कारण यही थियो।
यस्तो परिस्थितिमा सत्ता सम्हालेका जनरल याह्या खान, मुजिव र भुट्टोबीच त्रिपक्षीय सहमति बन्न सकेन। यही पृष्ठभूमिमा पूर्वी पाकिस्तानमा आन्दोलन शुरु भयो। शुरुमा जे-जस्तो उद्देश्य बोकेको भए पनि विस्तारै यो आन्दोलन विखण्डनतर्फ अगाडि बढ्यो। पाकिस्तानको राष्ट्रिय सेनालाई यो स्वीकार्य थिएन। यो विखण्डनकारी आन्दोलन दबाउन पाकिस्तानी सेना परिचालित हुनासाथ त्यस्तै अवसरको तीब्रताका साथ प्रतीक्षा गरिरहेको भारतीय सेना तत्काल पूर्वी पाकिस्तानमा प्रवेश गर्यो। विद्रोहका आफ्ना कारणहरू नभएका होइनन्। तर अब त्यहाँ आन्तरिक विषय गौण भइसकेको थियो। यो भारतको रणनीतिक युद्धमा परिणत भइसकेको थियो। लामो तयारीपछि गरिएको यो युद्धमा मुजिवलाई अगाडि राखेर भारतले पूर्वी पाकिस्तानलाई बङ्गलादेशको रूपमा स्वतन्त्र गराइदियो। बदनाम याह्या खान देश टुक्र्याएर सत्ताबाट बिदा भए।
त्यसपछि अर्को अध्याय शुरु भयो- राष्ट्रपति तथा सैनिक प्रशासकका रूपमा जुल्पि्ककर अली भुट्टोले सत्ताको जिम्मेवारी आफ्नो हातमा लिए। देश टुक्रिएको व्यथा खप्न गाह्रो हुँदै जाँदा त्यहाँ नागरिक प्रशासन चाहेर पनि सम्भव लाग्दैनथ्यो। तथापि संविधान विहीनताबाट पार पाउन भुट्टोले नियुक्ति गरेको एउटा समितिले बनाएको संविधान १९७३ मा लागू गरियो। तर, संविधानले सेनाको सहयोगविना सास फेर्न पनि सक्ने स्थिति रहेन। यसपछि भुट्टो अब प्रधानमन्त्रीमा परिणत भए र चौधरी फजल-ऐ-अलाही त्यहाँको राष्ट्रपति बने।
उक्त संविधान तीन आधारभूत अवधारणामा आधारित मानिएको थियोः राज्यसत्तामा इस्लामको भूमिका स्वीकार गर्ने; संघीय सरकार र प्रदेशहरूबीच शक्तिको बाँडफाँड, राष्ट्रपति र प्रधानमन्त्रीबीच अधिकार र दायित्वको बाँडफाँड। संघीयतामा आधारित यो संरचनामा प्रधानमन्त्रीलाई अपेक्षाकृत बढी शक्तिशाली बनाइएको थियो। कार्यपालिका, व्यवस्थापिका तथा न्यायपालिकाका अतिरिक्त संविधानले सबै प्रदेशका मुख्यमन्त्री तथा त्यतिकै सङ्ख्यामा प्रधानमन्त्रीद्वारा नियुक्त गरिएका केन्द्रीय मन्त्रीहरूसहितको साझ्ा हित परिषद् (काउन्सिल अफ कमन इन्ट्रेष्ट) को सृजना गरेको थियो। संविधानमा उल्लिखित विधायिकी सूचीको भाग दुईमा तोकिएका विषयहरूमा नीति-निर्माण गर्ने तथा त्यसलाई नियमित गर्ने जिम्मा यो परिषद्लाई तोकिएको थियो। त्यस्तै, जलस्रोतसम्बन्धी विषयमा प्रदेशहरूबीच विवाद भएमा यही परिषदले टुङ्गो लगाउन सक्थ्यो। यो संविधानले पहिले कहिल्यै नभएको राष्ट्रिय वित्तीय आयोग पनि गठन गर्यो। यसमा संघीय तथा प्रादेशिक अर्थमन्त्रीहरूको सहभागिता हुन्थ्यो। यसको प्रमुख उद्देश्य संघ तथा प्रदेशहरूबीच राष्ट्रिय राजस्वको बाँडफाँड गर्ने कार्यमा सहजता सिर्जना गर्नु थियो।
प्रदेशहरूको अधिकारको प्रसङ्गमा भने सन् १९७३ को संविधान पहिलेका संविधानहरूभन्दा पनि अनुदार देखियो। उदाहरणका लागि; बेलायतीहरूले छाडेर गएको सन् १९३५ को संविधान- जो संशोधित रूपमा १९५६ सम्म कायमै थियो- त्यसमा संघीय सरकारलाई ९६ वटा विषयमा अधिकार प्रदान गरिएको थियो। पछि सन् १९५६ को संविधानले यसलाई घटाएर ४९ मा झ्ारेको थियो। सन् १९६२ को संविधानमा यही प्रावधान कायम गरियो। तर, १९७३ को संविधानले यसलाई बढाएर ११४ पुर्यायो। यसले संघीयताको कस्तो प्रयोग भइरहेको छ भन्ने सन्दर्भमा एउटा दृष्टिकोण दिन्छ।
नागरिक शासन सधैं कमजोर
सन् १९७७ मा भुट्टो तथा उनका संयन्त्रलाई निष्काशन गरेर जनरल जिया उल हक सैनिक शासकका रूपमा स्थापित भए। सन् १९७९ मा भुट्टोलाई फाँसी दिइयो। तेस्रो सैनिक राष्ट्रपतिको रूपमा जियाले मुलुकमा इस्लामिक शरिया कानून लागू गरे। आफूलाई इस्लामकै आधारमा स्थापित गर्ने प्रयास जियाको थियो। यसले पाकिस्तानको कानून र व्यवस्थालाई अझ् रुखो बनायो। सन् १९८८ मा राष्ट्रपति जियाको हवाईजहाज दुर्घटनामा मृत्यु भयो। त्यसपछि भएको आमचुनाव जितेर भुट्टोकी छोरी बेनजीर भुट्टो पाकिस्तानकी प्रथम महिला प्रधानमन्त्री भइन्।
सन् १९९९ मा सैनिक कु गरेर जनरल परवेज मुसर्रफ सत्तामा देखा परे। यसबाट नागरिक शासन उनको हातमा केन्द्रित हुन पुग्यो। यसअघि श्रीमती भुट्टो र उनका प्रतिद्वन्द्वी नवाज शरिफबीच शक्ति कसले हात पार्ने भन्ने सम्बन्धमा करिब एक दशकसम्म फोहोरी राजनीति तथा भिडन्त भएको थियो। कारगिल युद्ध तथा बिग्रँदो भारत-पाकसम्बन्धबाट मुसर्रफलाई कार्यकारिणी शक्ति आफ्नो हातमा लिने राम्रो मौका मिल्यो। प्रधानमन्त्री रफिक तरारले विवादास्पद रूपमा राजिनामा गरेपछि जनरल मुसर्रफले सन् २००१ मा आफूलाई राष्ट्रपति घोषणा गर्न ढिलो गरेनन्।
बढ्दो अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय दबाबका कारण मुसर्रफ हाल बिदा भए। चुनावको बखत प्रचारमा हिँडेकी श्रीमती भुट्टोको अतिवादीहरूले हत्या गरेकाले सबैको सहमतिमा प्रस्तावित संसदीय चुनाव २००८ मा मात्र हुनसक्यो। हाल नागरिक सर्वोच्चता पुनः कायम भएको छ पाकिस्तानमा। संविधान बमोजिम निर्वाचित राष्ट्रपति अस्तित्वमा आइसकेका छन्। तर, संघीय पाकिस्तानले संघीयताको सही अभ्यास गर्न भने आज पनि सकेको छैन। केन्द्रको अस्थिरताले सम्पूर्ण मुलुकमा ग्रहण लगाएको छ पाकिस्तानमा।
संघीयताः नाममा मात्र!
पाकिस्तान संघीय प्रणालीको कमजोर प्रयोगको एउटा स्पष्ट उदाहरण हो। आधारभूत रूपमा समान र प्रगाढ सामाजिक तथा सांस्कृतिक नाता भएको सँगैको भारत केन्द्रोन्मुख संघीयताका लागि आज एउटा भरपर्दो उदाहरण मानिन्छ। तर, पाकिस्तान न त केन्द्रीकृत हुनसक्यो न त संघीय। मूल राजनीतिक दलहरूमा प्रजातान्त्रिक मान्यताहरूको अभाव तथा आमरूपमा कानूनी शासनप्रतिको वितृष्णा भएको मुलुकमा संघीयताका मूल्य र मान्यताहरू संस्थागत हुन गाह्रो पर्ने दृष्टान्त पाकिस्तानले पेश गरेको छ। धेरै ठाउँमा गोलीगठ्ठा र सशस्त्र सुरक्षाकर्मी उपस्थित नगराई शान्ति कायम गर्न गाह्रो हुन्छ। सुरक्षाकर्मी उपस्थित भएपछि अन्य नागरिक संस्थाहरू निरीह देखिन जान्छन्। उनीहरूलाई हटाउँदा पनि सुख छैन। अतिवादी नेतृत्व तथा परम्पराले अरूलाई त दुःख दिन्छ नै; आफूलाई पनि जनस्तरमा स्थापित गर्न सक्दैन। पाकिस्तानमा संघीयता यसै कारणले गर्दा बलियो हुनसकेको छैन।
पाकिस्तानीहरूले आज पनि द्विविधाग्रस्त संघीयताकै कारण दुःख खेपिरहेका छन्। न त उनीहरू स्वायत्तता अनुभव गर्दछन् न त स्वायत्तता पाएका क्षेत्रमा आफूलाई स्थापित नै गर्न सकेका छन्। प्रादेशिक तथा स्थानीय निकायहरू कमजोर र जर्जर छन्। केन्द्रीय सरकारले जस्तो प्रादेशिक सरकारहरूले स्रोत, सम्पदा तथा सार्वजनिक सेवा आफ्ना जनतामा पुर्याउन सकेका छैनन्। जहिले पनि प्रदेशहरू पर्याप्त अधिकार नपाएको गुनासो गर्छन्। तर, पाएको अधिकार पनि राम्ररी प्रयोग गर्न उनीहरू असफल छन्। अर्कोतर्फ केन्द्र शक्तिसम्पन्न भए पनि प्रदेशहरूलाई मुनासिब हिसाबले स्रोत र सेवा पुर्याउन उसलाई धौ-धौ परिरहेको छ। प्रादेशिक तथा जिल्ला सरकारहरू असक्षम र गैरजिम्मेवार भएको केन्द्रको आरोप हुनेगर्छ। पैसाको मात्र मुख हेर्ने तर आफ्ना कार्यक्रमहरू लागू गर्न/गराउन नसक्ने स्थिति प्रदेशहरूको छ।
हाल विद्यमान राष्ट्रिय वित्त आयोगको अवार्ड सिस्टम ले पाकिस्तानका प्रदेशहरूलाई विकृत गराउने गरी प्रलोभनका आधारहरू तयार गरिदिएको छ। कुनै प्रदेशले जति धेरै बजेट घाटा देखायो, उसले केन्द्रबाट त्यति नै बढी रकम दाबी गर्नसक्छ। अनि, आन्तरिक स्रोतबाट धेरै राजस्व परिचालन गर्ने प्रदेशले केन्द्रबाट कम सहयोग पाउने सम्भावना हुन्छ। यस्तो परिपाटीले प्रदेशहरूलाई राजस्व परिचालनका लागि मेहनत गर्न र खर्च नियन्त्रण गर्न प्रोत्साहित गर्दैन। केन्द्रीय वित्त आयोगले प्रादेशिक खर्चलाई केन्द्रीय सहयोगको आधार मान्ने गरेपछि सबैले बजेट घाटा देखाउने नै भए। त्यो भनेको जसरी भए पनि खर्च बढाउने प्रयास हो। त्यसले कसैको अर्थ-व्यवस्थालाई मद्दत गर्दैन। बरु, यसले पैसाको दुरुपयोग, अनुत्पादक खर्च वा भ्रष्टाचारलाई प्रोत्साहन गर्दछ। तर, केन्द्रीय सरकारले सहयोग गरेन भने उसमाथि प्रदेशहरूको वैधानिक आवश्यकतालाई अनादर गरेको आरोप लाग्ने गर्छ। फेरि, राम्ररी सहयोग गर्यो भने प्रादेशिक सरकारको प्रतिपक्षले केन्द्रले प्रादेशिक सरकारसँग गठबन्धन गरेको आरोप आउँछ। यस्तै राजनीतिक खिचातानीले पाकिस्तानको संघीय प्रणालीलाई सार्थक हुन दिएको छैन।
पाकिस्तानको पीडा भनेको आतङ्कवाद पनि हो। जतिजति देश आतङ्कबाट पीडित हुँदै जान्छ, त्यसलाई व्यहोर्न बाध्य राज्यव्यवस्था उद्दण्ड हुँदै जान्छ। अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सहयोगको बलमा पाकिस्तान आज आफ्नो सुरक्षा खर्च धानिरहेको छ। तर, यसैबाट प्रेरित सुरक्षा सन्दर्भहरूले गर्दा संघीयता फस्टाउने लक्षण देखिँदैन।
संघीयता रोग या उपचार?
विभिन्न क्षेत्रहरू मिली खुसीराजीले बनेको पाकिस्तानले शासनव्यवस्थाको एउटा विशेषताका रूपमा संघीयताको आदर्श प्रयोग गर्न चाहनु बुझन सकिने कुरा हो। तर, प्रजातान्त्रिक वातावरण तथा कानूनी शासनलाई आत्मसात् गर्न चाहने परिवेशमा मात्र संघीयता सहज हुन्छ। यसका लागि व्यवस्था उदार तथा बहुलवादमा आधारित हुनु पनि उत्तिकै जरुरी हुन्छ। यसभन्दा पनि महत्वपूर्ण कुरा, राज्यव्यवस्थामा शक्ति बाँडफाँड गर्नुपर्दछ र सबैको हितमा त्यसको प्रयोग गर्नुपर्दछ भन्ने भावना सबैमा हुनुपर्छ। ईश्वरलाई सार्वभौम मान्ने तथा निर्वाचित निकायहरू ईश्वरप्रति जवाफदेही हुनेछन् भन्ने मान्यतामा आधारित संघीयताले शक्तिको निक्षेपीकरणलाई स्थायित्व दिँदैन। त्यस्तै न्यायपालिका स्वतन्त्र तथा व्यावसायिक नहुँदा स्वेच्छाचारी शासन व्यवस्थाले प्रादेशिक हकअधिकारलाई कायम राख्न सक्दैन। आतङ्कवादको त्रास, विभिन्न गठबन्धनमा बाँधिएका छिमेकीहरू, शीतयुद्धको वातावरण तथा छिमेकले खाइदेला वा सिध्याइदेला भन्ने त्रासले पनि शक्ति केन्द्रीकरणतर्फ उन्मुख हुन जाने बाध्यता सृजना गराउँछ। स्वशासन आन्तरिक प्रक्रियाका रूपमा रहन सकेन, अन्य राज्य तथा क्षेत्रको प्रभावमा आयो भने प्रजातन्त्रप्रति रुचि घट्दै जान्छ आम जनताको। यसले स्वशासन, स्वायत्तता वा सशक्तीकरणको प्रक्रियालाई अवरुद्ध गर्दछ। संघीयताका सम्बन्धमा पाकिस्तानबाट सिक्नुपर्ने पाठ यही हो।
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